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5MEDIA AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE WESTERN 
BALKANS: A COMPLEX RELATIONSHIPAlthough, in a broader sense, both NGOs and media are considered part of the civil society, in reality each of them has an independent existence and live a complex relationship. There are numerous civil society 
organizations in all Balkan countries, but overwhelmingly they are not 
seen as an active and thoroughly influential actor in domestic affairs. Civil 
society organizations and efficacy of their activity still face a lack of trust 
among Balkan public, while civil society itself seems to be often politically 
divided. NGOs are also invariably dependent on foreign funding, often 
lacking sufficient financial and human resources. As Frank Hantke, director 
of Friedrich Ebert Foundation office in Tirana notes in his observations on 
civil society and public participation: “If democracy is largely nurtured and 
developed from outside only (through experts, consultants or even political 
pressure from other countries) it has nearly no chance of long-term survival. 
There are unfortunately already too many examples. Top-down democracies 
remain mostly thin facades while bottom-up democracies assure a more 
sustainable development.”1
On the other hand, all Balkan countries present media landscapes that 
are overcrowded, chaotic, non-transparent, where clientelism has become a 
chronic disease and self-censorship is now the norm. Although both media 
and NGOs subscribe to the same set of values: freedom, democracy, public 
participation, access to information, transparency, the relations between 
them oscillate between love and hate. 
Media coverage on civil society is often superficial and politicized. It 
is limited to broadcasting some footage from the seminars or conferences, 
or in the political use or misuse of some paragraphs from the research and 
studies of civil society. Civil society organizations are often demonized from 
the media as a bunch of people, supported by the West, who swim in money. 
On the other hand, civil society organizations often view media as PR agency 
for their activities, as opponents, and not as their allies. 
1  F. Hantke, “Civil society <-> Democracy <-> Civil society organizations (NGOs).”
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support of Council of Europe and Friedrich Ebert Foundation, initiated a 
regional research in six countries of Western Balkans, seeking to explore 
the relation between media and civil society. The research was conducted 
based on a common methodology in six countries: Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. The main aspects 
analyzed in each country include the media sector, the status of civil society, 
the way media covers civil society, the perception of civil society sector of 
the media, civil society representation in public media bodies, the hybrid 
between media and NGOs, and the status of public participation of citizens as 
influenced by media and civil society sector. The following sector attempts to 
summarize the main observations noticed in each country along these lines, 
while each country report includes a more detailed information on the state 
of affairs. 
Media sector: between politics and business
Different monitoring reports and press freedom indexes point to a 
continuous erosion of media freedom in the region, or, in the best case, to 
its stagnation. Legal framework is almost universally seen as conducive 
to media freedom in most countries. In the same way, problems with its 
implementation are also visible in each and every country of the Western 
Balkans, reflecting the weakness of institutional mechanisms to guarantee 
adequate implementation of the laws. 
Although each country has specific traits of the media landscape, overall 
the media landscapes are marked by oversaturation of media markets, 
pointing to decade-long suspicions on the ability of media outlets to survive 
in such small markets. These concerns are highlighted by lack of transparency 
in media ownership, in its funding scheme, and on the respective role of 
government and commercial advertisers on editorial standards. 
In fact, politicization and tabloidization are among the key terms 
mentioned in each country report to describe the media scene. Journalists 
find themselves under double pressure of the government and of the media 
owners, steering them constantly and further away from public interest 
reporting. Unpunished physical attacks and threats, along with legal lawsuits 
and closure of programs, do not help and self-censorship is a pervasive 
phenomenon in all countries under review. The weak power of associations 
of journalists and sometimes the lack of professionalism on their part are 
also part of the overall problem.  
As a result, a deep polarization is viewed in most countries in the media 
scene, mainly in political terms, but sometimes also based on ethnicity. Media 
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the businesses they promote and protect, and increasingly less as part of the 
efforts to further public interest. 
Civil society sector: a long way home
The landscape of civil society sector in the country is rich and diverse. 
In each country there are numerous organizations registered, sometimes 
considered excessive compared to the size of population. Similarly, in the 
best case, in each country about half of these organizations are active and 
persevere in their work. The nature of organizations working in the third 
sector seems also to be of two kinds: ranging from small, poorly equipped, 
and weak organizations working at the local level and targeting their specific 
community, to larger organizations, working at the national level, with a 
certain degree of influence on policy formulation and able to establish a 
dialogue with the government.
The legal environment for civil society organizations seems to be 
generally enabling, at least on paper. Legislation in most countries facilitates 
free and independent activity of civil society organizations. However, in 
some countries, such as Macedonia or Kosovo, the legislation is unclear or 
changes frequently, affecting negatively the environment for work of NGOs. 
In addition, even though the legislation is generally good, in some countries 
there is tension in the relations between government and civil society 
representatives, which is indicative of the democracy deficit in the region. 
In Montenegro there are reports of surveillance cases on civil society, as well 
as legal threats and intimidation from the government.  The situation is even 
tenser in Serbia and Macedonia, where the civil society is exposed to harsh 
criticism and attacks both directly from the government and from the pro-
government media. Civil society actors are increasingly being perceived as 
traitors of national interest, working only for their personal interest and that 
of foreign actors. 
Public trust in civil society remains low even in other countries. This is 
due to different factors, such as inability to influence policies, lack of dialogue 
between civil society and governments, and inability to communicate to the 
public and the media their work. In recent years the civil society has been very 
influential in countries like Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to some 
extent Albania, in mobilizing public in peaceful protests against government 
or demanding particular policies or actions from the government. In smaller 
countries, like Kosovo and Montenegro, the perception of civil society tends 
to be better, where leaders of the civil society sector are viewed as having a 
more solid integrity and capable of influencing public discourse and policy 
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have only a limited impact on activism through all these years and generally 
their actions are perceived of limited impact from the citizens in these countries.         
Civil society organizations’ activity is sustained by two sources of funding: 
government funds earmarked for civil society and foreign donors. While in 
countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina the funding is mainly available from 
public institutions, in most of the region the sector is heavily dependent on 
foreign donors. Either way, the funding scheme seems to be problematic: the 
funds stemming from central or local government are being cut as result of 
the economic crisis and are also a source of concern for independence of the 
sector; on the other hand, the decreasing interest of foreign donors in the 
region has also posed sustainability challenges for the civil society in the 
countries of Western Balkans. 
Coverage of civil society in the media
Presence of civil society in the media reports is diverse in each country 
and is inextricably linked to the overall political context and dynamics 
and the power relations between civil society, media, and government. 
What seems to be a common thread, though, is that the coverage is, at 
its best, frequent, neutral, and limited to report of current events and 
activities related to civil society, lacking follow-up of the stories and a 
deeper analysis of the phenomena. Even in countries where there was a 
more frequent and positive coverage of civil society in the media, it rarely 
tended to go beyond reporting on specific events, press conferences, and so on. While civil society representatives are invariably quoted as sources 
of information in most countries, another common tendency is for the 
coverage to include only one source of information, namely just the civil 
society actor, rather than balance it with public official sources to enable 
the reader to have a more balanced judgment on the public policy issue 
at stake. Even in countries like Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
where the press coverage seemed to be more active and positive vis-a-vis 
the civil society sector, in most cases the stories covered lack a background, 
context, and other sources of information that would complete the picture 
for the public. 
While in some countries, like Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
Montenegro, the civil society sector had a good visibility, not only in terms 
of space, but also of prominence in newspapers, the other extreme were 
countries like Macedonia and especially Serbia, where presence of the civil society is negligible or even hard to detect. This is in line with the political 
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to control great part of the media, leaving little space for alternative voices 
that might oppose the government. As a result, the public perception on NGOs 
in these countries might be heavily distorted, receiving only the negative 
and often “commissioned” coverage on NGOs, rather than any information 
on positive work they do. For example, the Serbian report highlights that 
even though civil society is very active in providing recommendations in the 
country’s negotiation process with EU and many of the recommendations 
have been accepted, the public is totally unaware of this contribution and 
only views the civil society organizations as “public enemy.”
Part of the explanation for the insufficient or biased coverage of the 
civil society sector lies in the ties between government and media, as well 
as on the fast news production that dominates the current media scene in 
all countries. However, most reports also identified a lack of cooperation 
between media and NGOs and especially the inability of civil society 
organizations to communicate properly and in an interesting way for the 
media on their work as the main culprit. Other reasons identified for the 
poor coverage on civil society also included the existing feeling of distrust 
between media and NGOs in some cases, as well as perceived politicization 
of NGOs, often leading to smear campaigns, especially during electoral 
campaigns or other significant events. 
On a more positive note, the media in most countries in the region has 
become an ally of civil society organizations in relation to marginalized 
groups, most visibly LGBT community. Although some online media display 
hostile tendencies towards this community, most traditional media has had 
a very good cooperation with organizations working in this field, resulting 
in a generally positive and active coverage in the media of this community, 
sometimes even opposing conservative political statements.  
Media under the perception of civil society
Civil society seems to be divided on whether the media is their ally or 
their adversary, especially in countries where government control over 
media is more visible and where political divisions in the society run deep. 
All respondents in all countries linked continuously increased politicization 
of the media to decreasing attention and interest for civil society actions. 
In addition, a direct link was established in the interviews between the 
editorial policy of the media outlets and the access granted to civil society: 
if the actions of the non-government organizations did not affect particular 
parties or political figures and were in line with the editorial policy of the 
media outlet, the action received satisfactory coverage and public awareness 
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was possible. If that was not the case, the action was ignored, at best, or the 
organization became target of media criticism. 
However, in spite of its flaws, there was no doubt among civil society 
representatives interviewed in all countries on the importance of media as 
an important actor for raising awareness on civil society initiatives and for 
influencing policy for bringing social change. Some organizations also view 
media coverage as crucial for their work. This is especially the case for think 
tanks, organizations that monitor government policy and conduct, as well as 
advocacy groups that aim to influence particular policies. 
Another problem emerging from the interviews related to the 
relationship of civil society organizations with the media was the scarce 
knowledge and interest of journalists on the work of NGOs and the lack 
of continuous commitment in this aspect. In addition, reports and data 
provided by NGOs are only covered superficially, or, worse, they are covered 
in a selective way and interpreted differently in different media, adapted to 
suit their own editorial policy. While these flaws are mainly recognized as 
systemic  problems, related to work overload of journalists, specific positive 
examples were brought where civil society actors had succeeded in attracting 
interest of journalists on their work, resulting in long-term cooperation. In 
line with these experiences, in many countries the civil society organizations 
have also started to employ persons that are responsible for relations with 
the media, aiming to establish a regular presence and media coverage. 
Failure of journalists to respect professional norms in some cases and 
the continuous shift in values of newsworthiness were two other factors 
that led many civil society organizations to consider media as an enemy, 
rather than a friend or partner in their work. The pervasive trend of media 
toward sensationalism and its tabloidization have led to a situation where 
it is increasingly more attractive to favor stories that are sensational and 
often breach human rights, rather than devote attention to stories on civil 
society organizations that work on public interest. In several countries, the 
problem of media expecting financial gains in order to cover civil society 
also highlighted the not always smooth relation between these two actors. 
Finally, the inability of civil society organizations to package their story and 
activity in a form adapted to the media requirements was also a recognized 
flaw among civil society representatives in the region.  More positively, the 
options provided for social activism by internet and social media, along 
with specific cases of closer cooperation between civil society and media 
actors to the benefit of public interest were also visible trends in several countries. 
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Civil society and media: do they ever meet?!
Each country in the region has a potential space and way for civil society 
and  media to meet: the council of the regulator of electronic or audiovisual 
media, the council of public broadcaster, advisory bodies to these institutions, 
or even self-regulation media councils. The legislation of every country 
stipulates this in the cases of regulator and public broadcaster, requiring 
that the representation of such institutions is also enriched by civil society 
representatives. They are usually nominated by civil society organizations, 
academia, or similar groups, and then elected by parliament.
While on paper these solutions might seem satisfactory, in practice 
their implementation has turned out to be problematic in all the countries 
of Western Balkans. The first and main problem lies with the formula and 
procedure itself: while many organizations might be entitled to nominate 
candidates, in the end the election is a political process, involving political 
parties in the parliament, who make the final decision. This procedure does 
not guarantee that the most professional or independent candidate will be 
elected, but rather that the person viewed most favorably by one party or another will have greater chances. 
In addition, following the law to the letter does not seem to be a common 
practice in the appointment of members of regulatory bodies or public 
broadcasting councils. There have been cases in almost all countries where 
the rules of the game were changed right in the middle of it, to favor pro-
government candidates or to stop others from being elected. This has been 
the case in Montenegro and especially in Serbia, where government efforts 
to prevent proposal of official candidates to reach the Assembly led to an 
open letter of protest from fifty five Serbian organizations, accusing the 
government of violations of the media law.
Even when civil society actors are elected in these bodies, there is no 
guarantee on their acting in the name of the public interest rather than the 
political wing that enabled their appointment. For example, in Albania, even 
though the members of such bodies are proposed by political parties, there 
is a clear division in major voting processes within the council, reflecting 
the position of one party or the other. Such a situation was noticed in spring 
of 2016, when after months of voting, the parliament decided to change 
the formula for electing the general director of RTSH, claiming that it was 
necessary given the deadlock that the council itself could not solve due to 
division of its members. 
In other cases, where civil society members have attempted to influence 
the work of institutions, they have encountered the resistance of deeply 
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entrenched politicization of institutions or efforts to their re-politicization. 
For example, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the efforts of the Program Council 
of RTRS to influence the program and contribute to better representations 
of different interests of citizens did not last long and were soon reduced 
to a mere formality. Similarly, cases in other countries indicate that even 
when there are the best intentions of civil society members, they often 
find themselves powerless when faced with the politicized ways the public 
broadcaster and the regulator work in most countries. 
On the brighter side, countries such as Kosovo and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina are two countries where the press council functions relatively 
well and the involvement of civil society in these bodies, as well as the 
cooperation between media and civil society is certainly a positive factor that 
contributes to the self-regulation practice of the media in these countries.  
The bridge: Media NGOs
In each country there are a various organizations of civil society that 
focus on freedom of expression and media development, aiming to act as 
a meeting point between civil society and media. The research identified 
three main types of organizations. First, there are organizations focused on 
providing training and other career opportunities for journalists, as well as 
on monitoring and furthering freedom of media through media policy, media 
debates, and other initiatives. In most countries these are organizations that 
have existed for almost two decades and have been key actors in particular 
fields of media development.
Second, there are the so-called hybrid organizations: registered NGOs 
engaged mainly in journalism content production, but also offering training 
or other opportunities for journalists. Against the background of increasing 
politicization of the media scene, these organizations aim to fill the void 
in investigative journalism and have become an increasingly popular and 
recognized source for other media and for the public. Since they are mostly 
funded by foreign donors, they enjoy a great deal of editorial independence, 
but questions on their sustainability remain. 
The third and last type of organizations identified is the organizations 
and associations of journalists themselves, which tend to be also among 
the weakest. This weakness was recognized in all reports, due to lack of 
capacities or interest of journalists to organize among themselves, but also 
because of the deep political divisions that exist in the media scene. 
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Media, civil society, and public participation
The research reports produced mixed views on the extent of success 
of the media and civil society to encourage public participation and to 
influence government policy. In most countries a well-established practice 
of institutional dialogue between government and civil society is lacking, or 
is carried out in a perfunctory way. However, there are also good practices 
of civil society organizations, which are active both in cooperating with the 
media and in monitoring the government and influencing its policies. For 
example, the think-tanks in Kosovo have had a very good record on this 
and their profile is being strengthened, although when direct interest of 
political parties is involved the intervention of civil society is marginalized. 
In Macedonia there have also been several attempts of organizations or 
coalitions of organizations to propose reforms to the media law and facilitate 
several public debates. The same can be said on media laws in Albania and in 
Kosovo. Overall, when it comes to passing or amending legislation there is a 
rather successful record of civil society. 
However, the lack of transparency of civil society organizations in some 
cases or the dubious nature of their affiliation have also led to concerns of 
a hidden colonization of the civil society field from political parties, where 
seemingly independent civil society organizations supporting different 
parties are pitted against one another. A similar trend is also visible in 
Serbia, where the recent years’ dynamics have established a division of the 
society in two camps: independent media and civil society organizations on 
one hand, and government and its own media and civil society, on the other 
hand, reducing the chances for political participation of the wider public and 
leading to even greater political division among society.   
A trend that all reports confirmed was the rising importance of social 
media as an alternative way and tool of organizing public participation or 
even public protests, especially in the face of increasingly authoritarian 
regimes and corrupt media. Both independent media organizations and the 
civil society actors, or even individuals, are continuously employing social 
media platforms in an effort to have a wider reach and mobilize more people 
for their causes, be it a simple petition or month-long efforts of protests of students.
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ALBANIA
Partners, rather than 
friends or foes
Valbona Sulce
16
17
A brief description of the media landscape According to the 2016 Freedom House Report, Albania is a country with partly free media, scoring 49 points out of 100. “The media are vigorous and fairly diverse. However, outlets often display a strong 
political bias, and their reporting is influenced by the economic or political 
interests of their owners”, the report says in its summary. The same position 
is confirmed by the 2016 World Press Freedom Index of Reporters without 
Borders, ranking Albania 82nd out of 180 countries.
Since the fall of communism in 1990, Albania has struggled to have an 
independent, free and fair media scene. The constitution guarantees freedom 
of the press. Defamation remains a criminal offense, though legal reforms 
enacted in 2012 eliminated prison terms as a punishment, leaving only 
fines. A 2012 amendment to the civil code set limits on financial penalties 
for defamation in order to protect the survival of media outlets.
In terms of plurality, Albanian media represents an interesting case 
study. There is a variety of daily and weekly newspapers (around 20), but circulation is the lowest in Europe and distribution networks do not reach 
some rural areas. Albanians have access to satellite television, foreign radio 
content, and television broadcasts from neighboring Greece and Italy. There 
are no government restrictions on the internet, which is accessed by more 
than 60 percent of the population, but access in rural areas remains limited. 
Television remains the primary source of political information. Two 
private television stations have national reach, and dozens of smaller 
television and radio outlets (over 70) also operate in a poorly regulated 
environment. The Public Broadcaster RTSH is constantly under criticism 
for a pro-government editorial line and the poor quality of its programs. 
The advertising market is very small. There are no real data on audience 
measurement.
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While the implementation of the strategy for switching from analogue 
to digital broadcasting resumed in 2015 - after the conclusion of a court case 
brought against the regulator by some broadcasters - the internationally 
agreed deadline for June was not met. The public service broadcaster (RTSH) 
is currently building its two digital networks needed to host its programs 
and those of local operators, while two private digital platforms operate in 
the country since 2004. Media ownership is reportedly obscured by the use of proxies, which 
circumvents legal barriers to concentration. There is little foreign investment 
in the Albanian media market. A private TV channel was closed down in 
2015 after its Italian owner Francesco Becchetti was sued by the Albanian 
Prosecutor’s Office on charges of fiscal evasion and money laundering. Most 
outlets rely on financial support from owners and a few major advertisers. 
The economic crisis in Albania since 2011 has affected many funding 
sources, and outlets often delay salaries. According to the Albanian Union of 
Journalists, most journalists work without being declared to social security 
and other public schemes, and only four out of 23 daily newspapers and 10 
out of 72 TV stations disburse salaries on time.
An OSCE/ODHIR report on the 2015 local elections notes that “despite 
the large number of media outlets, their affiliation with the main political 
parties, resulting from media owners’ business interests, causes direct 
interference in editorial autonomy, self-censorship, and limits pluralism of 
viewpoints. In addition, the media’s dependence on revenues from public 
tenders and state advertising undermines the media’s responsibility to 
scrutinize those in power.” 
Investigative journalism still remains an exception with very few outlets 
focusing on pervasive corruption such as Reporter.al/BIRN. Online media is 
represented mainly by the webpages of mainstream media and few news portals opened up recently.
In spite of numerous problems with the media scene, its power and 
trust among the population is not negligible. Public perception surveys 
constantly rank media as among the most trustworthy institutions, after the 
international community. A 2014 survey confirmed that the media continue 
to rank low on the distrust scale when compared to other institutions and 
organizations.
A brief description of civil society sector 
The first Civil Society Index study carried out in 2010 revealed that 
the Albanian third sector is moderately developed. “Civil society is widely 
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perceived as, and identified only with nonprofit organizations. It operates in a 
generally enabling environment and at a relatively developed organizational 
level that appears supportive to the general practice of values within the 
sector. Its major deficiencies consist of the low degree of civic engagement 
and also the limited impact,” the CSI says.
According to the Tirana Court of First Instance, which registers CSOs 
and maintains the CSO register, there were 6,855 CSOs in Albania at the 
end of 2014. However, this number could change significantly as the court continues to update its new electronic register. 
Civil society organizations operate in many sectors from human rights, 
minority rights, women’s rights and empowerment, children rights to 
environment, culture preservation, etc. There also numerous think tanks, 
research centers and foundations, which provide well-grounded in in-depth 
research about many aspects of Albanian life. CSOs have a good reputation 
for high expertise and human capacities. The sector of the services provided 
by NGOs remains small and dependent on foreign funds. 
According to USAID, the CSO Sustainability Index in Albania improved in 
2014, with advances in organizational capacity, advocacy, and infrastructure. 
“CSOs have increased their internal organizational capacities, constituency 
building mechanisms, and advocacy efforts, and the government increasingly 
recognizes the contribution of CSOs in major national reforms and policy-
making processes. The legal environment, financial viability, service 
provision, and public image, on the other hand, have stagnated.” Based on the 
2014 Trust in Government study conducted by the Institute for Democracy 
and Mediation, 34 percent of the population trusts CSOs, a 5 percent decline 
since 2013. Low levels of civic participation are seen as a consequence of 
policy / decision makers under-estimating the values of civic actions and 
initiatives. The painful transition period has led to individualistic attitudes and apathy towards volunteering.
A report to the OSCE Permanent Council by the head of the OSCE Presence 
in Albania, says that “however, the civil sector remained largely weak and 
politicized.”1 In fact, civil society organizations and their effectiveness do not 
enjoy a high degree of trust among the Albanian public, while civil society 
itself seems to be often politically divided. Albanian NGOs are also invariably 
dependent on foreign funding, often lacking sufficient financial and human resources. 
On a more recent note, the 2016 Nations in Transit report concludes that 
“Albania has made good progress in establishing an institutional framework 
1  http://shqiptarja.com/pdf/new/OSBE.pdf
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for civil society cooperation and cooperation between state institutions and 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) has improved.” 
Financial viability is considered the most pressing concern for NGOs 
in Albania, which depend mostly on foreign donor grants for funding. Since 
2009, state aid is also available for NGOs through an agency set up for this 
purpose. This agency has been criticized by civil society for the allocation of 
funding; civil society actors are claiming that loyalty to the government is the 
main criterion for awarding funds. 
Civic activism, however, has made some progress with students movement 
against reform in higher education, the “Qytetaret per Parkun,” (Citizens for 
the Park) group etc., while social networks have been instrumental in raising 
their profile. 
Coverage of civil society in the media. An analysis 
The coverage of civil society in the Albanian media has the same problems 
as the coverage of marginalized groups, women, children, etc., which are 
considered superficial and are not followed up. This kind of coverage is related 
to the norms that Albanian media apply in the process of newsgathering, 
analyzing, contextualizing, etc. It depends also on the professionalism of the 
journalists and on the personal values and beliefs of the editors toward civil society. 
Alba Malltezi, General Director of the Free and Fair Media Group, 
which owns Shqiptarja.com newspaper and Report TV, is of the opinion 
that besides a few positive cases such as Mjaft, LGBT, Ecovolis, there are no 
others representing civil society.  “Or they act when they have funds. When 
the funds are over, they disappear. Or worse, they have funds, but they don’t 
act.”  She says that since many years now, they have abandoned conferences 
and seminars of the so-called civil society, “because they have often resulted 
in false meetings, without any contribution or interest, just a way to spend 
money in luxurious hotels in Tirana. This applies also for organizations that 
help the media.”  “In our newsrooms come homosexuals, violated women, 
people in need which know only the state and the media to ask for help, 
so they don’t know to knock on the doors of or go to these NGOs (with few exceptions). I don’t recall a single case when civil society has approached 
us with a clear proposal for help in media for someone or a category,” she 
adds. However, Malltezi believes that although civil society in Albania is still 
a particle, when it is true, it has the value of a diamond.
Mentor Kikia, a senior journalist and editor at Top Channel TV, says that 
they have no specific policy for covering civil society. “All notifications for 
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activities are reviewed; we ask for preliminary information about the data which are going to be published and then we decide to cover it or not. They 
gain news value when they have arguments, or the issues they raise are new.” 
Kikia says that the NGO community is the part which less represents civil 
society. “NGOs have been transformed into businesses, small and medium 
enterprises. Politics has been successful in buying or subordinating, making Albania a unique country where alternative voices are not heard.” 
In our monitoring, we took three newspapers: Panorama, Gazeta 
Shqiptare and Mapo during March 1-21, 2016. 25 articles were found covering 
civil society activity.  The themes varied, with the central theme being the 
protest of the “Qytetarët për Parkun” group regarding the construction of a 
playground in Tirana, the capital. 9 articles were found about the theme of 
describing the dynamics of the protests. 
The other themes include: protests of the Association of Merchants for the new municipal taxes, 
protest of the taxi drivers for the same reasons, the Forum for the Protection of National Heritage 
of Monuments, a meeting about women’s rights at the municipality of Tirana and one conference 
with participation of the Minister of Defense, a project of an NGO regarding the communist 
regime in Shkodra – a guide, reportage about Greek-Albanian cultural days, the reaction of the 
Head of the Blind People’s Association over a decision of Tirana District Court, etc.
In general, the reporting is neutral, describing the activities correctly. In most cases, articles 
quote the representatives of civil society, but in one case the activity organized by the 
Association of Women with Social Problems, mentions only the Minister of Defense and the 
Swedish ambassador’s statements.3 This way, the conferences serve as platforms for VIPs to 
make public their positions rather than the CS participants to express their views on the issue. 
Also there is no follow up on the events, only in case of street protests, or context about the 
profile of the organizations, or in-depth coverage based on data from CSOs, etc.
3 Fuqizimi I rolit te grave ne shoqeri, Kodheli: Duhet vullnet politik (Strengthening women’s role in the society, 
Kodheli: political will is needed), GSH 
                                                            
The other themes include: protests of the Association of Merchants for 
the new municipal taxes, protest f the taxi drivers for the sam  reaso s, 
the Forum for the Protection of National Heritage of Monuments, a meeting 
about women’s rights at the municipality of Tirana and one conference with 
participation of the Minister of Defense, a proj ct of an NGO reg rding the 
communist regime in Shkodra – a guide, reportage about Greek-Albanian 
cultural days, the reactio  of th  Hea  of the Blind People’s Association over 
a decision of Tirana District Court, etc.
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In general, the reporting is neutral, describing the activities correctly. In 
most cases, articles quote the representatives of civil society, but in one case 
the activity organized by the Association of Women with Social Problems, 
mentions only the Minister of Defense and the Swedish ambassador’s 
statements.2 This way, the conferences serve as platforms for VIPs to make public their positions rather than the CS participants to express their views 
on the issue. Also there is no follow up on the events, only in case of street 
protests, or context about the profile of the organizations, or in-depth 
coverage based on data from CSOs, etc.
In the case of the protests for the Park in Tirana, the coverage reflected 
the editorial lines of the media involved. So, Panorama echoed more the side of the Municipality giving space to labeling used by the Mayor toward protesters 
such as “losers and delirants seeking attention in TV3” or “The owner of 
Kassel: how protesters broke my leg4” designing a violent profile of activists 
in the headlines, while at GSH more space is given to activists. Apart from a 
notification about the protest5, there is also a statement of the activist Elian Tanini saying protests will not stop6. Another article7 on the failed meeting 
between the group and the municipality gives also voice to the activists 
publishing their six requests. “Mapo”, which claims an analytical profile rather 
than a ‘news’ one, is more balanced giving the two sides of the protest in the 
same title:”Clashes over the Park, one policeman and one protester hurt”.8
Regarding online media, we made a research with keywords such as 
“lgbt” and “civil society” and the results were as follows:
In general, there is no hate speech towards LGBT in Albanian media. On 
the contrary, Albanian media has been one of the promoters of respecting 
the LGBT community, reporting fairly on their issues9. Not the same may 
2  Fuqizimi i rolit te grave ne shoqeri, Kodheli: Duhet vullnet politik (Strengthening women’s 
role in the society, Kodheli: political will is needed), GSH
3  Veliaj: Dhuna i diskreditoi, qyteti jo peng i deliranteve (Veliaj: The violence discredited 
them; the city – not hostage of delirants, )Panorama, 7.03.20164  Pronari i Kassel: Si ma thyen kemben protestuesit, (Onwer of Kasse: How protesters broke 
my leg), Panorama, 19.03.20165  Ndertimet te Parku i Liqenit, qytetaret neser ne 12 ne proteste, (Construction at the Lake 
Park, citizens to protest tomorrow at 12), GSH, 7.03.20166  Ndertimet te Parku i Liqenit, Tanini: Protestat nuk ndale, (Constructions at Lake Park, 
Tanini: Protests won’t stop), GSH, 8.03.20167  Deshton takimi i bashkise per diskutimin e projektit, ja 6 kerkesat e shoqerise civile, 
(Municipality meeting with to discuss project fails; 6 civil society requests), GSH 11.03.20168  Perplasja per Parkun, lendohen nje protestues dhe nje polic, (Clashes over park, one 
protester and one police officer injured), Mapo, 06.03.20169  Policia e Shkodrës dhunë psikologjike ndaj tranvestitit Anxhela: Çfarë je, burrë apo grua? 
LGBT i ankohet Tahirit (Shkodra Police uses psychological violence toward transvestite 
Anxhela: What are you, a man or a woman? LGBT complains to Tahiri)
 FOTO/ Crazy Party. LGBT jo vetëm paragjykime, por edhe festa në lokalet e Tiranës (LGBT 
– not only prejudice, but also parties in Tirana bars)
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be said about in online media, which are full of hate speech toward the 
LGBT especially, and on the other hand receive no reply from the editors, 
contributing to a hostile environment despite the efforts of the media.
For the keyword “civil society“ we had these results:
In general, all protests are covered by news media, being that about 
women’s rights, the Park, the protests of students, etc. The protest of civil 
society for the playground of Tirana was also extensively covered by online 
media through the websites of mainstream media or portals and news 
agencies. The protests of Tirana citizens supporting children after a video 
scandal was published in the orphanage of Shkodra also had great coverage 
from the media. Balkanweb10 writes about the protest organized in social 
networks by activist Edlira Cepani, but also BIRN. 
On a more critical tone, Lapsi.al says that former members of the Mjaft 
organization share funds dedicated for civil society11. Another article gives 
space to the protests organized by a new group called “protesters” with 
publishe  in the orphanage of Shkodra also had great coverage from the media. Balkanweb11
writes about the protest organized in social networks by activist Edlira Cepani, but also BIRN. 
On a more critical tone, Lapsi.al says that former members of the Mjaft organization share funds 
dedicated for civil society12. Another article gives space to the protests organized by a new group 
called “protesters” with masks on their faces13. “Forumi i trashegimise” (Heritage Forum) is put 
under scrutiny, calling them “mercenary” for their apathy regarding the urban plan of Tirana.14
11 Abuzimi me fëmijët jetimë, qytetarë dhe shoqëria civile protestë me mesazhe solidarizimi
(Abuse with orphan children, citizens and civil society protest with solidarity messages)
 
12 Si i ndajnë ish -mjaftistat fondet e qeverisë për shoqërinë civile (How the ex-Mjaft members share government 
funds for civil society) 
13  Të lidhur me zinxhirë para parlamentit (foto) (tied with chains before the parliament; photo) 
14Pse hesht Forumi i Trashëgimisë? Intelektualë apo mercenarë? (Why does the Heritage Forum 
hush? Intellectuals or Mercenaries?)
                                                            
An example that reflects the concept of the media toward civil society is the issue of the new 
stadium. In the presentation event of the project, some prominent media analysts were not 
allowed to enter the room and the title was: “Hearing for the stadium, civil society not 
allowed”15
What civil society think about media 
Civil society sees media as a partner, rather than a friend or foe. Usually, CSOs have former 
journalists covering media relations for their activities, who know very well how media works. 
Elda Spaho for example has been for many years a journalist in the print media and now she 
works as a communication officer for one of the biggest organizations for children and youth, 
World Vision. Spaho believes that media in principle, is similar to her organization: media raises 
issues about several categories, gives voice, raises awareness, highlights problems. “This is a 
strong basis for having media not simply as a friend, but a partner in our struggle against 
injustice. This is the reason why we push on the professional friendship with journalists, which 
has been proven very successful. In the last four years we have had 1000 media clips on World 
Vision, which for me are not simply publicity for the organization, but reports about children and 
youth issues in Albania”.
The same view is shared by Aranita Brahaj, Executive Director of the Albanian Institute of 
Science, also a former journalist. “Media has been our partner in the concretization of many 
activities and dissemination of results (analysis, data, articles, etc). In general, our coordination 
with media representatives has been friendly and productive.” Besjan Pesha from “Nisma 
Thurje”, an activist group established in 2013, also says that media is a partner. “This 
relationship has its ups and downs due to the political agenda of the media owners or economic 
interests, but in general the relationship is friendly.”
15 Dëgjesë për Stadiumin, s’lejohet Shoqëria Civile. Lubonja: Berisha ka të drejtë për 
armatosjen! Rama: Teatër, normale që s’u lejuat (Hearing on the stadium; civil society not 
allowed. Lubonja – Berisha is right about getting armed! Rama: Theater – normal you 
weren’t allowed in)
 
                                                            
10 Abuzimi me fëmijët jetimë, qytetarë dhe shoqëria civile protestë me mesazhe solidarizimi 
(Abuse with orphan children, citizens and civil society protest wi  solidarity message )11 Si i ndajnë ish -mjaftistat fondet e qeverisë për shoqërinë civile (How the ex-Mjaft 
members share government funds for civil society)
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masks on their faces12. “Forumi i trashegimise” (Heritage Forum) is put under 
scrutiny, calling them “mercenary” for their apathy regarding the urban plan 
of Tirana.13
An example that reflects the concept of the media toward civil society is 
the issue of the new stadium. In the presentation event of the project, some 
prominent media analysts were not allowed to enter the room and the title 
was: “Hearing for the stadium, civil society not allowed”14
What civil society think about media  
Civil society sees media as a partner, rather than a friend or foe. Usually, 
CSOs have former journalists covering media relations for their activities, 
who know very well how media works. Elda Spaho for example has been 
for many years a journalist in the print media and now she works as a 
communication officer for one of the biggest organizations for children and 
youth, World Vision. Spaho believes that media in principle, is similar to her 
organization: media raises issues about several categories, gives voice, raises 
awareness, highlights problems. “This is a strong basis for having media not 
simply as a friend, but a partner in our struggle against injustice. This is the 
reason why we push on the professional friendship with journalists, which 
has been proven very successful. In the last four years we have had 1000 
media clips on World Vision, which for me are not simply publicity for the 
organization, but reports about children and youth issues in Albania”.
The same view is shared by Aranita Brahaj, Executive Director of the 
Albanian Institute of Science, also a former journalist. “Media has been 
our partner in the concretization of many activities and dissemination of 
results (analysis, data, articles, etc). In general, our coordination with media 
representatives has been friendly and productive.” Besjan Pesha from “Nisma 
Thurje”, an activist group established in 2013, also says that media is a 
partner. “This relationship has its ups and downs due to the political agenda 
of the media owners or economic interests, but in general the relationship 
is friendly.”
12  Të lidhur me zinxhirë para parlamentit (foto) (tied with chains before the parliament; photo)
13 Pse hesht Forumi i Trashëgimisë? Intelektualë apo mercenarë? (Why does the Heritage 
Forum hush? Intellectuals or Mercenaries?)14 Dëgjesë për Stadiumin, s’lejohet Shoqëria Civile. Lubonja: Berisha ka të drejtë për 
armatosjen! Rama: Teatër, normale që s’u lejuat (Hearing on the stadium; civil society 
not allowed. Lubonja – Berisha is right about getting armed! Rama: Theater – normal you weren’t allowed in)
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Mirela Arqimandriti, who leads the Gender Alliance for Development 
Center, has a different view. Arqimandriti notes that the politicization of the 
media in Albania contributes to less attention on civil society activities at the 
expense of the citizens’ information. “Although media is present in activities 
of CSOs, it mostly does so when political figures or high level officials attend 
activities, which are usually hijacked by them and the main message of the 
activity usually gets lost or is not properly transmitted. In Albania’s context 
where the media serves political parties more than citizens it leans more 
towards a foe than a friend.” 
Edlira Cepani from the Equality on Decision making network, but also 
an activist for social causes from children to animal rights, acknowledges 
that the relationship with the media depends on the causes you follow. “If 
that cause is against the political/editorial lines of the media, they have no 
echo. Fortunately, positive cases where media is an ally of civil society are in 
greater numbers.” 
The over-politicization of the media agenda is also concerning for Ervin 
Goci, an activist of the “Qytetaret per Parkun” movement. “What has been 
constant for all media is that after protests in the field have been concluded, 
they have not come anymore where part of the activists gathered, but only 
when the Youth Forum of the Democratic Party became active. The attention 
in this case went to the young democrats and less on us, while we have been 
trying to have our statements regarding the presence of the DP and the abusive works being carried out”.  
Goci, who is also a media researcher, sees huge problems in “the 
information system” as he calls the news media, in three axes: no investigative 
reporting, no context of the reported news and no follow up.  This damages 
the quality of reporting for citizens because this information system is based 
“on sensationalism, empty statements filling information spaces” and not on 
the professional filters to give information to the public, not just the news. 
Altin Hazizaj from the Center for Children’s Rights in Albania, also 
coming from a journalism experience, is convinced that media is a friend, 
but it can be turned into a foe for sensitive issues. “At times media can be a 
foe, especially when the issue is a sensitive one, such as abortion, women’s 
rights, LGBT rights, religion etc. Yet, if one works with media and has the 
skills needed, it could achieve a great degree of getting the message from those groups to the society at large.” 
One thing is sure: civil society organizations strive for media attention. 
They have understood also that if you treat media as an ally, the benefits are 
greater. Spaho is convinced that if you tell media that you are there as an NGO 
that has something important to tell, they are more open to cooperate with 
Albania: Partners, rather than friends or foes
26
you. But in the minute you use media only as a PR tool, the decline starts. 
“This is bad because the media will not only ignore you, but it will also ignore the cause it believes in.”
Depending on the nature of their work, the relationship with media is 
crucial for some organizations. For example the Open Data project of AIS 
would be impossible to reach the audience without the cooperation of the 
mainstream media. Brahaj says that in this case, media is a beneficiary of 
their product. “At the same time, without re-use or re-dissemination in the 
media, it would be impossible to communicate with other interest groups, or 
to have visibility and impact. It’s impossible to start a public debate without 
the assistance of the media. Media is a user of our product, an instrument for 
distribution and communication. “
Arqimandriti also sees media as “a visibility tool for our initiatives”. 
Hazizaj says it’s both. “Media is a great PR tool and one cannot ignore that 
fact; lots of NGO’s use the media typically because of this purpose. The image 
of the organizations and the perception of public opinion on an NGO or all of 
them could influence our work positively or negatively. As such, a PR element 
in the NGO work is very important. Nonetheless, as most of us work with 
disadvantaged groups, for us the media needs to be an ally. For that reason, 
the relationship between the NGO and the media outlet needs to be a well-
established one, which has a history of cooperation and that of course it is built on trust and respect.”
Pesha takes into consideration that with internet-based media and 
social media platforms, activism has changed. “Social networks have re-
dimensioned this relationship. Today everyone has their own media through 
which they can distribute the message or influence the public if they have the 
right PR skills. In this context, media often follow you because it is in crisis of 
fresh news or because of the inflation with the news”.
One of the strong points of civil society in Albania is that it has great 
expertise and provides a number of reports, studies and surveys every 
year. CSO’s are satisfied with the cooperation with media, because they use 
them, but they would like more analyses on the part of journalists. Another concern is that usually, media neither mentions nor gives credit to the CSOs conducting the activities nor provides any analysis. 
However Spaho says that Albanian journalists are open and thirsty for 
information. “Give them ideas and stories, and they will come to you.”
When civil society and media meet
Although the regulatory bodies are meant to represent the public 
in their functions, this is rarely happening. The cause seems to be a long 
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tradition of not having public institutions but rather state ones and the 
polarized environment of the Parliament which is responsible for electing 
the members of these bodies.
Starting with Public Radio-Television, Albania has no experience of a real public broadcaster as there is in European countries. Established in 1961 as 
a propaganda tool of the communist regime, RTSH has failed to turn into a 
public institution, despite many efforts by foreign and national actors.
The Steering Councils, which constitute the highest decision-making 
body in the hierarchical organization, have had a weak role with the only 
responsibility being to formally elect the general director, which was and 
is the principal authority of the RTSH. A new law approved in 2013 was 
expected to bring some independence and clearer division of powers 
between the Steering Council and Management. But the process of electing 
members of the Steering Council is still depending on politics.
Although the law foresees the candidates from civil society to apply 
for their membership to the SC, parties are the ones that decide on the 
composition of the Council according to the formula: 5 from the majority, 5 
from the opposition and the Chairman directly from the majority. This leads 
to the already spread misperception that the members are representatives 
of the political parties. On the other hand, political parties do not make any 
effort to contradict this perception because even for them, members are 
“theirs”. 
The most illustrative case is the election of the General Director of 
RTSH , which took more than a year to be finalized. In terms of process, an 
open competition was organized. 60 candidates took part and the finalists 
were invited to a public hearing for their vision and platforms. During the 
first phase, 3 candidates shared respectively 5, 5 and 1 vote. The first two 
continued the race and the result was 6 to 5 for one candidate once and 6 to 5 
for the other in the third phase. In these circumstances, the Council could not 
decide the winner, because the law required a qualified majority of 7 votes. 
For the public, this was proof of the political division of the SC, while the SC 
tried to unblock the situation with another open call, which failed. The law 
was amended and, ironically, the General Director was elected with 7 votes.
As a first-hand testimonial, we can say that the members of the Steering 
Council do feel obliged to political parties for their election, but only when 
it comes to electing the General Director. For all other decisions, they try 
to behave in compliance with their professional and personal values, also 
representing the groups they come from. In order to contribute to the 
independence of the SC, a proposal to amend the law has been prepared as 
well, including the competences of the SC, the approval of the Statute, etc.
Albania: Partners, rather than friends or foes
28
A similar situation is seen with the broadcast media regulator AMA. The 
opposition has objected to the election of the new Chairman, saying he was 
not eligible for the post, being one of the lawyers of the biggest private media 
company in the country, Top Channel. However, AMA was constituted with 
the votes of the majority and the “hot potato” on the plate is the licensing of 
the digital platforms. Presently, the process is blocked because two members, 
chosen by the opposition, have voted against the beauty contest procedure. 
Their mandate is over now and the Parliament is administering the election 
process of new members.
On the positive side, AMA has pushed towards the digitization process 
especially of the public broadcaster, organizing a public information 
campaign on digitalization, explaining the benefits of this process after a 
massive study was conducted in cooperation with the University of Tirana. 
The Complaints Commission was established and promised to put order into 
the chaotic media scene. Some initial actions such as fines or notifications for 
ethics violations are promising in this aspect. 
The bridge: Media  NGO-s  
Over years, journalists and media workers have been trying to organize 
in associations, but they have faded over time. Another characteristic of 
media NGOs have been their grouping according to media companies or 
the reporting beat. For some time, the associations of journalists covering 
health or economy, or recently the justice sector, have been active, but once 
the funds have finished, they have stopped functioning.
The Union of Journalists is the biggest and most active media organization 
in the country with 850 members. It has regional branches and it is constantly 
monitoring and denouncing poor labor conditions for journalists, lack of 
collective agreements, delay of salary payments for journalists, etc. The Union 
has more of a profile of a trade union asking for the rights of journalists in the 
market, although it is trying also to build capacities of its members through 
trainings, facilitating exchanges with other countries, etc. The Union gives an 
annual award for economic journalism “Vangjush Gambeta” funded by JTI.
The Albanian Media Institute (AMI) is a central resource and training 
center for media, with considerable contribution to a number of reforms 
in favor of media freedom. Hundreds of journalists have been trained 
by the Institute , which is also a partner for many regional and European 
initiatives. AMI is a point of reference for almost all journalists and editors 
for exchanging experience, study tours and publications. Research is also 
a strong point of the AMI, including Albania in the map of regional studies 
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in fields such as media integrity, media ownership, freedom of expression, 
digital media, online media, etc. The open nature of AMI has secured it an 
important place in every discussion table about media in Albania.
BIRN Albania is a new media non-governmental organization based in 
Tirana, which specializes in investigative reporting, publishing and media 
monitoring. Launched in March 2014, BIRN Albania provides skills and 
knowledge-based training to individual journalists and media organizations 
via vocational and workshop-based methods; publishes high quality reports, 
investigations and analyses on crucial transitional political, economic and 
social themes. The expertise of the BIRN Albania editorial staff in investigative 
reporting has been recognized locally, regionally and internationally.
Media Active Center is another recently established NGO, which is 
focused on trainings and education programs for citizens, especially young 
ones, on radio, television and digital media. The same group has established 
last year the Media Council which aims to promote the Code of Ethics among 
media operators in the country, serving as representatives of public interest. 
Last, but not least the Center for the Development and Democratization 
of the Institutions, established in 2002 has been very active in creating a 
favorable terrain for journalists to apply the right of information as a basic 
and human right. It has been very active in pushing for amendments to the 
Law on the Right to Information in order to make it applicable for citizens.
Media, civil society, and public participation 
The 2015 EU progress report notes that Albania has made progress in 
institutionalizing dialogue between civil society and the decision-making 
level. The Agency for the Support of Civil Society has now new members, selected with an open procedure with online voting. Civil Society has a seat 
at important institutions such as the National Council for Children Rights or 
the National Council for European Integration.
Over years, civil society has established a good practice of hearings in 
the Parliament when laws with a focus on different segments of society are 
discussed. There are also some good practices of participatory budgeting at 
the local level, but this is not so widespread. For the national budget, especially 
for education and health, there has been a practice to have suggestions 
from civil society, an experience that has diminished in recent years. On the 
positive side, civil society has been successful in pushing amendments of the 
law on domestic violence for example and raising awareness about more 
women in politics, etc.
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Social media platforms have resulted very effective in mobilizing citizens 
around causes. The most prominent case has been the protest against the 
chemical weapons in Albania which gathered around one million people 
online and thousands in the streets, obliging the government of Albania to 
be transparent over its decision and at the end, to refuse them.
The “Qytetaret per Parkun” group, which has established a TV channel 
online, has been very active in social networks, namely Facebook. EcoVolis 
(118 k), another NGO is also very active on social networks, mobilizing 
citizens in their initiatives such as Mass Kids, protests for having proper 
infrastructure for cyclists, recycling, building the first Roma camp in Tirana, etc.
Also individuals/ activists are making great use of social platforms to 
organize protests or petitions. The last example was the protest for children’s 
protection in Tirana, which was considered a success given the number of 
participants. Volunteer protests were organized also in other cities such as in Elbasan or Shkodra.
Media on the other hand has been active in promoting its charity causes 
such as the case of Kristi Maze, a fundraising initiative of News 24 TV which 
was able to mobilize around 165 000 Euros for the child’s surgery in Italy. 
To a smaller scale, individual journalists, especially those dealing with social 
issues, have been able to mobilize help for poor families or children in need through their personal accounts in social networks.
Conclusions 
Media and civil society are both very important to democracy and they 
have done their best on their own to advance the democratic agenda and 
mobilize citizens. While media has a level of trust among citizens, CS has to 
work harder to gain more public support.
Media and civil society do view each other as partners, but they have a 
long way to go to make this partnership concrete and useful. 
Media owners’ agenda hamper their outlet’s pursuit of public interest, while CSOs are also viewed as politically oriented. Their dependence on 
foreign money is considered a barrier for their activism in Albania.
The image of civil society for journalists has to be improved, while 
civil society should invest more time and energy on media relationships, 
explaining patiently the value of their work and the importance of working together.
Media and civil society have a long history of ups and downs, but they 
still lack trust in each other. Data are appealing, but more so for the print 
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media. For the broadcast media, they need human faces and voices. On the 
other hand, NGO’s working on human rights are not satisfied with the ethics 
of media regarding their “clients”. Personal data are a permanent concern for 
CSOs with regard to media. On the other hand, media say CSOs are not open 
to the media, using privacy as a façade to hide real problems. A recent project 
of UN Women financed by the EU sought to strengthen relationships between 
media and NGOs working for victims of trafficking, explaining the nature of 
the trafficking and encouraging in-depth reports. Earlier, another effort from 
UN Women sought to increase cooperation of the media with CSOs working 
on women’s rights with a formal Memorandum of Understanding with the 
Union of Journalists, which ultimately was not efficient. In parallel with this, 
NGOs are investing in journalists ‘professionalism, organizing trainings and 
producing manuals for improving reporting skills on minorities, women, 
children, etc.
Media see civil society efforts as instrumental while civil society thinks 
media has little attention on their activities because it is over-politicized. 
CSOs complain that although media use their data, they often do not quote the source.
Coverage of civil society in the media is, in general, neutral and correct, 
but more should be done in terms of professionalism, leaving aside VIPs or 
politicians which join the cause for their own publicity. In general, Albanian 
media has developed an “allergy” toward seminars and conferences, which 
has been for many years the main characteristic of civil society activity in 
the country, contributing to the image of civil society as a “bunch of people 
spending money in Tirana’s luxurious hotels.” On the other hand, studies 
and surveys presented in these seminars have been used by Albanian media 
to raise awareness on specific issues. Also they can be used as context in ensuing reports. Civil society needs to explore innovative ways to work with 
media and make its activities interesting and newsworthy.
Social platforms are proving to be a very effective tool in raising citizen 
awareness and reaching larger audiences. The encouraging examples of 
Nisma Thurje, Ecovolis, Qytetaret per Parkun, to name only a few,  are a clear signal that civil society in Albania is alive and growing.
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BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Neither allies, nor adversaries
Sanela Hodzic
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This research report is based on a study conducted by Mediacentar Sarajevo, as part of regional study lead by the Albanian Media Institute. It explores the patterns of mutual relations between media and civil 
society in Bosnia and Herzegovina, within a methodological framework 
involving secondary research, small-scale survey  (eleven respondents), 
interviews (three in-depth and two short interviews), as well as analysis 
of media content (analysis of 14 days of media reporting of three major 
print and three major online media outlets)1. The content analysis provided 
insights into the frequency and patterns of media reporting on civil society, 
while the survey and interviews were aimed at exploring the perception of 
individuals from the sectors, media and civil society, about each other and 
their mutual relations. Before the results of primary research are presented, 
the report will first provide a short introduction about the media and civil society in the country. 
Short overview of the media sector 
The global indicators of media freedom in Bosnia and Herzegovina had 
shown a steady growth for years in the post-war country. The solid legislative, 
regulatory and institutional framework that was developed sought to 
assure media freedom and respect for professional norms. Among other 
things, media content was for the most part pacified; decriminalization of 
1 The analyzed dates were selected based on a stratified random sampling over a period of 
two months, given that we attempted to capture the patterns of regular reporting. In this 
period, also few dates which hold particular relevance for the civil society are selected – i.e. 
16 and 17 May, days of the fight against homophobia.  The selected days are: 28 and 29 
April, 7 and 8 May, 16 and 17 May, 25 and 26 May, 3 and 4 June, 12 and 13 June, and 21 
and 22 June. Media included in the sample are dailies Oslobođenje, Nezavisne novine and 
Dnevni avaz, and online media klix.ba, bljesak-info and banjaluka.com. They were selected 
based on relevance and reach, but also with the attempt to include media from both enti-
ties, based in three major cities- Banjaluka, Mostar and Sarajevo.
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libel assured freedom of journalists from imprisonment; the Freedom of 
Information Act was adopted on state and entity levels; the public service 
system was established; there was a proliferation of broadcasters promising 
media pluralism and transition of the previously state owned print media 
into private ownership is becoming the thing of the past. However, the   weak 
implementation mechanisms and lack of advanced policy developments 
have become increasingly evident, in particular with the financial crisis in 
the background. In the past several years, the positive trends were much 
reversed, as indicated in the declining position of BiH on global systems of 
monitoring media freedoms2. 
The market is populated by nine dailies, more than 180 different 
magazines, 144 radio stations, 43 television stations3 and a large number of 
online media, but this abundance is not coupled with high media pluralism 
or media quality. In fact, the majority of media are receiving merely enough 
funding to survive, but hardly enough to be promoting journalistic quality. 
Moreover, the fact that the financially weak media market, ravished by the 
economic crisis and additionally affected with the migration of advertisers 
towards foreign and non-journalistic media, is maintaining almost the 
same number of media outlets over the years raises doubts about possibly 
conflicting sources of revenues. 
Against the background of scarce sources of revenues, the role of 
government funding has become decisive. While it contributed to the 
sustainability of the sector, their public interest is doubted and such funding 
is believed to be curbing editorial policies towards the interests of the ruling 
parties. Firstly, given that the privatization process was never finalized, 
local authorities are still the founders and direct financiers of 28 percent 
of TV stations (out of 43 overall) and 44 percent of radio stations (out of 
139 overall). Without assured long-term funding and with the politicized 
appointments of the management of these broadcasters, they can hardly 
have a strong public interest role, and instead are mostly perceived as 
mouthpieces of municipal and cantonal government(s). Similarly, government 
advertising or public campaigning contracts, and government donations, 
have often been questioned for the lack of public interest-criteria and lack 
2  Global reports point to the decline in freedom of expression and media professionalism. 
Ranking of the press freedom index by Reporters sans Frontiers has been mostly declining 
since 2007, and in 2016 BiH ranged 68th out of 180 countries. A similar decline was 
registered by Freedom House, with the press in BiH being evaluated as partly free.  MSI 
IREX scores for 2016 especially point to the downfall in terms of business performance 
and environment (MSI IREX reports available at: https://www.irex.org). For more on the 
risks to media integrity and freedom in BiH, see Media observatory publications, at: www.
mediaobservatory.net.
3  Sources: websites of Press Council of B&H and Communications Regulatory Agency.
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of transparency. Media that turn to the advertising market for revenues are 
hardly free from interference, given that main advertisers are controlled 
by key political parties, while abuses of advertising contracts for personal 
financial gains are also considered a common practice4. Appointments of 
the managing structures within the public service broadcasters are highly 
politicized, which negatively affects their public service role5. Public media, 
including the local broadcasters and the PSB are obliged to dedicate a part of 
the informative program to minorities and vulnerable groups,6 but without 
systematic monitoring of the broadcaster’s content, it remains unclear 
to what extent and in which manner this obligation is met and whether it regularly includes reporting on civil society. 
On the level of media policies, there are no substantial efforts to promote 
media freedom and pluralism or to promote reporting on the civil sector. For 
the most part, media are perceived to be a function of particular political and 
business interests, while the public interest role, including reporting on civil 
society, is rarely among editorial priorities. 
Short overview of the civil society sector 
There are no recent data about the number of civil society organizations 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the common estimates suggest around 
twelve thousands are registered on different administrative levels in BiH. 
Only about half of that number is considered active7. 
The main sources of revenue for the non-governmental sector by 
far are the government institutions. In 2012, the public sector provided 
4 See for example article published here: http://www.zurnal.info/novost/18397/
marketinske-prevare-otkrivamo-sumnjive-ugovore-koji-nisu-obuhvaceni-akcijom-gibraltar; For related controversies concerning audience measurements, also see article published here: http://www.media-marketing.com/en/opinion/will-ivan-caleta-reign-
supreme-over-the-media-space-in-the-region/e  5  There are three public service broadcasters, mirroring the administrative arrangement in 
the country: state level BHRT, and two entity-level broadcasters: RTV of Federation BiH and 
RTRS. Radio-television of Republika Srpska (RTRS) is particularly mentioned for favorable reporting on the ruling party in Republika Srpska6 Article 29, Rule 77/2015 on Audio-Visual Media Services, also see Rule 76/2015 on Radio 
Media Services, as well as the Law on Public Broadcasting System and laws on each of the three public service broadcasters. 7  A report from 2005 suggests that then there were around 4629 active non-governmental 
organizations (Nezavisni biro za humanitarna pitanja (IBHI), 2005, Zapošljavanje, pružanje 
socijalnih usluga i nevladin (NVO) sektor: status i perspektive za Bosnu i Hercegovinu, 
available at: http://www.ibhi.ba/Documents/Publikacije/2005/QS3%20NGO%20Sector_
bos.pdf; Another source from 2011 suggest 6600 are active (Siebenmann E, and Kolić, A, 
2011, Civil Society in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Seeking the way forward, United Nations 
Voluneers (UNV) programme
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something over 100 million KM (51.1 million Euro) for non-governmental 
organizations, while around a third of that sum was estimated to been 
received from international donors. It is important to note that the revenues 
from both sources of revenues is declining, raising concerns about their 
further sustainability, especially if one takes into account the fact that with 
the economic crisis in the background, funds provided to non-governmental 
organizations have been cut disproportionately more when compared to other public spending8. The yearly revenues of the sector in 2005 were 
estimated to around 5.5 million Euro or 4.5 percent of GDP9. They declined 
significantly in the following years, but are still considered an important part 
of the country’s economy10.  
Among the high number of civil society organizations, the part that is 
focused on the monitoring of the political structures is the most present in 
the public, but also different NGOs are recognized for delivering particular 
services to citizens, such as education in different topic areas, distribution 
of international funds to particular groups of citizens, etc. The participation 
of the civil sector in decision-making is still not sufficiently promoted at the 
institutional level, given that no state strategy on civil society exists and at 
the state level the policy dialogue between the Council of Ministers and civil 
society has not been formalized11. 
Political activism is ongoing at different levels and in different forms, 
but its influence on policies remains marginal. Citizen protests have been 
a frequent occurrence, and especially in the recent years several protests 
involved a large numbers of participants. In the summer 2013, thousands 
of protesters gathered in Sarajevo to demand legislation for the national 
identification numbering system12. In February 2014, mass protests gathered 
even larger numbers of several thousands of citizens in anti-government protests in several cities, mainly in FBiH, with a series of demands published, 
including requests for resignations of officials. Lack of responsiveness and 
8 Source Muhić, A.A., 2013. In Ninković-Papić, R. Civil inclusion Foundtion Sarajevo and Civil 
Society Promotion Centre. p.5. Available at: https://www.cin.ba/images/pdf/Pismo_glava_
Izdvajanja_vladinog_sektora_za_nevladin_sektor_u_Bosni_i_Hercegovini_za_2012._godinu.
pdf 9  Last available data by IBHI, 2005, p.2.  
10  See Numanović, A. 2016. Numanović, Millioni u NVO nezanemariv dio ekonomije BiH. 
Mediacentar Sarajevo. Available at: http://media.ba/bs/magazin-novinarstvo/milioni-u-
nvo-nezanemariv-dio-ekonomije-bih but there is no newer data. 11 European Commission, 2015, Commission Staff Working Document: Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 2015 Report, p. 9. available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_
documents/2015/20151110_report_bosnia_and_herzegovina.pdf 12 The legal vacuum at the time did not allow for registration of new citizens, which caused 
many difficulties; it hampered the access of the newborn to health care. The interim solution 
was adopted swiftly, while the final legislative change was adopted later in 2013. 
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failure of government(s) to introduce substantial changes highlighted the 
democratic shortcomings in the country13.  In the latest general elections 
held in October 2014, the turnout amounted to 54.5 percent14, and while 
abstinence is considered an indicator of lack of citizens’ trust toward political 
parties, the political class and state institutions in general, the elections did 
not bring major changes in power sharing. 
Lack of communication and cooperation within the civil sector, as well as 
between the civil sector, authorities and the media, is mentioned as a major 
challenge for civil society.15 In general, unwarrantably high expectations, 
poor communication on their functioning, as well as some claims of political 
affiliation and overt lavishness of civil society actors are believed to affect 
the level of public trust in non-government organizations.16 
Frequent but mostly superficial and reactive 
media reporting on civil society
“Civil society” is a phrase that rarely appears in media content in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Even when mentioned, it is mostly referred to at an abstract 
level, without attempting to define or analyze what civil society is and what it ideally should be. As secondary sources suggest17, in 2015, civil society had 
been mentioned 60 times by four major dailies, but in only 28 of those articles 
the references were direct, and even then mainly as a part of statements of 
speakers. Indicatively, primarily government officials (in 17 out of 28 cases) 
mention civil society in statements that suggest the civil sector is one of 
the major stakeholders in the reform processes. In sum, civil society is not 
reported about in detail and is not meaningfully discussed. 
13 Feedom House took it as a reason to reduce the score for political rights by one point. 
The country is in sum considered partly free. More at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/
freedom-world/2015/bosnia-and-herzegovina14  Data of Central Election Commission, BiH, available here: https://izbori.ba/
Documents/2015/25052015/Izborni_Pokazatelji_2002-2014.pdf 15  See for example the web page on civil society at the Delegation of EU in BiH, at: http://
europa.ba/?page_id=679, Also see Siebenmann E, and Kolić, A, 2011, p 10, as well as report 
by TACSO, 2014-  
 Civil society organizations in  Bosnia and  Herzegovina, available here: http://www.tacso.
org/doc/ipsos_report_ba.pdf, where it is reported that as much as two thirds of CSOs 
believe that consultations mechanisms with the government exist only pro forma (page 6) . 16  See for example a series of articles published by Mediacentar Sarajevo, available at: http://
media.ba/bs/tags/civilno-drustvo-i-mediji. Accessed 28 June 2016. 17 Čilić, U. 2016. Šta nam je potrebno za reforme?, article published by Mediacentar Sarajevo, available at http://media.ba/bs/magazin-novinarstvo/sta-nam-je-potrebno-za-reforme, 
Accessed 28 June 2016.
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The analysis done for the purposes of this report involved not only 
mentioning of the phrase “civil society”, but also other terms through 
which the members of civil society are identified, such as “organization”, 
“association”, “foundation”, “trade union” and in some contexts “workers” 
“parents” or “citizens”. The analysis shows that civil society, or its different 
segments were mentioned 131 times in the period of 14 days, in six analyzed 
media outlets. This suggests that civil society, in some of its manifestations, 
is in fact reported upon on a daily basis. This is particularly the case with the 
most popular online news websites. 
When it comes to the importance given to articles of the analyzed dailies 
that mention civil society, they were relatively prominent, mostly placed on pages 4th to 13th, while a smaller part of the articles were also located in the 
last several pages, dedicated to culture, and only few were occupying the first 
three pages. Overall, civil society is given relatively high importance by the 
media, but mostly pertaining to current events such as protests of workers, 
negotiations about status of workers etc., while the “regular” actions and 
long-term processes are less present and less prominent. 
In most of the cases, civil society actors are mentioned in a neutral 
context. There were only six instances of positive and three instances 
of negative valence of reporting on civil society, all being a result of 
the quoted evaluations by the media sources and pertaining to specific 
actors/cases. While such overall neutral reporting might be considered 
a desirable practice, in accordance with the concept of journalistic 
objectivity, it was however also accompanied with overall disengagement 
of media outlets in terms of the lack of depth of reporting and lack of 
its political potential. Even when initial elements for building political 
relevance are included in the text, for example the collocutors directly 
criticize specific policy of local governance18, media outlets rarely provide 
extensive information and in-depth insights that would verify the claims 
included in the text, provide more information on the accountability and any suggestions about the needed policy changes. This analysis revealed 
that dailies still provide more background information compared to the 
online news media.
Articles often included statements that point to the problems faced by 
certain citizens, and provided indicators of accountability of officials for 
18 See for example article published here: http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/radnici-gikil-a-
blokirali-magistralni-put-upitan-je-opstanak-hiljadu-porodica/160516035, and here 
http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/radnici-gikil-a-blokirali-magistralni-put-upitan-je-
opstanak-hiljadu-porodica/160516035 
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these problems, and sometimes were even missing crucial information for 
understanding the issue and accountability for the identified problems19. 
For example, claims about poor conditions in student dorms, evaluations 
about the compromised judiciary in the context of processing war crimes, 
information on the failure of the government to submit the draft law on war 
veterans in the parliamentary procedure, information on disempowered 
workers in particular companies, claims on the parts of IPA funds the 
government failed to use, about debt of the government towards farmers, 
and many other issues, were all covered by the analyzed media, but without 
providing additional information that would help users to judge the situation, 
government accountability, needed government actions and potential means 
of citizen participation. 
Judging by the analyzed content, while there is an overall diversity of 
news sources at the level of the entire sample, rarely are the voices of both, 
the civil society and public sector on particular issues presented in the same 
article. This limits insights for those that are not regular readers of such 
media, and in general suggest that the analyzed mainstream media rarely 
serve as a platform in which the two sectors communicate. In fact, officials 
were rarely consulted for statements about criticism by civil society, which 
can be justified with the imperatives of fast news production in these types 
of media, but also can be argued to be contributing to a sort of normalization 
of the practice in which the officials sometimes might be criticized, but are 
rarely if at all specifically called for accountability and engaged in dialogue with the public. 
The very core of the media system, as well as the editorial policies of 
online news outlets and dailies oriented towards short and swift daily reporting is not conducive to in-depth investigation and analyses20 and 
therefore the results of the analysis are largely lacking. However, even under 
such limitations, some background information can be sought and provided, 
as illustrated in a minority of the analyzed articles. 
19 For example, while other media published an article about the part of IPA funds that the 
government failed to use, Oslobođenje clearly states it was due to the inability of leading 
officials to come to an agreement and it furthermore spells out a need for the policy steps 
towards informing the public and setting up a web platform that will facilitate the use and 
access to IPA funds. Article “IPA fondovi nisu humanitarna pomoć”, Oslobođenje, 3 jun 2016. 
20 On scarcity of investigative reporting see for example MSI Irex reports, and Hodzic, S. 2004. 
Chapter on BiH in Petković and Bašić-Hrvatin (ed). Media Integrity Matters. Peace Institute. Available at: http://mediaobservatory.net/radar/media-integrity-matters-%E2%80%93-
book-see-media-observatory
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In few analyzed articles the media missed the opportunity to critically 
review and distance itself from the problematic statements of state officials,21 
which suggest that the minimum critical distance from the statements of the 
sources is sometimes missing. By contrast, for example, an article published 
by Oslobođenje provided a simple yet a decisive intervention. Namely, 
in an article from 3 July 2016, titled “Dijelite sudbinu ukupnih prilika u 
RS-u” [“You share the faith of the overall circumstances in RS”], the claim 
in the title directed by an official to the pensioners implies unwarranted 
relativization of both the position of a marginalized population of citizens, as 
well as accountability for social problems. Without the need to engage in an 
extensive research, the journalist confronts such a claim simply by providing 
information that the official was driven to and back from this meeting by a 
helicopter, thus indicating that political elites, i.e. “not everyone shares the 
same destiny”. 
Several articles within the sample stood out because of well-selected 
sources, which provided thorough information, analysis and information on 
needed legislative and policy changes. In the period of reporting on protests 
by workers because of difficult working conditions and violation of labor 
rights, an article22 in which a trade union organization pointed out a few 
major problems that contribute to such a situation and urge for the revision 
of privatization in accordance to the law and for stipulations of the law on 
bankruptcy procedure to be changed, provides an important contribution to 
insights into these interrelated problems. 
Another example of a good practice was an article published by website klix.ba23. Besides an analysis by a well-selected expert on the issue of overt 
spending by the public sector, it also provided a list of previously published 
articles about new employments in the public sector (despite a moratorium 
on new hiring). This is a simple contribution that backed up the claims of the 
media sources and by which they were given greater leverage. 
The results of the analysis additionally point to a still pervading 
fragmentation of the media sector, in particular when it comes to the topics 
and cases that carry particular ethnic relevance. This was mostly identifiable 
in online articles about anniversaries of particular war crimes, as well as 
21 For example in an article published 28 April 2016 by Nezavisne novine titled “Najznačajnije 
resore u Vladi RS treba da vode novi ljudi”, the report by Center for Civic Initiatives was 
quoted by the official as a proof that u 2015 “the National Assembly of Republika Srpska 
was more efficient than the Parliament FBiH and Parliamentary Assembly BiH, a statement 
that remained unchallenged and uncoupled with any evidence or counter-evidence. 22 For example, see article here: http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/savez-samostalnih-sindikata-
nikad-gore-stanje-u-privredi-i-realnom-sektoru/160526068
23 The article is available here: http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/maligno-tkivo-ekonomije-
drzavne-institucije-i-firme-u-bih-imaju-240-000-zaposlenih/160610033
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about the position of war veterans, victims and families, where media outlets 
are still functioning as separate spaces divided by ethic and entity lines, 
reporting mainly on “our” victims and “their” crimes. Fragmentation is also 
partly visible in the selection of topics and sources, with media covering 
more the events and developments from the same entity that the outlet is based on. 
And finally, reporting on the civil sector does not seem to be based on 
any strategic orientation and thought-through approach by the media, but rather on an ad hoc approach, reporting on everyday events, such as protests 
of workers, different events, statements and press releases by civil society. 
As suggested by several respondents of this research, while civil society 
actions and ideas are more likely to get coverage, but also to receive criticism 
from certain political actors and the affiliated media, they are mostly related to party-political topics24. The issues that are related to “softer” politics or 
that relate more to technical matters will not be faced with similar hostility 
but media will, in general, show less interest25. Reporting on marginalized 
groups and civil society that is engaging on promoting their rights is mostly 
politically correct in the mainstream media, but they also involve some 
prejudice, while there are also websites that publish radically hostile content 
concerning LGBT rights26.
How civil society views the media: 
neither allies nor adversaries 
Respondents of this research for the most part consider media partly as 
passive allies of civil society, partly as their adversaries, but, lamentably, 
not active allies in the struggle for transparency and good governance. 
Experiences of our respondents vary, and while the majority believes 
information from civil society mostly gets fair media coverage, some also 
point to the examples of media denying access to civil society organizations 
or negative labeling of those organizations as foreign mercenaries27. 
The media community is primarily polarized about issues related 
to transitional justice and facing the past. Goran Zorić from the youth 
24 For example Amra Hodžić of the Radio Federation BiH, submitted questionnaire, June 2016. 
Anti-corruption initiatives and analyses of political parties. 25 As noted by Edin Hodžić from the Centar for Social Research Analitika, submitted 
questionnaire, June 2016. 26 Most often mentioned in this regard is website Saff. 27 Examples mentioned by Amra Hodžić from Radio Federation BiH are part of a campaign 
against  Amnesty international BiH through few major media in Republika Srpska, or 
publishing of information on salaries in the Centre of Civic Initiatives with the aim of 
discrediting them 
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organization Kvart speaks of his experiences with the latest example of: 
“refusal of Kozarski vijesnik to publish a mentioning about ... kids killed in 
Prijedor. There are also the distorted reports by RTRS about this event”28. 
However, Zorić mentioned few good examples of cooperation with media 
concerning the same topic. “One of the positive examples was an article 
by Dragan Bursać, published at website Buka, reporting on two murdered 
children and the fight for the memorial for the children killed in Prijedor. We 
jointly backed it up with facts and the information we had. Or for example 
when we asked a journalist of Radio Free Europe to report on Ljubija and 
after the report which described catastrophic circumstances in which people 
there are living, there was a huge response by people that wanted to help”.
Civil society initiatives that jeopardize or involve criticism against 
particular officials or parties risk to attract criticism and to be covered in a 
politicized manner by part of the media.  Ivana Korajlić of the Transparency 
International BiH from her experience mentioned media in Republika Srpska, 
mainly RTRS, Nezavisne novine and Glas Srpske for politicized reporting on 
the civil sector, but also points out that the examples of fair reporting on the 
civil sector are much more numerous29. 
Beyond politically-sensitive topics, the reasons for lack of substantial, 
engaged and continuous reporting on civil society in general are numerous, 
involving lack of resources, but also editorial orientation away from public 
interest and towards sensationalism and commercialized content. Media are 
believed to be increasingly relying on ready-made content, including that 
coming from the civil society30. Several respondents also noted that media 
do not sufficiently recognize the value of different reports and analyses by 
CSOs, nor do they acknowledge the quality of information and knowledge 
they can acquire from the sector. Meliha Sendić from the Center for legal help 
for Women, Zenica, noted that continuous reporting is mainly related to the 
media actions that are financially supported31. Zoran Ivaničić notes that media 
got so accustomed to paid announcements that they often ask for financial 
compensation for publishing convent related to issues of public interest. On 
the other hand, several respondents also point out that part of the reason for 
flawed reporting by mainstream media is the lack of understanding of civil 
society on how media function and what they regard as newsworthy. Press 
releases are often written in a format that is not interesting for the media, 
respondents from the media outlets indicated. As Almir Panjeta from Slobodna 
Bosna noted, the press releases are often too long and unclear since some key 
28 Interview, 3 June 2016.29  Telephone interview, 3 June 2016. 
30  As suggested by Goran Zorić. 
31 Submitted questionnaire, June 2016
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information is often missing.  Furthermore, the entire communication by civil 
society is focused on press releases only, and the subject of the communication 
is not well-thought, suggests Goran Zorić from Kvart, adding that civil society 
organizations communicate more about the activities than about the ideas and 
values that should be in the center of attention. Civil society is largely passive 
and closed in relation to media, unwilling to share more information and 
provide comments when asked by the media32, but also it is largely project-
oriented, without a long-term strategic focus on certain issues that would 
make them relevant participants in communication on those issues beyond 
duration of particular projects33. 
Too often, the quality of relations between the media and civil society 
depend on the engagement and sensitization of individual journalists34, instead 
of being part of strategic orientation of either media outlets or the civil society 
actors. This lack of strategic approach is visible in the difference between 
regular reporting and reporting on particular dates relevant for particular 
issues. As noted by Vedrana Frašto from Foundation CURE, reporting on 
women rights organizations on 8th of March is mostly politically correct, but: 
“In other situations, if media report on marginalized groups or the NGO sector, 
they will mostly report with stereotypes and sensationalism.”35 Overall, there is no continuous and in-depth reporting on public-interest issues or analyses 
on the role of civil society and its value for local communities36. As noted by 
one of the respondents: “NGOs work on important projects – for example safe 
houses for victims of violence, other social services, participation in discussions 
and decision-making on different levels of governance, legislative changes, 
democratic dialogue on important issues. However, such actions are mostly 
not in the focus of the media, which is more inclined towards simplified...
visions of the nongovernmental sector”37. 
Despite these problems, respondents believe that in the majority of 
cases, important actions and ideas from civil society get an overall fair media 
coverage, although possibly not by all media. Few respondents mention 
positive examples of media coverage, mainly coverage of the campaign “I 
32 Both journalists (Rubina Čengić, Marija Arnautović) and civil society representatives 
(Goran Zorić, Ivana Korajlić)
33 Rubina Čengić, of magazine Start for example points to these problems.
34 As noted by Huremović and Frašto, submitted questionnaires, June 2016. 
35 Submitted questionnaire, June 2016. 
36 As indicated for example by Zoran Ivačnić, activist, submitted questionnaire, June 2016. 
On the other hand, an example of negative campaign based on superficial arguments 
about the abundant foreign funding for actions of allegedly no public interests, is available here: http://novi.ba/clanak/73149/majstori-ublehe-najvece-zvijezde-granta-u-bosni-i-
hercegovini?page=1 
37 Edin Hodžić, Center for Social Research Analitika, Sarajevo.
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am Museum,” an initiative which resulted in the re-opening of the National 
Museum in Sarajevo, as well as coverage of protests from 2013 (Bebolution 
or JMBG protests)38 after which the problem with issuing new identification 
numbers got firstly a temporary and later a permanent solution.
Journalist Rubina Čengić of magazine Start mentions few good 
experiences of cooperation with civil society actors: “The best experience 
was with Transparency International; I had a journalistic assignment to do 
an interview with young people that experienced or observed some cases of 
corruption and they (TI) helped me a lot with some contacts, invited me to events attended by young people who discuss corruption”39.  
In terms of overall communication with civil society and between 
different sectors, the respondents agree that the role of social networks and 
blogs,40 as well as some non-governmental platforms, is becoming more and 
relevant. Civil society organizations are increasingly using social networks 
in their communication practices, especially those related to the younger 
population. As one of our respondents said: “We are an organization that 
deals with youth and the use of social networks is very important for us. The 
initiative “Because I am concerned” (Jer me se tiče) communicates its entire 
engagement through social networks” (Goran Zorić, organization Kvart, 
Prijedor).  However, media are still considered pivotal for the overall reach 
of civil society initiatives, as well in terms of fostering citizen participation 
(more below).
Bodies where the civil society and media almost meet
While the laws on public service broadcasters envisage the existence of 
editorial or program councils, in practice, only Radio Television of Republika 
Srpska (RTRS), one out of three public service broadcasters has established this advisory body41. In theory, the body includes participants from different 
38 As noted for example by Almir Panjeta, Slobodna Bosna, submitted questionnaire, June 
2016. 
39 She also adds that the founders of an NGO are simultaneously owners of magazine Start, 
which fosters their cooperation on many topics. Rubina Čengić, magazine Start, submitted 
questionnaire, June 2016. 
40 Two respondents for example mention that blog of Srđan Puhalo is increasingly accepted 
and reach significant respondents, and that it provides engaged analysis on socially relevant 
issues reporting of media (submitted questionnaires, June 2016).41 As noted by Radenko Udovičić, previous member of the Board of Governors on public service 
broadcaster RTVFBiH,  the reasons that the Program Council does not exist are mostly 
procedural, since the several calls for Council members the response was not enough to 
enable all conditions for their appointment to be fulfilled (members from different cantons, 
from different constituents, minorities, members of different associations…), but he also 
adds that this is probably welcomed by the management since it’s easier for them to make 
decisions without such advisory interference (Telephone conversation, 15 June 2016)  
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segments of society, including the civil sector. In the case of RTRS, the National 
Assembly of Republika Srpska appointed them. Radmila Žigić, a former 
member of the Program Council of RTRS noted that under the circumstances 
in which the public service system is almost by “default” in the function 
of the ruling political structures, for the few years this body had found a 
way to influence the program and contribute to better representations 
of different interests of citizens42. The situation soon changed: “When it 
became somewhat clear that we are not going to act as defenders of editorial 
policy of RTRS… the role of the Program council was reduced to a formality. 
We met two times a year to give our opinion on the Winter and Summer 
programmatic scheme”. “This is how the Program Council functions today”, she added43. 
The Communications Regulatory Agency (CRA) is a public body with a 
decisive role in the protection of the public interests and regulation in the 
sector of broadcasting. The credibility of CRA is increasingly questioned 
in recent years, one of the reasons being the perceived politicized 
appointments of members of the CRA Council. The amendments to the 
Law on Communications, adopted in 2012, introduced an ad hoc body 
that is proposing the list of 14 candidates for the CRA Council. While the 
body consists of the same number of political representatives and the 
representatives of civil society, and thus seems as a step towards greater 
participation in decision-making, in fact, the selection of the members of the 
ad hoc body is done by the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH and is designed to 
assure the dominance of political interests44. Therefore, it is not considered 
that this change contributed to better representation of citizen’s interests 
in these procedures. On the contrary, under strong political interference, 
even the stipulation in the Law on Communication on gender equality is 
completely disregarded, since the current composition of the Council does 
not include a single female member.45 
Finally, the Press Council in BiH oversees the self-regulatory system 
in the print and online sector. Its Board of Directors and Assembly consist 
42 Although the consultations between the public and the Council were never introduced 
despite the initiative by the members of the Council, Žigić ads. 
43 Telephone interview, 16 June 2016. 44 Furthermore, the list proposed by the ad hoc body is sent first to the Council of Ministers, 
whose role remains unclear, and then submitted to the parliamentary procedure. In case the 
Parliamentary Assembly does not approve the proposed candidates, the entire procedure 
has to be repeated and practically no limitations in this regard are specified.45 Having said this, it is important to also note that there have not been significant critique of 
the way that CRA processes the complaints concerning the program of the broadcasters, 
but rather critiques on the lack of reactions in some cases and lack of monitoring of media 
content, so in this aspect of the CRA functioning, the interests of the citizens are relatively protected.
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Neither allies, nor adversaries
48
of the members coming from the media community, but the Complaints 
Commission, which processes complaints concerning content published 
by online and print media, includes members from different sectors. Out 
of ten members, three come from universities, three from the judiciary and 
four from the media46. The Press Council is one of the most respected self-
regulatory bodies in the region, contributing to the protection of citizen 
interests and promotion of journalistic values, and the composition of its 
managing bodies has not been substantially criticized.    
Media-related nongovernmental organizations: 
providing what is missing in the mainstream media 
Some of the media outlets that are registered as non-profit and non-
governmental organizations play an important role in terms of the diversity 
of media offered in the country. In fact, the Center for Investigative Journalism, 
Žurnal and Buka are most frequently mentioned as media sources that provide 
either investigative journalism pieces or valuable content independent from 
the influence of the local political and economic centers of power.
In addition to these media outlets, there are also several online sources 
that are registered and/or are functioning as nongovernmental organizations 
that, through different activities (research, different analyses, educational 
programs, online platforms, events etc.), focus on freedom of expression and 
media-related issues. In a way, they belong to both the media community 
and civil society. Such organizations are recognized by our interviewees 
and surveyed respondents as valuable for several reasons, mainly because 
they provide relatively systematic and constant analysis of media policies 
and media practices. Judging by the evaluation of the respondents, online 
platforms such as media.ba or analiziraj.ba, are recognized as relevant and 
reliable sources of information for and about the media community. Other 
platforms of civil society are a valuable contribution to communication 
about particular issues of public relevance47. Some of these platforms 
were considered to have provided a valuable contribution during citizen 
protests, by countering the unfavorable reporting about the protests by the 
mainstream media and providing missing accounts on events (for example 
AbrasMEDIA and media.ba).  At times, social media platforms provided 
46 Source: Press council, more at: http://english.vzs.ba/index.php?option=com_co
ntent&view=article&id=585%3Ainformation-on-the-press-council-in-bosnia-
herzegovina&catid=7%3Aabout-us&Itemid=10&lang=en 47 An example is a platform on position and rights of people with disabilities, at: http://
ukljuci.in/bs/, as mentioned by respondent Almir Panjeta, of magazine Slobodna Bosna. 
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alternative narratives, involving personal testimonies and citizen reports on 
police brutality, marginalized in mainstream media. 
Although they are providing an important alternative, the respondents 
noted that the reach of these platforms is still limited to relatively closed 
circles of users. As Aleksandar Brezar from online platform analiziraj.ba 
said“...it will take time for the society to become digitally more literate, or 
that the shift of generations happens, in which these platforms will become 
more relevant than other media.”48
Both of the types of organizations, both the journalistic platforms and 
platforms related to journalism, are mainly funded by international donors, 
who on one side foster editorial independence and critique of local centers 
of power, but on the other also bring uncertainty with regard to their long-
term sustainability. 
Media, civil society, and public participation
Mainstream media are considered to hold the power for mass citizen 
mobilization, but that this power has been mostly underused because media 
fail to report more substantially on issues of public interest. In some cases, 
this power has also been largely misused, and the respondents in particular 
mention favoritism towards official sources and perspectives that many 
mainstream media demonstrated during the February citizen protests in 
2014. 
Secondary sources suggest that mainstream media, in the end, 
contributed to the demise of the protests49. Lack of in-depth information 
and details about the issues relevant for the protests, initial focus on protest 
violence, perseverance of visual representation of violence in media reports 
long after the outburst of violence stopped, uncritical coverage of spinning 
against protests originating from government officials (promoting ethnic-
national divides and pointing to alleged criminal behavior of protesters) 
were some of the factors that diverted the focus from the protests rationale 
and demands. While social networks, in particular Facebook, were identified 
as crucial platforms for informing and mobilizing citizens, the same report 
suggested that televised communication is decisive for the wider reach, 
sustainability of protest actions and for achieving the desired changes.   
48 Interview, 22 June 2016. 49 It is important to note that the results of content analysis within the same research did 
support such evaluations only in part. See Cvjetićanin, T, in Hodžić and Pajnik (ed.). 
Foundation “Mediacentar”, 2016.
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Respondents of this research recognize the importance of social 
networks in fast exchange of information and interactivity, and as platforms 
through which citizens were mobilized for few massive protests. Beyond 
these few cases, the respondents indicate that the role of social networks 
remains confined to the discussion between a relatively closed group of 
people, and also noted that they include few problematic aspects as well. 
One of the respondents additionally noted that the practices can be as 
(un)democratic as the society in general “how much is this alternative 
space more democratic and to what extent is it on the other hand merely 
mirroring a divided society”50, while others also mentioned a problem of 
questionable reliability of information shared on social networks. Beyond 
the few exceptions, much of the “activities on social networks mainly remain 
on the margins, in separate space which is construed and maintained as 
elitist, without meaningful outflow to traditional media and to society, or the 
citizens” noted one of the respondents51. 
When it comes to mainstream media, as noted earlier, the results of 
content analysis suggest that the analyzed print and online news media rarely 
provide in-depth information and analysis, that they do not cover issues 
promoted by civil sector in a systematic manner, and mostly do not promote 
dialogue between media and civil society on issues of public interest or 
explore government accountability. As such, these media do not act as major 
initiators and promoters of public participation. However, where there is an 
initiative with strong message and strong support, mainstream media seem 
to be necessary for reaching the wider citizens support and/or for achieving 
a policy impact. Even considerable media reporting on certain issues and 
support for civil society initiatives does not necessarily lead to desired 
results. For example, the reaction of the Center for Legal Help for Women, in 
the town of Zenica about the fact that the Government of the Zenica-Doboj 
Canton did not involve a single female minister had a considerable echo in 
the media, but this has not led to any changes. “We still have a small number 
of women in the executive power”, noted Meliha Sendić52. 
Lack of responsiveness by political officials, despite different platforms 
used for communication and increased opportunities for interactions, is the 
main problem. Civil society is overall portrayed as a valuable contributor 
to public discussions that foster citizen participation, but their strength 
in achieving policy changes is seen as minor53, if faced with hostile or 
50 Edin Hodžić, Centar of Social Research Analitika, submitted questionnaire, June 2016. 51 Ibid.52 Submitted questionnaire, June 2016.
53 See for example Keil, S and Perry, K, 2016, State Building and Democratization in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Rutledge. 
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unresponsive mainstream media and/or with unresponsive decision-makers. 
As respondents indicate, part of the problem is also the lack of unified efforts 
by civil society for important changes, and the lack of an “institutionalized 
platform for consultations between the public and institutions”54.  
Conclusions 
Neither media nor civil society in Bosnia and Herzegovina is believed to be 
substantially contributing to public participation. There are six main and 
interconnected reasons identified in this research: a) weak messages by 
civil society (often focused on their activities instead of the overall ideas and 
policy requirements) and lack of know-how and capacities to present them in 
a newsworthy manner b) lack of public-interest engagement and continuous 
reporting by the media, as well as political interference in editorial policies 
c) lack of joint engagement of different segments of civil society, d) lack of 
joint engagement of both civil society and media in persistent promotion 
of issues of public interest, f) lack of responsiveness of the officials to such 
initiatives and pressures, and d) lack of wider citizen engagement. 
Several positive examples of media reporting and few examples of 
cooperation between media and civil society organizations mentioned in 
this report can offer some guidelines for both the media and civil society 
actors. Namely, small engagement by the media, such as pointing to further 
sources on particular issues, providing multiple views, distancing from 
problematic statements can make an important difference even when 
media do not have the resources or mission that involve investigative and in-depth reporting. Civil society on the other hand should also rethink the 
messages they are communicating towards media and instead of mainly 
promoting the civil society actions per se aim to promote the main ideas and 
suggestions on how to improve services and decisions of the public sector. 
Civil society actors should also develop their practices and communication 
skills with the media, including more continuous, strategic communication, 
organizing interesting events and writing good press releases. Improvement 
of mutual communication and cooperation between media and civil society 
on issues of public interest is indicated as a needed step towards greater 
public participation. Additionally, structural changes in terms of greater 
independence from local stakeholders and in terms of more strategic 
orientation of both media and civil society organizations towards issues of 
public interest should also be pursued as long-term goals. 
54  As Ivana Korajlić of TI noted.
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Finally, developing institutionalization mechanisms of consultations 
between officials and the public should assure greater responsiveness of 
institutions and greater impact of civil society initiatives on the decision-
making processes. Both media and civil society can play a crucial role in 
examining the responsiveness of the governments and investigating if and how they are building in the civil society voices in their policy processes. Only 
when this is turned into themes in the public discourse in a more substantial 
way will the participation be recognized by the authorities as a necessary 
means to demonstrate their democratic credentials. 
One should also not underestimate the importance of the civil sector 
in disseminating support and providing services to particular groups of 
people, in providing information that would otherwise be difficult to access, 
or in offering different education programs, which in their own right bring 
relevant benefits for the society.
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Old and New Media in a New Country 
For a country that is both young and small, Kosovo has an oversaturated media scene. For somewhat less than two million Kosovars, there are 7 daily newspapers, 21 TV stations, out of which 3 with national 
frequencies, and as many as 83 radio stations.1 While an Independent Media 
Commissioner regulates the broadcast media, the print media run a self-
regulatory body – the Press Council of Kosovo. The number of online media 
remains unknown with estimates showing up to 30 websites that provide news and analysis on a daily basis.2 Blogs, albeit a new phenomenon, are 
also flourishing, making the media scene both vibrant and pluralist. This 
crowded market, however, has a direct impact on financing of the media, as 
merely a few of them are self-sustainable. Several media outlets faced closure 
in the past few years, mainly due to lack of own revenues. As the Institute 
for Development Policy (INDEP) finds out in their annual The State of the 
Media in Kosovo report in 2015, ‘the high number of media outlets provides 
for a serious dispersion of potential advertising revenue, preventing the 
formation of a group of highly professional and profitable organizations’.3 
When this situation is combined with the fact that some third of Kosovo’s 
GDP is generated by the public sector, with government being the biggest 
advertiser, convenient conditions for government pressure against the 
media are created.
Sustainability, however, is only one of the problems that Kosovo media 
are facing. Editorial independence, violence and threats against journalists, 
as well as government interference, particularly in the public broadcasting 
1  Independent Media Commission, Raporti Vjetor [Annual Report], http://www.kpm-ks.org/
materiale/dokument/1400761852.6487.pdf. 2  Author’s interviews with journalists and editors in Kosovo, May 2016.
3  Gashi, K. and Qavdarbasha, S. (2015)  The State of the Media in Kosovo. Pristina: Institute for 
Development Policy (INDEP).
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service, remain some of the ongoing challenges for journalists and media 
professionals alike.4 Thus, in the eyes of international organizations, Kosovo 
media are considered to be struggling for their independence. In 2015, 
Reporters Without Borders ranked Kosovo in 90th place out of 180 countries 
that are featured in the World Press Freedom Index.5 Freedom House ranks 
Kosovo media to be ‘partly free’ with their index showing 49, where 0 is the 
best and 100 the worst.6 In Nations in Transit, another report that looks 
closely at media freedom, Freedom House ranks Kosovo media with a score 
of 5.25, where 1 is best and 7 is worst.7 In the last three years, different 
legislative and practical developments have accounted for a slight change 
in the way Kosovo media are portrayed by international organizations. 
While Reporters Without Borders noted a decline in terms of press freedom, 
mainly focusing on threats against journalists, the Freedom House’s Nations 
in Transit report highlights slight improvement, mainly relating it to the 
vibrancy and productivity of Kosovo journalists in spite of the environment where they operate. As a recently published report by OSCE in Kosovo rightly 
concludes, the freedom of Kosovo media is subject of a debate, whereas 
media experts more or less agree that the situation remains challenging in 
spite of improvements. 
Legally speaking, Kosovo offers some of the highest standards of 
journalists’ protection and media freedom. Article 40 of Kosovo’s Constitution 
guarantees freedom of expression, Article 41 guarantees the right to access 
public documents, whereas Article 42 guarantees freedom and pluralism of 
the media.8 The last one stipulates that censorship is forbidden: ‘no one shall 
prevent the dissemination of information or ideas through media’.9 These constitutional provisions are well backed by legislation. Libel has been 
categorized as a civil issue since 2006, whereas it is being fully implemented 
as such only since 2013, when the new Penal Code was enacted that does 
not foresee libel and slander as a penal offence. In the same year, the Kosovo 
Assembly passed the Law on Protection of Journalists’ Sources, making Kosovo 
the first country in the region to provide this legal instrument for journalists’ 
protection. As it was seen during the 2015 reporting on corruption in the 
EU rule of law mission in Kosovo (EULEX), the law is crucial to guarantee 
4  Ibid.5  Reporters Without Borders (2016) World Press Freedom Index, https://rsf.org/en/ranking 6  Freedom House (2016) Freedom of the Press, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
press/freedom-press-2016 7  Gashi, K. (2016) Kosovo, in Freedom House, Nations in Transit, https://freedomhouse.org/
report/nations-transit/2016/kosovo 8  Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo (2008) Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo. 9  Ibid
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working conditions for investigative reporting.10 If applied as it presently is, 
the law makes Kosovo a good example for the protection of journalists.
However, similar to the other policy fields, legislation on the media 
freedom lags in terms of implementation. Judicial institutions in Kosovo 
are still weak and overloaded, dealing with a significant backlog.11 When 
it comes to cases of libel, slander, and especially to cases of violence and 
threats against journalists, the Courts are weak and cannot process cases 
in a timely manner. According to the experts interviewed for this research, 
it takes 3 to 5 years before such cases are put to trial. To this day, there has 
been no verdict in any case of threats or violence against journalists, in spite 
of the high number of such cases. In 2015 alone, the Association of Kosovo 
Journalists alone reported 25 cases where journalists were attacked.
Last, but definitely not least, the media in Kosovo are facing a problem 
of their own: professionalism. First of all, there is a systematic problem 
with media management. According to the data provided by the Institute 
for Development Policy as well as the Association of Kosovo Journalists, 
many journalists work for a minimum wage, very often without employment contracts. Research has shown that there is no distinction between the 
business arm of the media and their editorial one, that there are no clear 
indicators for the use of advanced marketing strategies, and that there are 
no specialized media.12 IREX media sustainability index for 2016 highlighted 
that ‘Kosovo media outlets are not doing enough to guarantee security 
for their journalists.13 Secondly, most of the small and new media have no 
written editorial policies or codes of conduct. Systematic monitoring has 
shown that journalists usually report superficially on daily events, with 
feature stories, analysis and especially investigative reports being scarce.14 
In the eyes of media and civil society experts interviewed for this research, 
the quality of reporting has dropped with the entry into scene of the new 
online media, which focus on short stories with sensational titles, giving no space to context and proper analysis. 
10  Gashi, K. (2016) Kosovo, in Freedom House, Nations in Transit, https://freedomhouse.org/
report/nations-transit/2016/kosovo11  European Commission (2014) Progress Report for Kosovo. Brussels. 12  Gashi, K. and Qavdarbasha, S. (2015)  The State of the Media in Kosovo. Pristina: Institute for 
Development Policy (INDEP)
13  IREX (2016) Media Sustainability Index: Kosovo, https://www.irex.org/sites/default/files/
pdf/media-sustainability-index-europe-eurasia-2016-kosovo.pdf.pdf 14  Ibid.
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Kosovo: You bring the civil, we’ll bring the society15
Although the first Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)16 in Kosovo 
were established in the 1990s, the current civil society sector was vastly 
developed in the aftermath of the 1998-99 conflict. Being war-torn and 
administered by the United Nations, Kosovo was an attractive spot for many 
international NGOs and donor organizations, which shortly after landing 
established their spinoffs and were granting funds to local organizations. 
According to official data, more than 7,000 NGOs were registered in Kosovo since 1999.17 The number of active NGOs, according to a survey conducted 
by the Institute for Development Policy and Lens, is around 2,200.18 For a 
country of less than two million people, this number of active civil society 
organizations is considerably high.
The high number of operational NGOs comes as a result of a high-
standard environment in which the civil society organizations operate. 
Freedom of association is guaranteed by Kosovo’s Constitution. Article 44 of 
the Constitution specifies that this freedom includes ‘the right of everyone 
to establish an organization without obtaining any permission, to be or not 
to be a member of any organization and to participate in the activities of 
an organization’.19 This high standard of freedom of association is mirrored 
in the Law on Freedom of Association in NGOs, which requires minimal 
administrative procedures for the registration and operation of civil society 
organizations. According to this Law, NGOs in Kosovo can be registered as 
Associations, that is membership-based organizations, or as Foundations, 
which are without membership.
The relatively simple legal framework as well as civil society’s own efforts 
have kept the state’s involvement in the civil society affairs to a minimum. 
NGOs are neither exempted from Value Added Tax nor from income and 
15 Eric Jarosinski, in Sbunker, Nein Quarterly and the Utopian Negation, available at Sbunker, 
http://sbunker.net/teh/81889/video-sbunker-nein-quarterly-dhe-mohimi-utopik/ (TC 
00:50:00). 16 The terms Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) 
will be used interchangeably throughout this chapter. They both refer to not-for-profit 
entities, registered as per Kosovo’s Law on Freedom of Association in NGOs, operating in Kosovo. 17 Government of the Republic of Kosovo, Ministry of Public Administration, Department 
for Registration and Liaison with NGOs, Official Website, https://map.rks-gov.net/
Departments/DOJQ.aspx?lang=en-US 18 Institute for Development Policy and Lens, Bashkepunimi mes Qeverise se Kosoves dhe 
Shoqerise Civile [Cooperation between the Government of Kosovo and the civil society], 
http://indep.info/?id=5%2C0%2C0%2C1%2Ca%2C153 19 Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo (2008) Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo.
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rent taxes. A special public beneficiary status is given to certain NGOs which 
enables them to operate VAT-free. The government has no direct supervisory 
powers over NGOs; the administrative procedure involves submitting annual 
narrative and financial reports to the Ministry of Public Administration, but 
this is not well implemented. The government cannot punish or shut down 
NGOs, except for specific cases when this can be done by a court. The simple 
legal framework, however, has its downsides, as it remains unclear whether 
NGOs have to pay taxes for generating own income, and whether NGOs can 
hold shares in for-profit enterprises, which would enable their sustainability. 
When it comes to financial sustainability, the civil society sector in Kosovo 
is in a worse situation than the media one. The absolute majority of all civil 
society funds come from foreign donors, be that international organizations 
such as the EU, development agencies of foreign countries, or international 
foundations.20 Government grants for NGOs are unregulated and happen on 
an ad-hoc basis. Civil society leaders that were interviewed for this research 
stated that they would not consider receiving grants from the government 
even in case they were available, as this would jeopardize their independence. 
At the same time, new emerging conflicts in world politics have caused many 
donor organization to leave Kosovo and focus elsewhere.21 In spite of this, 
however, in its 2014 Civil Society Index, USAID concludes that sustainability of 
Kosovo’s civil society has improved over the last few years, with advancements 
being made in terms of legal framework, advocacy, service provision and public 
image.22 Within Kosovo’s political system as well as the public sphere, civil 
society organizations have solid integrity and continuously influence both the public discourse and the policy agenda. 
Kosovo’s civil society scene is diverse, with NGOs varying from think 
tank and advocacy centers, to professional service-providing associations 
and foundations, to grassroots, student and youth organizations. In terms of 
shifts in the overall scope of work, the development of Kosovo’s civil society 
is explained by theoretical frameworks of post-conflict reconstruction, which 
by and large suggest a shift from being oriented towards fast results in the 
first years after the conflict, towards more long-term and sustainable forms 
of engagement.23 Given the latter, organizations that work on current affairs 
20 Gashi, K. (2016) Kosovo, in Freedom House, Nations in Transit, https://freedomhouse.org/
report/nations-transit/2016/kosovo21 Gashi, K. (2014) Kosovo, in Freedom House, Nations in Transit, https://freedomhouse.org/
report/nations-transit/2014/kosovo22 USAID (2014) The 2014 CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Asia, 
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1863/EuropeEurasia_FY2014_
CSOSI_Report.pdf#page=129 
23 Musliu, V. (2016) Country Report: Kosovo, in Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe: 
Taking stock and looking ahead. Forthcoming. Vienna: Vienna University.
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and public policy issues have established a stronger profile for themselves 
and it could be argued that they are more sustainable, despite the financial 
challenges. As a forthcoming paper by Vienna University rightly argues, civil 
society organizations in Kosovo ‘have become increasingly sophisticated 
in promoting their visibility and utilizing media for public outreach as well as pressure’.24 The extent to which the relationship between the media and 
CSOs has developed as well as the nature of this relationship is the scope of 
the analysis that follows. 
Media coverage of civil society
Civil society organizations and activists are featured extensively in the 
Kosovo media, be that in terms of media reports on civil society activities 
or in terms of civil society activists providing independent expert opinions 
on current and policy affairs. It has become imperative for many journalists 
and editors, especially those of the more serious media outlets, to turn to civil society activists in order to balance their reporting. This is the case particularly on political stories and those dealing with policy issues that are high on the public agenda. 
In this section, we shall explore the relationship between the Kosovo 
media and civil society organizations in the country. The primary corpus 
of data for this research comes from qualitative media monitoring. Three 
Kosovo dailies – Koha Ditore, Zeri and Kosova Sot – have been monitored 
alongside with three online media – Express, Blic and Kallxo – using the 
same methodology. Although the monitoring period was May – July 2016, 
this research takes into account other articles, published at an earlier period 
of time, as per their relevance to the analysis. For this purpose, a public 
domain inquiry was conducted to create a second corpus of data illustrating 
relations between media and civil society, including also coverage from other 
Kosovo media. The third corpus of data is gathered through in-depth semi-
structured interviews with media and civil society experts in Kosovo. 
The monitoring process enabled us to classify three kind of reports of 
the Kosovo media where civil society organizations or activists are featured: 
1) media reports on CSO activities, be that press conferences, actions 
or any kind of other activities; 2) media analysis whereby civil society 
representatives are quoted in the capacity of experts; and 3) opinions and 
editorials published by civil society representatives. Since the first group of 
stories consists by far the vast majority of the media content and is of crucial 
importance to this research, it will be elaborated in greater detail than the other two. 
24 Ibid
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Civil society activities are to a great extent covered by the Kosovo media. 
When it comes to CSOs that operate in Pristina and mainly deal with public 
policy issues, this coverage is even more intensive and extensive. This 
phenomenon is noted throughout the monitoring period and in all the media 
that were monitored, albeit Koha Ditore and Koha.net have had by far more 
stories covering CSO activities than the others. In this spirit, for example, 
Kosovo media reported a conference organized by the Kosovo Civil Society 
Foundation (KCFS) whereby CSOs have demanded from the government 
not to interfere with their works.25 Similarly, events and activities organized 
by leading Kosovo think tanks – Gap Institute, Group for Legal and Political 
Studies (GLPS), Institute for Development Policy (INDEP), Kosovo Centre 
for Security Studies (KCSS), Democracy 4 Development, Kosovo Democratic 
Institute (KDI) – are usually widely covered. Other CSOs that deal with 
transparency and rule of law, such as Levizja Fol, receive even more extensive 
coverage, since these policy issues are very high on the public agenda.
When civil society organizations join forces for a particular issue or 
a cause, be that by formally establishing consortiums or merely working 
together on an ad-hoc basis, media tend to provide them with greater 
space and attention. To illustrate, NGO Ec Ma Ndryshe from the southern 
city of Prizren has received great support by other CSOs in their efforts to 
improve the local government in this city.26 Their protest and demands for 
the resignation of the Mayor of Prizren were widely covered by the media. 
Interviews with civil society and media experts, however, reveal 
that this coverage is not the same for all the CSOs, a finding confirmed by 
further public record research. As Burim Ejupi the director of INDEP admits 
straightforwardly, smaller and more rurally-based CSOs as well as those 
working on very professional themes receive less attention than the think tanks do.27 Given the continuous presence of a few activists of civil society 
in the media, the definition of ‘civil society’ in Kosovo’s public sphere is 
very often confined to a few think tanks and advocacy centers, whereas the 
majority of CSOs operating in Kosovo are somehow left out of the definition. 
In spite of this, the rise of the new media has created more space for other 
CSOs, even those operating outside of the capital Pristina. For an illustration, 
25 Gazeta Blic (2016) Kerkohet qe shteti te mos nderhyje ne punen e OJQ-ve [Demands for 
state not to meddle in the works of NGOs], Gazeta Blic, 6 June 2017, http://gazetablic.com/
kerkohet-qe-shteti-te-mos-nderhyje-ne-punen-e-organizatave-jo-qeveritare/26 Koha (2016) Protestuesit kerkojne doreheqjen e kryetarit dhe dy ministrave [Protesters 
demand resignation of the mayor and two ministers], 14 June 2016, http://koha.
net/?id=27&l=11844127 Ejupi, B. (2016) Author’s interview with Mr. Burim Ejupi, executive director of INDEP and a 
civil society expert in Kosovo. Pristina, June 2016.
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during the monitoring period all the media, but particularly Koha Ditore, 
have reported extensively on activities of CSOs operating in other cities, such 
as Prizren, Ferizaj, Lipjan and Klina, but also those of smaller and more rural 
towns. Such activities involved a variety of topics, from criticism toward local 
authorities,28 to civic initiatives dealing with stray dogs,29 to protection of 
workers’ rights,30 to teen marriage and pregnancy.31 Thus, we can conclude 
that Kosovo media covers the activities of civil society to a great extent. 
The tone of the coverage of civil society activities in the media is usually 
neutral, although interviewees for this research thought it was leaning 
towards a more positive tone, since in normal circumstances media and 
civil society organizations see each other as natural allies and partners. 
In this way, there is a kind of gentlemen-agreement between the two, 
whereby the media publish press releases and statements sent by CSOs as 
they are, usually without major interventions.32 This neutrality, however, is 
jeopardized whenever a certain media or a CSO is seen as linked to a political 
party or a group of interest, whereby the tone can switch to a negative one.33 
Although cases where political parties or the government have used certain 
media to publicly attack a civil society organization or an activist are not 
frequent, they did happen in the past.34 As Arben Ahmeti, a journalist, editor 
and former President of the Association of Kosovo Journalists puts it, ‘in 
such cases we witness media offensives [against CSO activists] whereby 
journalists follow absolutely no professional standards’.35 Ahmeti worries 
28 Koha (2016) OJQ Koha kundershton mbylljen e qendres se qytetit te Klines [Koha NGO opposes 
closure of the centre of town of Klina], 10 June 2016, http://koha.net/?id=9&l=11783829 Koha (2016) Shoqëria civile në Ferizaj kërkon masa kundër qenve endacakë [Civil 
Society in Ferizaj demands measures against stray dogs], 21 June 2016, http://koha.
net/?id=9&l=119577
30 Koha (2016) Në Lipjan shkelen të drejtat e punëtorëve në sektorin publik e privat [Workers’ 
rights in the public and private sector in Lipjan are violated], 18 June 2016, http://koha.
net/?id=9&l=119120
31 Koha (2016) Martesa nen 16 vjec eshte dhunim [Marriage under 16 means rape], 16 May 
2016, http://koha.net/?id=27&l=113586
32 Ejupi, B. (2016) Author’s interview with Mr. Burim Ejupi, executive director of INDEP and a 
civil society expert in Kosovo. Pristina, June 2016.
33 Zhubi, D. (2016) Author’s interview with Mr. Driton Zhubi, executive director of NGO LENS. 
Pristina, June 2016.
34 For example the case of 2009 when the pro-government newspaper Infopress had published 
a series of articles against the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, calling, among 
others, for a public lynch of its journalists. In another case, in 2011, the public broadcaster 
RTK used its main news edition to attack the author of the Freedom House’s Nations in 
Transit report as they did not agree with the findings of this report on RTK. 
35 Ahmeti, A. (2016) Author’s interview with Mr. Arben Ahmeti, journalist and editor with 
Dukagjini TV station, former President of the Association of Journalists of Kosovo and a 
frequent media commentator. Pristina, June 2016.
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that such cases bring a negative trend when it comes to implementation 
of journalistic standards in Kosovo, something in which the country has a 
somewhat better standing than its neighbors in the Western Balkans.36 The 
negative tone of media reports on CSOs is present very much during election 
periods, as it has become a norm in Kosovo for political parties to recruit 
CSO activists and leaders just before kicking off their election campaigns. In 
such cases, the media see the civil society as part of politics.37 Cases where 
the media have abused their power to attack civil society organizations or 
activists on the basis of ideologies and values have not been noted. On the 
contrary, there is an overall feeling of cooperation in such issues, as was for 
instance the wide promotion of LGBTI rights by both media and civil society, 
in response to attacks coming from conservative politicians.38 
This relatively good but to some extent unhealthy relationship between 
media and civil society is revealed further when looking closely at the 
content of the monitored stories. The vast majority of the stories featuring 
civil society organizations were rather short and straightforward, whereby 
reporters simply explain an event or, in some cases, merely copy and paste a 
press release from an NGO. Most of the interviewees believe that journalists 
neither know nor care to know details about the work of civil society. The 
majority of journalists do not know which organization deals with what, 
they possess no in-depth knowledge of their activities, yet they still see them 
as partners, as they believe in the same system of liberal values, democracy, 
human rights, transparency and good governance.39 This shallow reporting 
hinders the relationship between media and society and prevents the 
creation of a greater value-based synergy. This too, however, is improving 
slowly. More and more organizations are now facing different institutional 
and financial challenges thus they are focused on creating narrow profiles 
for themselves, which in turn results in greater professionalism.40 Although 
many journalists see the NGOs as a homogenous group whereby all are the 
same,41 this is slowly changing. 
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Koha Ditore, OJQ-te dalin ne mbrojtje te LGBTI, denojne deklaratat e Kelmendit [NGOs 
protect LGBTI rights, they condemn Kelmendi’s statements], 18 May 2016, http://koha.
net/?id=27&l=113951
39 Gashi, A. (2016) Author’s interview with Mr. Astrit Gashi, chairman of the board of Blic 
online media and a frequent commentator on media, civil society and politics. Pristina, June 
2016.
40 Ejupi, B. (2016) Author’s interview with Mr. Burim Ejupi, executive director of INDEP and a 
civil society expert in Kosovo. Pristina, June 2016.41 Gashi, A. (2016) Author’s interview with Mr. Astrit Gashi, chairman of the board of Blic 
online media and a frequent commentator on media, civil society and politics. Pristina, June 
2016.
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The second type of media reports where civil society is featured are 
news analysis. These are in-depth longer stories, usually published in daily 
newspapers and less so in online portals. Civil society activists are featured 
in the capacity of experts or policy analysts. In most cases, such stories are 
of a political nature, thus the number of civil society activists featured in 
them is limited to researchers of think tanks.42 During the monitoring period, 
however, we have noted other cases of less political topics where civil society 
activists were included, such as a story by Kosova Sot daily on the potential 
for reviving the tobacco agriculture in Kosovo.43 It should be noted that the 
usage of social media has boosted significantly the inclusion of civil society 
in media reports. Many media outlets, particularly online media, publish 
statements, reactions and other information that civil society activists and 
organizations post on social media.   
The third type of media presence that Kosovo CSOs get is through opinions and editorials. Many civil society leaders and activists have their 
regular or irregular columns in the press. Head of Riinvest Institute Lumir 
Abdixhiku writes a weekly column for Koha Ditore,44 Agron Demi of the Gap 
Institute writes opinion pieces for various print and online media while 
Florian Qehaja of KCSF and Petrit Zogaj of Levizja Fol blog regularly at 
sbunker.net,45 to name a few. This pool of opinion-writers who are leaders 
of some of the most important NGOs has further strengthened the capacity 
of Kosovo’s civil society to shape and influence public opinion. Civil society 
leaders have a similar presence also in the televised media, but it would 
exceed the scope of this research to explore it further. 
Friends, foes, or in between? 
As the previous analysis of the coverage has already shown, Kosovo media 
and civil society organizations, in principle, see each other as a kind of steady 
partner. For many NGOs, their core activities depend on media coverage. 
This is especially the case for think tanks and advocacy groups, which focus 
on providing policy solutions to policy-makers. As the interviews for this 
research reveal, media attention and coverage is of crucial importance to such 
42 See for example, Popova, E. (2016), Mandati I EULEX ne zgrip ndersa BE shperfill Thacin 
[Mandate of EULEX on the brink as the EU ignores Thaci], Kallxo, 14 June 2016, http://
kallxo.com/gjnk/mandati-eulex-ne-zgrip-ndersa-shperfill-thacin/
43 Kosova Sot (2016) Arat e Anamoraves do te mbushen serish me duhan [Anamorava land to 
be planted with tobacco again] 1 June 2016, http://www.kosova-sot.info/lajme/106393/
arat-e-anamoraves-do-te-mbulohen-serish-me-duhan/44 Abdixhiku, L. (2016) Brezovica dhe deshtimi I pritur [Brezovica and the expected failure], 
Koha Ditore, 27 June 2016, http://koha.net/?id=31&o=1319 45 Sbunker, http://www.sbunker.net  
Kosovo: Synergized in Struggle
65
CSOs as they need to raise the awareness of the public on the policy issues they are dealing with.46 For smaller, more professional CSOs, working jointly 
with the media is a must in order to receive the attention of the public.47 CSOs 
that are not based in the capital Pristina have less access to policy-makers and 
their only way to have their voice heard is through the media.48 Thus many 
CSOs now have appointed specific personnel to deal with media and public 
relations, although in most of them this is not an exclusive full-time job. 
Many civil society organizations are directly involved in projects with 
media or journalists’ organizations. While a few years back the Association 
of Journalists of Kosovo drafted its development strategy jointly with 
Institute for Development Policy, during the monitoring period it published 
a Manual for the Prevention of Corruption in the Public Sector jointly with 
the Kosovo Democratic Institute.49 The Association, as well as many other 
media individually, has implemented different projects jointly with other 
civil society organizations. 
Journalists and media executives are aware of the importance of the civil 
society sector for their day-to-day work. However, as the interviews for this 
research reveal, journalists and editors know little detail about the work of 
civil society. A good portion of journalists and editors do not know which 
organization deals with what issues; they are more driven to know individuals, 
researchers or leaders of CSOs rather than the organizations themselves.50 
It happens often that journalists would not even read materials published 
by civil society but would prefer to interview activists or leaders instead.51 
Materials offered by the civil society are used by the media but merely for 
superficial and brief reporting whereas research findings of many NGOs are 
hardly ever consulted by journalists and there is no follow-up reporting.52  53 
46  Ejupi, B. (2016) Author’s interview with Mr. Burim Ejupi, executive director of INDEP and a 
civil society expert in Kosovo. Pristina, June 2016.47  Zhubi, D. (2016) Author’s interview with Mr. Driton Zhubi, executive director of NGO LENS. 
Pristina, June 2016.48  Demi, A. (2016) Author’s interview with Mr. Agron Demi, executive director of Gap Institute. 
Pristina, June 2016.49  Halimi, V. (2016) Publikohet udhezuesi per parandalimin e korrupsionit [Corruption 
Prevention Manual published], Zeri, 14 June 2016, http://zeri.info/aktuale/94322/
publikohet-udhezuesi-per-parandalimin-e-korrupsionit-ne-prokurimin-publik/
50  Gashi, A. (2016) Author’s interview with Mr. Astrit Gashi, chairman of the board of Blic online 
media and a frequent commentator on media, civil society and politics. Pristina, June 2016.51  Demi, A. (2016) Author’s interview with Mr. Agron Demi, executive director of Gap Institute. 
Pristina, June 2016.52  Zhubi, D. (2016) Author’s interview with Mr. Driton Zhubi, executive director of NGO LENS. 
Pristina, June 2016.
53  Ahmeti, A. (2016) Author’s interview with Mr. Arben Ahmeti, journalist and editor with 
Dukagjini TV station, former President of the Association of Journalists of Kosovo and a 
frequent media commentator. Pristina, June 2016.
Kosovo: Synergized in Struggle
66
At the same time, not all the CSOs have the capacity or the know-how to deal 
with the media54 resulting in few CSOs being featured extensively. 
Frictions between CSOs and the media happen especially during election 
campaigns. Many journalists and media professionals see civil society 
activists as part of the political system that are merely using the civil society 
as a ‘trampoline’ to ‘jump’ into politics.55 It is during these times that media 
reports on civil society organizations and individuals become somewhat 
negative. There are also cases where entities registered as NGOs are involved 
in wrongdoings, for which the Kosovo media have a kind of ‘no mercy’ 
policy. Such was the case of some NGOs involved in a suspicious scheme of 
agricultural grants provided by the government, for which the media have reported extensively.56 Thus, in spite of an informal partnership that exists 
between media and civil society, frictions between the two are also present. 
Media operating as NGOs
It is important to make a digression from the analysis in order to elaborate 
on a special category of the media: those operating as NGOs. Although the 
media can be considered to be part of the wider definition of civil society, the 
Kosovo media that operate as NGOs are indeed a kind of a hybrid, as their 
interests are those of other media as well as other NGOs. 
The exact number of the media registered as NGOs is not known. The 
number used to be very high in the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict, where 
many media, particularly radio stations, were registered as NGOs. With 
Kosovo’s economy being destroyed and with no real media market in place, 
they saw international donors as the only way for financial sustainability. In 
due time, however, some of them were either closed or turned to operate as 
businesses, although a number of them still remains. Below, we shall explore 
the activities of some of the most-known media NGOs. 
Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) is a regional media 
organization that operates as NGO. In Kosovo, they produce two current 
affairs TV programs, two online publications in the Albanian language and 
the third one in English. Their profile is more in-depth and investigative reporting.57 Another NGO, Cohu, which initially dealt with transparency, 
anti-corruption and civic activism, has established Kosovo’s Centre for 
54 Ibid55 Ibid56 Preportr (2016) Tu prashitë n’ujë [Harrowing on the Water], Blic Newspaper, 24 May 2016, 
http://gazetablic.com/tu-prashite-nuje/ 57 BIRN (2016) Official Website, www.birn.eu.com 
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Investigative Journalism which publishes Preportr, an online magazine 
featuring investigative stories.58 Kosovo 2.0 is an online blogging platform 
and magazine that focuses more on societal and cultural issues and publishes 
in three languages: Albanian, Serbian and English.59 Sbunker, is a recently 
established blog that promotes in-depth debates on political and social 
affairs.60 All these media put forth their editorial independence as one of the 
main reasons why they continue to operate as NGOs. 
Comparing the quality of reporting, at a glance, media that operate as 
NGOs tend to be better, applying stricter and higher professional standards 
of journalism. At the same time, however, they do create a kind of unfair 
competition for other media, who still have to struggle for their income.61 
The sustainability of media that operate as NGOs is highly questionable. 
Civil Society and media regulatory authorities
Given it’s contemporary constitution that provides guarantees for civic 
and press liberties, Kosovo has constructed a good legal framework when 
it comes to representation of civil society in state regulatory bodies. The 
implementation of this framework, however, is lagging behind. Below, we 
shall explore what happens when media and civil society meet their interest 
in the cases of two regulatory bodies: the Independent Media Commission 
(IMC) and the public broadcasting service Radio Television Kosovo (RTK). 
The boards of both these institutions should consist, among others, of 
civil society representatives. This research shows that this representation, 
however, is not happening in practice and is rather being abused by political parties. 
The board of IMC as well as the one of RTK are elected through a public 
and to some extent transparent procedure, which, although regulated by 
different laws, is essentially the same.62 Civil society organizations are 
invited to nominate people for the respective boards, but this invitation is not 
exclusive as anybody can be part of the nomination process. A parliamentary 
committee consisting of all political parties is then established to interview 
the nominees. The committee compiles a list of selected candidates for 
each position and submits it to the plenary session, where board members 
58 Preportr (2016) Official Website of Cohu, http://preportr.cohu.org/sq/per-ne 59 Kosovo 2.0 (2016) Official Website, www.kosovotwopointzero.com 
60 Sbunker (2016) Official Website, www.sbunker.net 61 Gashi, A. (2016) Author’s interview with Mr. Astrit Gashi, chairman of the board of Blic 
online media and a frequent commentator on media, civil society and politics. Pristina, June 
2016.62 The Law on Radio Television Kosovo and the Law on Independent Media Commission.
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are elected by a simple majority vote. None of the experts interviewed for 
this research believe that the procedure is sufficient to ensure appropriate 
representation of civil society. 
The fact that the parliamentary committee in charge of the selection of 
candidates represents the political parties as per their political power makes 
this process of selection entirely political.63 Furthermore, legal provisions 
only enable civil society to nominate candidates but the Committee does not have to select candidates who represent civil society; they can represent anybody.64 As a consequence, virtually all candidates that are appointed 
in these regulatory bodies are political clients, which leave civil society 
organizations and especially the media in an unsatisfactory position.65 
Taking a glance at the media reports on the selection procedure for these 
two important boards gives an impression of a great synergy between the 
efforts of CSOs and the media to stop this bad practice from happening, but 
unfortunately without yielding any results. Tens of media reports highlighted 
nomination of political clients for the boards of IMC and RTK boards yet all 
the joint public pressure with CSOs was not successful. In the eyes of the 
interviewees consulted for this research, the situation is bleak given the 
ability of political parties to outsmart the current system and inability of the 
media and CSOs to change it in such a way that it could guarantee proper 
representation of civil society. Media and CSOs have a better track record when cooperating in the 
self-regulatory body Kosovo Press Council, which regulates the press and 
some online media. Given that the Press Council is also seen as part of the 
civil society, numerous institutes and research centers have implemented 
continuous joint projects with the Council. 
Synergizing struggle: the power of media 
and civil society in Kosovo 
Although the efforts of Kosovo media and CSOs to establish independent 
and professional regulatory bodies that can implement the wide freedoms 
guaranteed by the constitution cannot be rated as successful, when it comes 
to influencing public agenda and discourse the situation is much different. 
In many policy cases, including some of the most controversial policies in 
63 Demi, A. (2016) Author’s interview with Mr. Agron Demi, executive director of Gap Institute. 
Pristina, June 2016.64 Zhubi, D. (2016) Author’s interview with Mr. Driton Zhubi, executive director of NGO LENS. 
Pristina, June 2016.65 Demi, A. (2016) Author’s interview with Mr. Agron Demi, executive director of Gap Institute. 
Pristina, June 2016.
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Kosovo, the media and civil society have shown their power of influence 
whenever they could build a synergy of operations. 
One of the most salient cases is the one from 2012 when the new Criminal 
Code of Kosovo was enacted, including three problematic provisions that 
could be abused by courts to suppress freedom of the media and compel 
journalists to reveal their sources under broadly defined circumstances.66 
For weeks media and civil society activists were putting pressure on 
policymakers to change or clarify the problematic provisions, yet, given the 
support the government had from the European Union Office and the United 
States Embassy in Pristina, the Code was formally adopted in the Parliament. 
With high stakes at play, the pressure of the media and CSOs became more 
organized, leading to eventual vetoing of the Code by the President of Kosovo, 
resignation of the Minister of Justice and adoption of a new Criminal Code 
without the problematic provisions.67 This case of media and CSO synergy is 
worth a more detailed study, as it is for the first time that neither the media nor 
civil society organizations could use the international community’s presence 
in Kosovo to put pressure on authorities, as they usually do. In other words, 
the battle over the Criminal Code was fought by media and CSOs without 
major support. Not only were the problematic provisions removed from the 
new Criminal Code, but the momentum was used to initiate a new law on 
protection of journalistic sources, which was adopted soon after, marking 
an important legal step toward implementing constitutional provisions on 
media freedoms. 
Other salient cases where the media and CSOs have shown their power 
vis-à-vis policy makers include the Law on Amnesty, when they sided with 
the opposition to shape a controversial law that stemmed from Kosovo’s 
dialogue with Serbia, public pressure against particular cabinet ministers, 
amendments of legislation on electronic wiretapping, as well as any policy 
directly related to the media or civil society. 
Another case worth mentioning is also from 2012, the case of the Law 
on the Central Bank of Kosovo and Microfinance Institutions. With the 
new law, the government challenged the basic mechanism of Kosovo’s civil 
society system, which guarantees that the wealth accumulated by not-for-
profit organizations should remain within the civil society sector and cannot 
be divided as profit.68 The new law would have allowed the Central Bank to 
66 Gashi, K. (2013) Kosovo, in Freedom House, Nation in Transitm https://freedomhouse.org/
report/nations-transit/2013/kosovo67 Koha Ditore, Miratohet ne parim kodi penal pa nenet problematike [New Criminal 
Code, without problematic provisions, adopted in principle] 5 July 2012, http://koha.
net/?id=8&arkiva=1&l=106033 68 Gashi, K. (2013) Kosovo, in Freedom House, Nation in Transit https://freedomhouse.org/
report/nations-transit/2013/kosovo
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turn microfinance NGOs into for-profit businesses, without stipulating what 
is to happen with their assets, including some 100 million euros they had 
accumulated from their operations.69 In a synergized campaign, media and 
civil society organizations advocated with the Office of the Ombudsperson 
who addressed the issue to the Constitutional Court. In 2013, the Court 
ruled that the provisions of the law contested by the civil society were 
unconstitutional and that assets of NGOs could not be transferred to for-
profit entities. 
Beside these special occasions, Kosovo think tanks and advocacy groups 
work directly with the policy-makers and have a significant influence in and 
on the policy-making process. There are more and more organizations that 
are profiling themselves into different policy areas, where they have gathered 
knowledge and built expertise, areas in which they are really competent when 
influencing policies.70 This influence, however, is marginalized on policy issues where political parties have a direct interest.71 In its annual report, 
the European Commission has continuously criticized Kosovo authorities 
for not cooperating sufficiently with civil society. The cooperation is not 
inexistent but rather happens on an ad hoc basis. Some particular media, especially those that apply stronger standards and have better sustainability 
index, have similar influence on policies.
Kosovo’s civil society and its media are very often engaged in ad hoc 
coalitions or consortiums for a particular policy cause. In such cases, their 
forces are synergized and the effect of their joint work is noticeable. As 
Astrit Gashi puts it, media and CSOs have a great influence on shaping the 
public opinion, yet, it remains unknown as to what extent the public is using 
that opinion when making decisions.72 All the interviewees consulted for 
this research noted that there is quite some influence of the media and civil 
society in the society at large, but also expressed their dissatisfaction with 
the level of such influence, which could have been much greater. 
It is worth mentioning that the influence of certain NGOs in the policy-
making process in the central level has created the environment for many 
local NGOs to repeat their work at the level of local governments. Virtually in 
every municipality in Kosovo, there are NGOs that monitor, evaluate and/or work directly with local authorities. 
69 Ibid
70 Ejupi, B. (2016) Author’s interview with Mr. Burim Ejupi, executive director of INDEP and a 
civil society expert in Kosovo. Pristina, June 2016.71 Demi, A. (2016) Author’s interview with Mr. Agron Demi, executive director of Gap Institute. 
Pristina, June 2016.72 Gashi, A. (2016) Author’s interview with Mr. Astrit Gashi, chairman of the board of Blic 
online media and a frequent commentator on media, civil society and politics. Pristina, June 
2016.
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Conclusions 
As we have shown, Kosovo has a vibrant public scene where media and 
civil society are influential. Both actors, media and civil society, see each 
other to be of crucial importance for their own activities. Thus, civil society 
reports and opinions are featured regularly in the media. Journalists have 
created a pattern of including civil society activists and leaders in most of 
the policy-related stories, in the role of independent analysts. The positions 
of civil society organizations are very often embraced by the media, creating 
a synergy of efforts and resulting in policy change.
The partnership between Kosovo media and civil society, however, 
remains informal. Due to the context in which the media operates in 
Kosovo, with fragile sustainability and questionable professional standards, 
journalists are mainly reporting on the civil society’s work in a shallow 
manner, preferring to quote activists instead of digging through well-
researched reports. On the other hand, the context in which the civil society 
operates, with no steady income and rather project-driven financing, leaves 
them understaffed and unprepared to disseminate their work through the 
media. Frictions between civil society and media exist, albeit to a less extent than those in the neighboring countries. This overall setting leaves the cooperation between the two sectors in a 
rather ad-hoc basis. In spite of the ad-hoc nature, however, we have shown 
that on some crucial issues and very controversial policies, the synergy of 
actions by civil society and media has opened the way for them to assert their 
power in the policy-making process. Joint projects and activities between 
media and CSOs should be encouraged, as they could serve as a great step 
towards a more systematic cooperation between the two sectors. 
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MACEDONIA
Friends and enemies, 
polarization and conspiracies
Marina Tuneva
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Short overview of media landscapeThe media landscape in Macedonia is very diverse and there are numerous media outlets, both traditional and online. More specifically, there are: 5 national private television stations,  55 regional and local 
TV stations and 6 cable TV stations at the national level, 8 newspapers,  8 
magazines and 76 radio stations at the national and local level, as well as 
hundreds of internet portals and internet televisions. Apart from these 
media, several cable television stations were established in recent years that 
produce programs in the Macedonian and Albanian language. We could say 
that, beside the public national broadcaster MRT, Macedonia has more than 
200 media outlets that are privately owned1.
Despite the large number of media outlets in the country, there is 
continuous criticism that the confrontation between the two main opponents 
within the Macedonian political block and the political domination of the 
ruling party VMRO-DPMNE has affected the entire media scene after 2011. 
One of the mechanisms for dominance over the media scene was state 
advertising, which caused dependence of private media on the state budget, 
thus opening the way for direct influence in newsrooms. Hence, public 
interest in the media is often replaced with individual interests of various 
political parties, or business centers. Media content is often detrimental 
to citizens because they are repeatedly subject of media manipulation and 
have difficulties accessing accurate and timely information from mainstream 
media. “The CSO sector, despite making progress over the last decades, still 
has a quite limited influence on public policies and consequently on the 
wider processes of good governance”2. 
1  Agency for Audio and Audiovisual Media Services, Market analysis of audio and audiovisual 
media services for 2014 (2015) see: http://www.avmu.mk/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=1154&Itemid=463&lang=mk, (accessed 11 May 2016)2  B. Petkovic, ed. Media Integrity Matters – Reclaiming Public Service Values in Media and 
Journalism, Peace Institute Ljubljana, 2015, p.262-265
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Criticism for media content is contained in recent reports based on a 
monitoring of traditional media outlets, conducted by the state regulator, 
the Agency for Audio and Audiovisual Media Services (AVMS), and the 
monitoring by the Institute of Communication Studies within the project 
“Democracy Watch 2015: Political pluralism in the media before and during 
elections (MODEM).”3 These reports point out to some of the mainstream 
traditional media as unprofessional and unethical in the coverage of certain 
topics in the first half of 2016. Reports identified tendencies of breaching the 
Code of Journalists and the Law in the programs of the public broadcaster, 
the Macedonian Radio Television (MRT) and in at least three national private TV stations. 
In addition to this, reports by the international organizations that 
monitor the media situation in the country continuously rank the country at 
a very low level with regard to media freedoms. Thus, following the Index of 
Freedom of Expression by Reporters Without Borders4, Macedonia is ranked 118th out of 180 countries in the world and in reports for 20165, Freedom 
House assessed that Macedonia is one of four countries in Europe considered 
non-free in terms of the media sector. The other three countries included in 
this report are Russia, Belarus and Turkey.
Due to all these problems that negatively affect the work of the media 
and their editorial policy, the media issue has become a political requirement 
that should be met through implementation of systemic reforms in the sector 
by Macedonia in its Euro-Atlantic integration process. Reforms in the media 
sector are part of the “Przino Agreement”6. 
3 Institute for Communication Studies, Report from the Monitoring of the Media Content 
Through the Rapid Response Media Mechanism of the Institute of Communication Studies 
(2016), see:  http://respublica.edu.mk/modem/23-18-dekemvri-2015/First-Monthly-
report-MODEM-28_12_15%20EN_PDF.pdf (accessed May 15 2016) 4  Reporters without Borders, 2016 World Press Freedom Index (2016) see: https://rsf.org/
en/macedonia (accessed June 13 2016)  5  Freedom House, Freedom of the Press 2016, see: https://freedomhouse.org/report/
freedom-press/2016/macedonia (accessed May 18th 2016) 6  The Przino agreement, or agreement from 2 June – 15 July, is a political agreement 
among the main political parties in the Republic of Macedonia with the mediation of the 
European Union. The agreement ended the Macedonian political and institutional crisis 
in the first half of 2015. It included: the participation of the opposition party SDSM in the 
ministries; the early resignation of Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski in January 2016 and a 
caretaker government to bring the country to general elections in June 2016, as well as a 
Special prosecutor to lead the investigations about the eventual crimes highlighted by the 
wiretapping scandal, see: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/news_corner/news/news-
files/20150619_agreement.pdf (Accessed 19 May 2016)
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The state of civil society
The fundamentals for free operation of civil society organizations (CSOs) 
in Macedonia are provided with the Constitution of the country and, more 
specifically, in the Law on Citizens’ Associations and Foundations. This Law 
is one of the least amended laws in Macedonia, taking into consideration 
that the first Law on Citizens’ Associations and Foundations dates back from 
July 1998 and amendments on this version of the Law were made 9 years 
after, i.e. in 2007. This Law was abrogated with the adoption of the “new” 
Law on Citizens’ Associations and Foundations (LCAF) that the Parliament 
of the Republic of Macedonia adopted on 16th of April 2010 – a version, that 
a year later, was amended again. Hence, there were only two laws in the last 
18 years and both versions were amended once.
The current Law regulates: the manner, the conditions and procedures 
for establishing, registration and terminating of associations, foundations and 
organizational types of foreign organizations in the Republic of Macedonia, 
their available assets, supervising, statutory changes and the status of public 
benefit organizations. The provisions of this Law do not pertain to political 
parties, churches, religious communities and religious groups, trade unions, 
chambers and other forms of association regulated by separate laws7. 
Until the adoption of the “new” Law on Citizens’ Associations and 
Foundations in 2010, the number of CSOs was 11,350.  By March 2012, only 
3,732 CSOs had re-registered in compliance with the obligations set out in 
the 2010 Law.8
In the last several years, the number of organizations has significantly 
increased - there were 11,457 associations and foundations registered by 
2010. Pursuant to the new Law on Associations and Foundations adopted in 
2010, organizations were required to register again; thus the number of re-
registered organizations by March 2012 reached 3,732.
According to data published by the Central Registry of Macedonia 
(CRM), there are an increasing number of registered CSOs (associations and 
foundations). The registry enlists a total of 14,245 organizations in 2015, in 
comparison to 2014, when 13,656 CSOs were registered. Active organizations 
7 International Center for Not-for-Profit-Law, Law on Associations and Foundations (2010) see: http://www.tacso.org/doc/mk0020.pdf (Accessed 1 June 2016) 8  Government of Republic of Macedonia, Strategy for Cooperation with the NGOs (2012-2017), see: http://www.gov2gov.info/uploads/library/1450261274_strategy-for-cooperation-of-
the-government-with-the-civil-society--282012-2017-29.pdf (Accessed May 10 2016) 
 http://www.nvosorabotka.gov.mk/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_
view&gid=22&Itemid=37
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are considered those that submitted audit reports or provided a financial 
statement. A total of 3,938 CSOs have completed this requirement9. 
Based on the Civil Society Index - CIVICUS (2011)10, CSOs are described 
as “moderately developed” in terms of institutions and values. According to 
data published by the Financial Intelligence Unit concerning 11,350 CSOs, 
their budgets are very small and only 5 CSOs have an annual budget of more 
than 1.6 million EUR.
Sustainability continues to be a key challenge, and this is confirmed 
by the financial indicators pertaining to CSOs. Namely, most (65%) of CSOs 
submitted only a financial statement, which means that they had an annual 
budget below 2,500 EUR; furthermore, there is a small number of employees 
in CSOs and, last but not least, they are financially dependent on donations and grants.
The total expenditures of CSOs in Macedonia were 60,226,397 EUR.11
In addition to this description of the CSO status in Macedonia, there 
are significant findings identified in the Progress Report of the European 
Commission for Macedonia for 2015. Although the Report notes that some 
progress was made, CSOs continued to show serious concerns about the 
difficult climate in which they operate. Based on the CSO’s reports, the EU 
progress report marked that they have been a subject to harsh criticism 
by politicians and pro-government media, and that there was limited 
Government commitment to a dialogue12. The 2015 Progress report also 
states that, during the political crisis in the country, CSOs often played a 
constructive role by organizing numerous peaceful protests across ethnic 
lines and demanded greater accountability by politicians. There is also a 
general remark that national authorities should involve CSOs in policy-
making and in amendments of legislation in a more regular and effective 
manner. 
9 Macedonian Center for International Cooperation, A Report About the Positive Environment 
Enabling the Development of Civil Society in Macedonia (2015), see: http://mcms.org.mk/
images/docs/2016/izvestaj-za-ovozmozuvacka-okolina-na-go-vo-mk-2015.pdf (Accessed 
1 June 2016)
10 Macedonian Center for International Cooperation, CIVICUS: Civil Society Index- Analytical 
Country Report on Macedonia (2011) see: https://civicus.org/downloads/CSI/Macedonia.
pdf (accessed 11 June 2016)11 European Centre for Not-For-Profit-Law, A Report About the Positive Environment Enabling 
the Development of Civil Society in Macedonia (2015), see: http://ecnl.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/06/MM-Regional-Report-2014.pdf (Accessed 11 June 2016) 12 European Commission, Progress Report 2015 see: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/
key_documents/2015/20151110_report_the_former_yugoslav_republic_of_macedonia.pdf 
(Accessed 2 June 2016)
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In June 2016, a total of 89 CSOs issued a public response to the 
Government, in which they seek to stop the process for a selection of CSO 
representatives in the Council for Cooperation between the Government and civil society.13 These CSOs demanded amendments of the Decision 
on establishment of the Council and consultative process with CSO 
representatives, with an objective to offer varied opinions of relevance 
to the Council’s work. This joint public reaction followed the Decision 
of the Government to appoint majority members within the Council for 
Cooperation from the public institutions and as result of the objections for a 
lack of transparency in the process. These reactions undoubtedly prove the 
lack of mutual trust between national authorities and the civil society sector in the country.  
Coverage of civil society in the media
In a period of two weeks, starting from June 13th until June 29th, coverage 
of the CSO sector in the country was monitored in the following four daily 
newspapers (in Macedonian language): 
- Sloboden pecat
- Vest 
- Vecer
- Utrinski vesnik 
Within the same period, the following Internet portals were also 
analyzed: 
- www.plusinfo.mk
- www.dnevnik.mk
- www.emagazin.mk
None of the covered stories/reports take a dominant place in the 
newspapers, with an exception of the cases where the CSO sector was 
involved in politically related events in the country, such as in the so-
called “Colorful revolution”14. The CSO’s involvement in the “revolution” is 
13 The public reaction is published at the web page of the Macedonian Center for International 
Cooperation (MCIC), see: http://www.mcms.org.mk/en/news-and-publicity/news/1783-
da-se-zapre-izborot-na-pretstavnici-vo-sovetot-za-sorabotka-na-vladata-so-gragjanskiot-
sektor.html (Accessed 10 June 2016) 14 This is the term used for the protest movement that draws on the country’s diversity and 
extends across the political spectrum, uniting people of all stripes, ages, and colors to 
air their grievances against the government. These protests differ from the protests that 
erupted in February 2015 when the opposition released recordings allegedly made illegally 
by the government.
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reaffirmed and supported in some of the dailies (e.g. Sloboden pecat), while 
it is heavily criticized in others, where the story is framed in a negative way 
(e.g. Vecer daily). There are similar tendencies noticed in Internet portals. 
While the activities related to the “Colorful revolution” are reported in a 
neutral manner in the portal Emagazin, they are either neutrally or positively 
covered in Plusinfo and ignored in Dnevnik. 
A daily newspaper which mostly reported about the CSO sector is 
Sloboden Pecat,15 the newest media outlet in the country compared with the 
others. Out of the five newspapers analyzed, Sloboden pecat has a total of 11 
articles about the CSO sector in this period, compared to the others which vary between 4-6 articles. 
- Vecer
- Utrinski vesnik 
Within the same period, the following Internet portals were also analyzed: 
- www.plusinfo.mk
- www.dnevnik.mk
- www.emagazin.mk
None of the covered stories/reports take a dominant place in the newspapers, with an exception 
of the cases where the CSO sector was involved in politically related events in the country, such 
as in the so-called “Colorful revolution”155. The CSO’s involvement in the “revolution” is 
reaffirmed and supported in some of the dailies (e.g. Sloboden pecat), while it is heavily 
criticized in others, where the story is framed in a negative way (e.g. Vecer daily). There are 
similar tendencies noticed in Int rnet po tals. Whil  the activities related to the “Colorful 
revolution” are reported in a neutral manner in the portal Emagazin, they are either neutrally or 
positively covered in Plusinfo and ignored in Dnevnik. 
A daily newspaper which mostly reported about the CSO sector is Sloboden Pecat,156 the newest 
media outlet in the cou try compared with the oth rs. Out of the five newspapers analyzed, 
Sloboden pecat has a total f 11 articles about the CSO sector in this period, compared to the 
others which vary between 4-6 articles. 
Out of the dailies analyzed, Sloboden Pecat is the one which covers the activities of the CSO 
sector in a neutral or positive manner, while Vecer and Dnevnik, which are considered dailies 
that are inclined toward the ruling party, mostly report about this sector in a negative manner.
155This is the term used for the protest movement that draws on the country's diversity and extends across the 
political spectrum, uniting people of all stripes, ages, and colors to air their grievances against the government. 
These protests differ from the protests that erupted in February 2015 when the opposition released 
recordings allegedly made illegally by the government.
156 The first edition of this daily appeared on October 19th, 2013 in Skopje.  
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Out of the dailies analyzed, Sloboden Pecat is the one which covers the 
activities of the CSO sector in a neutral or positive manner, while Vecer and 
Dnevnik, which are considered dailies that are inclined toward the ruling 
party, mostly eport about this ecto  in a negative mann r. Quite often, the 
activities of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights are covered in this 
daily and it is an organization whose members actively take part in the 
Colorful r volu ion. 
The only difference is that when this topic is on the agenda of the daily 
Sloboden Pecat (which is considered to lean toward the opposition) it is 
covered in an affirmative, i.e. positive way, while in Vecer it is only covered in 
a negative way as, for instance, with the following title “How much money do 
foreigners pay to participants in the Colorful revolution”16. 
Vest covers the activities of the CSO sector in a neutral manner, with 
short articles and its focus is on Roma CSOs, organizations that work with 
15  The first edition of this daily appeared on October 19th, 2013 in Skopje. 16  This article is published in daily Vecer on the 29th of June. It is a very long article, which puts 
the NGOs Sollidarnost and Lenka in the main focus, while making speculations about the 
sources of financing, the motives for the involvement of these NGOs in the “revolution”, etc.
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people with disabilities, as well as CSOs working with children. USAID 
and UNDP supported projects are briefly presented in some of its articles. 
While the tone of coverage is neutral, there is an absence of the voice of a 
representative from the CSOs covered in the article. Most of the articles are 
covered in the middle of the newspaper in places which are not so dominant on the page.  
The activities of CSOs working on issues related to the LGBT community in the country are covered twice in Sloboden Pecat, once in an affirmative 
way, by raising the question about homophobia in the society and once in a neutral way. In Dnevnik this issue is covered once, framed in a negative 
context, i.e. that “USAID spends money to support the LGBT community in 
Macedonia while a massacre happened in the US (in Orlando)”17. 
Utrinski vesnik covers the activities of the CSO sector less frequently. The 
four articles referring to the CSO sector begin to appear from the 22nd of June 
and all of them are neutral. One of the articles is at a dominant place in the 
daily, i.e. on the second page, and extensively covers findings of a research 
by a CSO related to a public opinion poll about the resolution of the name 
dispute with Greece. The dominance of this story in the introductory pages 
of the daily once again confirms the practice that an important space is 
allocated for CSO stories that deal with topics that deal with political issues in the country. 
Taking into consideration that June was a month for organizing pride 
parades at a global level, the LGBT community, and organizations that 
address the issues that this community faces were extensively covered in 
some of the media outlets. For example, this was the case with the coverage 
of the informative portal Emagazin, where a total of 10 articles referred to 
this topic. This internet portal also extensively covers the work of the CSO 
sector in general, with a frequency of 3-4 articles daily. It also has a separate section “Good neighbors’ relations” where the activities of the CSO sector are 
extensively covered. The tone of reporting is always neutral. 
In general, the activities and statements of the CSOs to the public are 
covered through press releases and press-conferences or similar events. There are rarely cases when a direct voice is given to a CSO representative 
in the articles. More often than not, the media does not cover the CSO sector 
in great detail and information is unattractive for the wider audience. There 
is no background provided either on the profile of the CSO or the history of its work. 
17  This is the title of the article in daily Dnevnik, 15.06.2016, pages 2-3
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What civil society thinks about media?
Five senior experts in the field of CSOs and media development were 
interviewed for the purposes of this research paper. More specifically, they 
are leaders of well-known, credible CSOs/consultancy organizations in 
Macedonia that, amongst other, work on assessments of the status of the civil 
and media sector and have a variety of advocacy actions that are aimed at 
improving the relations between the CSOs and the media outlets. There are divided opinions in relation to the question about the image 
that the civil society has in the media. It appears that CSOs often do not 
understand the role of the media and, conversely, media often perceive CSOs as “money laundering machines”. Yet, CSOs consider media as influential in 
creating public perception about policies of the civil sector, but often there 
is not much interest among the media about the CSO’s topics and there is 
even misinterpretation about the issues presented by the CSOs. Besides, 
there is another issue. The Code of Journalists18 is quite often breached and, 
as one of the interviewees says, “the media does not inform about the event; 
instead it just covers a quote from a ‘foreigner’ presenting the event from his/
her perspective; and they also do not identify the source of information in the 
investigative analysis”. In addition, the same news is copied in many media 
outlets, to the extent that identical grammar errors are made.
The interviewees note that polarization is another issue that is obvious 
in the way media report on CSO topics, which also affects the coverage of 
the CSO’s news/events. In addition, CSOs perceive that media mainly focuses 
on daily political issues and media coverage of other issues of importance 
to the CSOs is insufficient. On the other hand, many of the media are seen 
as being controlled by the political elites. Critical CSOs are often ignored by 
the mainstream media and, in this regard, an organization which is often 
negatively depicted in the media is the Foundation Open Society Macedonia 
and this is also a case with other affiliated CSOs. As explained by one of the 
interviewed persons, “the term ‘SOROSIODS’ is frequently used in the last two 
years of the political crisis in the country. It was created in early 2000’s during 
the open attack of the right centered political parties towards the local SOROS 
Foundation (Foundation Open Society Institute Macedonia -FOSIM) after the 
decision of this organization to organize a campaign in support of the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement (OFA), a peace accord signed by Macedonian and 
Albanian politicians that ceased the armed conflict in the country in 2001”. 
18 Association of Journalists of Macedonia, Code of Journalists (2001), see: http://znm.org.
mk/?page_id=1412&lang=en (Accessed on 14 May 2016)
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In regard to the question whether media are perceived as a friend 
or an enemy, many considered media an enemy rather than a friend. 
However, as one of the experts emphasized, “if private links between CSOs 
and media or journalists exist, they can be cooperative partners”. Still, there 
are not many examples of cooperation between media and CSOs. With some 
rare exceptions, media are indifferent towards CSOs and their activities. In 
addition, as assessed by the experts interviewed, mainstream media allow 
themselves to be used as a tool by political elites to make pressure and criticize 
some CSOs. “CSOs usually claim they are interested in cooperation, however 
the majority of them often do not succeed to attract sufficient media attention”, 
one of the interviewed experts said. However, there is another issue in this 
regard and it is related to the fact that both CSOs and media contribute to 
their weak mutual interest. CSOs often lack capacities to “package” their 
issues, achievements and results in a user friendly and “digestible” format 
that can be easily covered in the media. Press releases sent by some CSOs are 
rather descriptive reports of their activities, instead of simple stories that can be understood by the wider audience. 
On the other hand, some of the interviewees think that the media is 
always a friend, even when their views are completely opposite. In addition, 
our findings from interviews indicate that independent media clearly 
understand the role of civil society and, in many cases they support CSO’s 
work. “Media influenced by the regime”, in the opinion of an interviewee, “are 
often considered enemies”. 
CSOs are committed to attracting media attention with lots of 
activities, thus perceiving them as an ally in their public relations efforts. 
However, CSOs often overburden media with lots of requirements for their 
participation at events, which means that they lack a proper judgment of the 
best opportunities or methods/tools/tactics to attract their attention. 
Another conclusion is that CSOs increasingly become aware that they 
need to use media as a main tool in their work, and this especially refers 
to those CSOs that are involved in advocacy activities and are committed to 
influencing policy creation, good governance, the fight against corruption, 
monitoring of social services, etc. “As a result of this awareness, CSOs pay 
more attention to the communication component and show interest in building 
their PR capacities”. Consequently, one of the experts recommends that “quite 
often project proposals of CSOs contain communication with media as a MUST!” 
On the other hand, there are many CSOs that can be seen on TV and in other 
media, their activities are promoted free of charge. CSO’s activities are often 
considered a great source to fill the programming needs of the media.
With regard to the extent to which media use analyses and evidence 
by CSOs, a general assessment of all interviewed experts is that this depends 
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on the particular interests of the media. On the other hand, even if media 
use information from CSOs, they often omit referencing the source of the 
information. However, there are some improvements in this regard. In the 
words of one of the experts, “it seems that CSOs offer more analyses lately with 
better quality, and they cover issues of high interest in the public”.
Interviewees were also asked about the influence and impact of media 
and civil society in decision-making and the extent to which they serve 
as platforms for promoting public participation in decision-making at all 
levels of governance. The general view is that the influence and impact 
are limited. This is explained with the fact that there are many situations 
of a collision between the interests of the political parties with those of 
CSOs. “CSOs and media are on different sides in this regard; CSOs’ findings 
can be used, while media can be misused to cover manipulative content in the 
interests of centers of power”, emphasized one of the interviewees. Another 
challenge is that CSOs often have to pay for the publication of their content in order to present relevant results or policy positions. This is particularly 
the case because media are not always interested in supporting CSO’s in the 
promotion of their policies and in the decision-making processes. Still, there 
are some opinions that CSOs are indeed more influential lately, especially in 
relation to the political crisis, rather than the media themselves. However, it 
is considered that the impact, both of CSOs and media, is quite limited and 
in this regard, there are opinions that CSO’s reports and arguments often are not taken into consideration by national authorities.
Representing public or politics?
National laws stipulate the existence of several multi-stakeholder bodies 
comprised of representatives of public institutions, the civil society sector 
and other relevant institutions. In addition, there are also member-based 
CSOs with multi - sectorial governance structure (e.g. Council of Media Ethics 
of Macedonia). 
Council of the media regulator19 – Agency for Media and Audio Visual 
Media Services. This is a multi - sectorial body, consisting of 7 members, out 
of whom 3 are CSOs, 1 representative from an educational institution, 1 from 
a chamber and 2 members from the Parliament.  Based on the Law on Audio 
and Audiovisual Media Services, the Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia 
appoints 7 members in the Council that are proposals from the following 
authorized nominators: the Majority Journalists’ Association of Macedonia 
19 Agency for Audio and Audiovisual Media Services, http://avmu.mk/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=55&Itemid=34&lang=en
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nominates one Council member; the Interuniversity Conference nominates 
one Council member; The Bar Association of the Republic of Macedonia 
nominates one Council member; the Trade Unions Association nominates 
one Council member; the Committee for Elections and Appointments of the 
Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia nominates two Council members; 
and the Association of the Local Self-government Units in the Republic of 
Macedonia nominates two Council members.
Programming Council of the public broadcaster (PBS), Macedonian 
Radio Television (MRT)20 – This is also a multi-sectorial body, consisting of 
13 members, out of whom 5 are CSOs, 1 from an educational institution, 2 from 
art institutions (Turkish and Albanian theater) and 5 from the Parliament. 
Based on the Law, the Parliament appoints 13 members that are proposed 
from the following authorized nominations: the Inter-University Conference 
nominates one member-candidate; the Albanian Theatre nominates one 
member-candidate; the Turkish Theatre nominates one member-candidate; 
the Majority Journalists’ Associations nominates two member-candidates; 
the Association of the Local Self-government Units nominates three member-
candidates; the Committee for Elections and Appointments of the Assembly 
of the Republic of Macedonia nominates five member-candidates.
One of the organizations that nominate two members (in the Council of 
the AVMU) and three members (in the Council of the MRT) is the Association 
of the Local Self-government Units in the Republic of Macedonia (ZELS). Both 
councils of the regulator and the organization are member based, whereas all 
the municipalities are the constituencies. It may be noted that, even though 
this organization is formally registered as a CSO, its members are part of 
the main political parties in the country and they represent political party 
interests, which does not necessarily mean that they represent the public or civil interests in general. 
National European Integration Council21 - The Council has 17 
members: four members from the opposition and the ruling party respectively, 
and ex officio members: the chairperson of the European Affairs Committee, 
chairperson of the Foreign Policy Committee and Co-chairperson of the Joint 
Parliamentary Committee of the Republic of Macedonia and the EU.
Members of the National Council are: the Vice-President of the 
Government in charge of  European affairs and one representative from the 
Cabinet of the President of the Republic of Macedonia, from the Cabinet of the 
20 Macedonian Radio Television, Annual Report of the work of the Macedonian Radio Television 
(MRT), see: http://goo.gl/3VQAuq (Accessed on 12 May 201)  21 National European Integration Council, http://www.sobranie.mk/national-european-
integration-council-621c4a67-3b5f-49ca-b84f-9345dcc9b589.nspx
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President of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia, the Macedonian 
Academy of Science and Arts, the Association of the Local Self-Government 
Units and the Journalists Association of the Republic of Macedonia 
respectively. These members participate in the work of the Council, without a right to vote.
There is a significant difference in the nominators of the National Council 
of Euro Integration and the other similar bodies since in this case, political 
parties directly nominate members together with the religious communities. 
It may be noted that in the councils of the media regulator and the public broadcaster there are institutionally established linkages between the CSOs 
and the media. As stipulated in the Law, the nominators are the “Majority 
Journalists’ Associations” or, as defined with the new media law, those are 
the journalistic associations (Association of Journalists and the Macedonian 
Association of Journalists). However, the 2015 European Commission 
Progress Report for Macedonia emphasized that: “representation of 
journalists is divided between two associations, the Association of Journalists 
of Macedonia (AJM) and the Macedonian Association of Journalists (MAN). 
Here too, polarization occurs along political lines, with the recently reactivated 
MAN tending towards pro-government stances on most issues. The older of 
the organizations, the AJM, has continued to draw attention to a number of 
important issues such as the impact of government advertising on the diversity 
of the media and the role of the media during the political crisis”22.
Other organizations which are part of the CSO sector and where their 
councils, commissions and boards consist of different stakeholders from the 
media and the public include the Council of Media Ethics of Macedonia 
(CMEM)23, the sole independent media self- regulatory body in Macedonia. 
The structure of the Managing Board of the CMEM is a mix of journalists and 
media owners: four of the Board members are nominated by representatives 
of the media owners and three from the journalists proposed by the 
Association of Journalists of Macedonia. The Press Complaints Committee 
has a similar structure, i.e. it is composed of seven members, out of whom 
two are representatives of the media owners, two are representatives 
of journalists proposed by the Association of Journalists, and three are 
representatives of public life.
Regarding the independence of these bodies, some of the findings from 
national and international reports state that there is a lack of financial 
dependence, lack of transparency in their work and interference by political 
22 European Commission, 2015 Progress Report, see: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/
key_documents/2015/20151110_report_the_former_yugoslav_republic_of_macedonia.pdf 
(Accessed 11 May 2016) 
Macedonia: Friends and enemies, polarization and conspiracies
87
parties into their work. As stated in these reports, the PBS is biased towards 
the ruling parties, while the Agency of Media is inclined towards the private 
media outlets which are also biased in favor of the government. The 2015 EC 
Progress Report stated that: “The largest television outlets with concessions to 
broadcast nationally (SITEL, KANAL5, ALFA and MRT, the public broadcaster) 
favor the Government and report selectively on opposition or civil society 
activities.”24  
Bridges and walls
There are several mainstream journalism and media organizations that are 
quite often present in the public sphere with a critical stance on the main 
challenges that affect the sector. Their findings and analyses are frequently 
quoted in different reports that assess the media situation and the media 
sector in general, such as in the reports of the European Commission, United 
Nations, OSCE, Reporters Without Borders, Freedom House, the International 
Federation of Journalists, etc. 
Association of Journalists of Macedonia (AJM)25 was founded 
in 1946. AJM is an independent, non-governmental and non- political 
party organization, whose purpose is to be the protector and promoter of 
professional standards and freedom of expression. AJM is a member of the 
International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) and the European Federation of 
Journalists (EFJ).
Independent Trade Union of Journalists (ITUJ)26 – is a union-based 
organization founded in 2010, in compliance with the Labor Rights Law. 
This organization protects the social rights of journalists. The Union is also a 
member of IFJ and EFJ.
Council of Media Ethics (CMEM)27 - is a non-governmental, non-
political and non-profit organization founded in 2013 and it is a media self 
- regulatory body that protects the Ethical Code of journalists and promotes 
professional standards in the media. CMEM is a member of the Alliance of 
Independent Press Councils of Europe (AIPCE) and the regional network of press councils MediaNethics.
23  Council of Media Ethics of Macedonia, see: http://semm.mk/en/council-on-ethics/who-we-are 24 European Commission, 2015 Progress Report, see: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/
key_documents/2015/20151110_report_the_former_yugoslav_republic_of_macedonia.pdf 
(Accessed 11 May 2016)25 Association of Journalists of Macedonia, http://znm.org.mk/?lang=en 26 Independent Trade Union of Journalists, http://ssnm.org.mk/za-ssnm/ 27 Council of Media Ethics of Macedonia, www.semm.mk
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Macedonian Institute for Media (MIM)28 - is a non-governmental, 
non-political and non-profit organization founded by the Danish School of 
Journalism, USAID/IREX Pro Media and the Macedonian Press Centre in 
2001. The Institute is a founder of the high education institution the School 
of Journalism and Public Relations. MIM is a member of numerous networks 
whose mission is aimed at strengthening the professional standards and 
ethics of journalists in the region and worldwide.
The above-mentioned organizations have been publicly vocal in their 
critical observations of the media situation and the unfavorable environment 
of journalists and media workers in Macedonia. These organizations have 
been functional also as a non-formal platform, especially regarding legal 
reforms in the media sector. They frequently organize different public events 
on relevant topics in the area of professional and ethical reporting, promotion 
of media self - regulation, social rights and status of journalists, as well as 
a variety of trainings accessible to journalists from all media outlets at the 
national level. In addition, there are some incentives for journalists, such as 
annual awards organized by AJM and MIM that stimulate professional and 
investigative reporting. On the other hand, different multilingual guidelines 
are developed and published to support the work of journalists and media workers. 
Other organizations that have been active in the sector in recent years 
are the Media Development Center (MDC)29, the Center for Civic Cooperation 
(CCC)30, NVOInfocentar31, Metamorphosis32, Transparency International 
Macedonia (TIM)33 and others. These organizations are not member-based 
as the ones mentioned above and they predominantly act as think - thank 
organizations that frequently publish different types of assessments and 
organize trainings for civil activists and journalists. Another civil society 
organization that is active in the media sector is Civil - Center for Freedom.34
28 Macedonian Institute for Media, http://mim.org.mk/index.php/en/about-mim1 29 Media Development Center, http://mdc.org.mk/en/
30 Center for Civic Cooperation, http://ccc.org.mk/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=98&Itemid=80&lang=en
31 NGO Info Center, http://nvoinfocentar.mk/en/
32  Metamorphosis, http://metamorphosis.org.mk/en/about/
33  Transparency International Macedonia http://www.transparency.mk/en/index.
php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12&Itemid=26
34  Civil, http://civil.org.mk/profile-of-civil/
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Media, civil society, and public participation
There have been a significant number of initiatives aimed at linking the CSO 
sector, media and the public in general, to influence the decision-making 
process and to amend legislation. Regardless of the level of their efficiency in 
reaching the ultimate objectives, it is worthwhile to briefly describe some of 
those in the context of our analysis. 
One of the recent initiatives is the joint submission of a draft law for 
amending the current Law on Audio and Audiovisual Media Services by a 
non-formal platform composed of representatives of the media civil sector35. 
The initiative, among others, refers to changes of this law with regard to 
state advertising for the media, political and financial independence of the state regulator and the public broadcaster etc. 
As far as the media reforms in the society are concerned there has been a 
process of consultations among CSOs, the media community and political 
partners headed by a mediator appointed by the EU Delegation in Skopje. 
This process has been taking place for several months in the course of 2015 
and 2016, during which the media community was provided an opportunity 
to exchange views on the media reforms, implementation of the Przino 
Agreement and the Urgent Reform Priorities set forth by the European 
Commission in June 201536. This was a good model for the inclusion of 
different actors in consultation processes addressing legislation and the 
entire environment in which CSOs and media operate. 
The Institute for Communication Studies, through its platform for 
digital citizenship Res Publica37, allows comprehensive professional 
discussion to improve media and communication policies and standards, 
strengthen the role of the academic and professional community in public 
policies and provide strategic participation of civil society in protecting 
the public interest in Macedonia. The main purpose of Res Publica is to 
empower citizens, journalists, experts and members of other communities to 
participate and debate on matters of public interest, creating a professional 
network that will analyze these issues. Its associates are professionals who 
are experts in their fields or policy makers and, in this way, the public is 
encouraged to form opinions and make decisions in an informed manner.
35  See the press statement at http://znm.org.mk/?p=1861&lang=en (Accessed on 15 June 
2016) 
36  Urgent Reform Priorities for the Republic of Macedonia, see: http://ec.europa.eu/
enlargement/news_corner/news/news-files/20150619_urgent_reform_priorities.pdf 
(Accessed 12 June 2016)
37  Res Public digital platform, http://respublica.edu.mk/
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The Council of Media Ethics of Macedonia initiated the establishment 
of a non-formal working group to address the use of hate speech in the 
media. The network is to be composed of representatives from the civil society 
sector, media organizations, journalists and editors and representatives of 
state institutions. This is considered of particular importance in dealing 
with hate speech, as there has been wider criticism about the inefficiency 
to tackle this problem. On the other hand, the Council of Media Ethics also 
made an effort to link citizens, media and the public in general, through 
the adoption of a Charter on Ethical Reporting During Elections38. Taking 
into consideration that the country is ahead of early parliamentary elections, 
an immediate need has been identified for a more direct involvement of the 
public in monitoring media work and for the observance of professional 
standards in journalistic work. This initiative also came in parallel to the 
discussions about reforms in the media, particularly in relation to their 
professional work. It was supplemented with a research on perceptions 
of citizens and journalists about the topic of self-regulation in the media, 
as well as on the most immediate problems to be addressed in the area of 
media work. 
The importance of civic participation through social media and networks 
has become visible and effectuated through the wider mobilization of 
students in the protests against the recent elections of the management of 
the Student parliament, a body that stands for students rights at the State 
University “Saint Cyril and Methodius” in Skopje.  This has been also a case 
in the past when students mobilized themselves in protests against reforms 
in the higher education system. 
Conclusions
The research showed that CSOs invest a lot of effort into communication 
with the media and the public; however, more emphasis could be given to 
interactive aspects of that communication.
1. CSOs in Macedonia are moderately developed in terms of institutions and values and their sustainability continues to be a challenge;
2. The environment in which CSOs operate, especially those that 
criticize the work of national authorities, is unfavorable and they 
are often the subject of negligence or ignorance and criticism by 
mainstream media that tend to favor the Government;
38 Charter on Ethical Reporting During Elections, see: http://semm.mk/en/news/2015-08-
11-15-03-18/204-2016-01-27-13-41-21 (Accessed 15 June 2016)
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3. None of the news stories about the CSO sector takes a dominant 
place in the analyzed media outlets; 
4. Generally, there is low level of coverage of CSOs’ activities in the 
media and coverage is limited to some CSOs, particularly those that take part in activities linked to changes in the politics in the country;
5. While there are media outlets that cover the activities of the CSO 
sector in a neutral fashion, there are other media outlets that portray 
the activities of this sector in a negative way, particularly if this stems 
from the political affiliation of the media outlet; 
6. There have been wider perceptions that the media and the CSO 
sector do not understand each other’s role sufficiently, hence there is 
a need for additional education on both sides; 
7. Polarization among CSOs also reflects the portrayal of the CSO sector 
in the media;
8. There are initiatives aimed at establishing linkages between the 
CSO sector and the media in achieving changes in legislation and 
in the decision - making process, as recommended in different 
international repots; However, there haven’t been any outstanding 
achievements due to the lack of systematic and strategic connection 
with the institutions and the political actors to this objective; and
9. Due to the polarization of the media, there is biased selection of 
news, which creates unfair access of the public to different topics of 
relevance for their informed choices. This also affects the CSOs that 
cannot equally promote their actions publicly. However, social media 
and the civil society media “compensate” this gap and contribute to 
the distribution of news among different audiences.  
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Short overview of media landscape
Liberal entry to the media market and, generally to the journalistic profession, 
introduced in the early 2000s, brought a pluralism of views to a young 
democratic media scene in Montenegro. Currently, there are six television 
channels with national coverage, and a dozen local, 54 radio stations, four 
national dailies, one political weekly, and several local editions of Serbian 
daily papers and tabloids that cover a population of less than 650,000. 
However, failure to introduce a functional mechanism of safeguarding the 
professional standards and fair competitive environment left these freedoms open to abuses.  
Insufficient transparency about media ownership1, poor implementation 
of antimonopoly measures, and weak rules on media concentration have 
led to the creation of media clusters that deeply polarise the media scene 
in the country. Organised around a single editorial policy, sided either with 
or against the ruling party, such media clusters are used by political power 
centres for the propagation of their agendas and to smear their opponents, 
often disregarding professional standards and neglecting the public interest. 
Many media outlets are not financially sustainable and this has a negative 
impact on the quality of reporting and professionalism. Some major private 
media outlets are at risk of failure due to high tax debts. On the other hand, 
there are concerns about transparency and non-discrimination in state 
advertising. According to Montenegro’s media trade union, journalists are 
poorly paid and their jobs are not secure. In the past three years, at least 500 
journalists lost their jobs, while three TV stations and one newspaper closed 
due to poor financial performance. 
1  D. Brkić, “Media ownership and financing in Montenegro”, in B. Petković (ed.) Media 
Integrity Reports, Peace Institute, Institute for Contemporary Social and Political 
Studies, Ljubljana, 2015, http://mediaobservatory.net/sites/default/files/Media%20
Ownership%20and%20Finances%20in%20Montenegro.pdf (accessed 23 May 2016).
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Economic pressures put journalists at risk of editorial interference and 
self-censorship. 
The problems proved persistent for many years. In assessing freedom 
of expression in 20152, the European Commission noted that no progress 
was made in the past year. The main concerns remain the unresolved cases 
of attacks on journalists and media property, including the 2004 murder 
case of editor-in-chief of daily Dan, the independence of the public service 
broadcaster RTCG, and proper implementation of European Court of Human 
Rights case law in lawsuits against the media. 
In 2016, dialogue on improving ethical standards in reporting, facilitated 
by the OSCE, led to a revised Code of Ethics for journalists, but self-regulation 
mechanisms, re-established in 2012, so far proved insufficient due to the fact 
that they are split in different forms, reflecting divisions within the media 
community. 
Montenegro keeps a poor score with other international media watchdog 
organisations also. In Reporters without Borders’ World Press Freedom Index 
20163, Montenegro climbed eight places to 106th position, which still places 
it among the worst in southeast Europe, outpacing only Bulgaria (113th) and 
Macedonia (118th). The report states that the Montenegrin media are subject 
to political and economic pressure as reporters investigating government 
corruption are often accused of trying to harm the nation. “Journalists have 
to censor themselves because they are often the targets of violent verbal and 
physical attacks and those responsible enjoy virtually systematic impunity,” the report noted.
Freedom House, in its annual Freedom in the World report4, granted 
Montenegro the unenviable “downward trend arrow” for 2016. Montenegro’s 
civil liberties rating declined from 2 to 3, its status declined from Free to 
Partly Free. Montenegro enjoys the same status also when it comes to 
freedom of the press. Some of the serious problems, according to the report, 
include attacks on independent media, including vandalizing vehicles; public 
threats to editors expressed on social media; and the arrest of a journalist 
during protests in 2015.
2 European Commission, Montenegro 2015 Report, Brussels, p. 19.
3  Reporters Without Borders, World Press Freedom Index 2016, https://rsf.org/en/ranking 
(accessed 28 June 2016)4  Freedom house, Freedom in the World 2016, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
press-2016/table-country-scores-fotp-2016 (accessed 28 June 2016)
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Civil society landscape
There are 3,940 non-governmental organizations (NGO) registered in 
Montenegro, but estimations say that only one fourth of them are active. 
The estimation is based on the fact that in 2013, only 1050 NGOs filed their 
financial statements to the Tax Administration, which is an indicator that 
they have actually conducted some activities. 
The largest number of registered organizations, according to the Register 
of non-governmental organizations kept by the Ministry of Interior, work in 
the areas of culture (656), protection of human and minority rights (267), art 
(240), institutional and non-institutional education (233), agriculture and 
rural development (221), social and health protection (239), development 
of civil society and volunteerism (267) and environmental protection (254).According to data5 from the EU-funded Montenegro office for 
technical Assistance for CSOs, Montenegrin NGOs are mostly small, poorly 
equipped, municipal organizations, dedicated to solving problems directly 
in the local community. However, at the national level, there is a core of 
established, organisationally mature NGOs engaged mainly in advocacy, 
research, monitoring and capacity building in areas such as the fight against 
corruption, public administration, poverty reduction and human rights. 
Their presence in public life is very strong, and their actions yield significant 
results in influencing public decisions, processing corruption and legislation 
amendments.
Research shows that public support for NGOs and their activities is relatively high and stable.According to a survey6 conducted in February 2016 by Ipsos Strategic 
Marketing, for the purpose of the Centre for Development of NGO (CRNVO), 
public trust in NGOs is on the stable level of 47% if compared to a similar 
2012 survey. Also, around one half of citizens believe that the NGO sector 
as a whole operates with the aim of improving life in Montenegro. However, 
the trend is declining when it comes to its effectiveness. Only 37% of citizens 
believe that NGOs are an important factor when it comes to controlling and 
limiting governing structures. In 2012, this percentage stood at 49%.
Limiting factors to the functioning of the CSO sector, as recognised in EC’s 
2015 Report on Montenegro, are the lack of a sustainable system of public 
funding for CSOs and an appropriate institutional framework. The current 
system of public funding has so far proven inefficient, a fact acknowledged 
5  Technical Assistance for Civil Society Organizations, Montenegro Office, Needs assesment 
report, May 2016 6  Ibid
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by the State Audit Institution. Moreover, the Law on Gaming, currently the 
only source of public financing for CSOs, is not being implemented properly 
and the amount allocated to CSOs’ projects is decreasing. 
Relations between CSOs and the government have occasionally been 
overly adversarial and characterised by distrust, especially on matters of 
the rule of law and fundamental rights. Instances of government bodies 
undertaking unlawful surveillance of CSOs and using administrative 
intimidation and legal threats have been reported and proven with court 
verdicts. EC also states that it is a matter of concern that some civil society 
activists have been repeatedly targeted on a personal basis by local media 
through smear campaigns. 
Despite all the detriments, Freedom Houses reports in nations in transit, 
as a rule, give the civil society sector the best scores within the measured 
parameters, and considerably higher than those related to the independence 
of media. 
Coverage of civil society in the media
The monitoring of three main newspapers (Dan, Vijesti, Pobjeda) and 
three main websites (Vijesti.me, CDM.me, Portalanalitika.me) during the 
period 4-18 May 2016, showed that civil society is considerably present 
in media coverage. The total number of articles amounted to 235 and they 
covered 122 different topics. On average, each of the monitored media had 
2.8 articles involving CSOs on a daily basis. In terms of quantity, most of the 
media had on average 2.2 articles related to CSO activities, with the exception 
of daily Dan whose daily average amounted to 5.7 articles.
The precence of CSOs in media coverage, besides quantitative, had 
notable visibility, considering that articles involving CSO were mentioned 14 
times in cover pages of the three dailies. Only two of those were consequences 
of CSOs planned activities, i.e presentation of a poll on public trust in 
judiciary, while the rest of them are products of media efforts in which they 
sought partnership with CSOs. These instances, however, for the major part 
can be asigned to only one media – daily Dan, which made 9 cover stories 
with CSOs as main sources of information. The stories that made the cover 
pages refered mainly to corruption and abuse of power. However, only half of 
them had CSO activities as the main focus of the article, while the rest of the selected coverage used CSO representatives as secondary sources.
The rest of the media coverage, although prolific in quantity, proved to 
be of rather meagre quality.  44% of all articles were adapted press releases 
issued by CSO, and another 27% were hort news stories based on one source, 
usually the very CSO whose activity or statement was reported on.
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While the dominant journalistic genres in reporting CSO, beside press 
releases, were news, extended news and statements, sourcing was also 
limited to just one source (68%), and only 12% of all monitored articled had 
three or more sources of information.
CSOs’ activities are mainly reported on the basis of press conferences, 
or on the basis of their press releases, statements and reports (59%). Other 
occasions for the articles include staged events such as sessions, meetings or 
encounters (21%), and another 12% are announcements of CSOs’ activities. 
Only 6% of the articles referred to an up-to-date real event.
The monitoring of three main newspapers (Dan, Vijesti, Pobjeda) and three main websites 
(Vijesti.me, CDM.me, Portalanalitika.me) during the period 4-18 May 2016, showed that civil 
society is considerably present in media coverage. The total number of articles amounted to 235 
and they covered 122 different topics. On average, each of the monitored media had 2.8 articles 
involving CSOs on a daily basis. In terms of quantity, most of the media had on average 2.2 
articles related to CSO activities, with the exception of daily Dan whose daily average amounted 
to 5.7 articles.
The precence of CSOs in media coverage, besides quantitative, had notable visibility, 
considering that articles involving CSO were mentioned 14 times in cover pages of the three 
dailies. Only two of those were consequences of CSOs planned activities, i.e presentation of a 
poll on public trust in judiciary, while the rest of them are products of media efforts in which 
they sought partnership with CSOs. These instances, however, for the major part can be asigned 
to only one media – daily Dan, which made 9 cover stories with CSOs as main sources of 
information. The stories that made the cover pages refered mainly to corruption and abuse of 
power. However, only half of them had CSO activities as the main focus of the article, while the 
rest of the selected coverage used CSO representatives as secondary sources.
The rest of the media coverage, although prolific in quantity, proved to be of rather meagre 
quality.  44% of all articles were adapted press releases issued by CSO, and another 27% were 
hort news stories based on one source, usually the very CSO whose activity or statement was 
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While the dominant journalistic genres in reporting CSO, beside press releases, were news, 
extended news and statements, sourcing was also limited to just one source (68%), and only 12% 
of all monitored articled had three or more sources of information.
CSOs’ activities are mainly reported on the basis of press conferences, or on the basis of their 
press releases, statements and repo ts (59%). Other occasions for the articles include staged 
events such as sessions, meetings or encounters (21%), and another 12% are announcements of 
CSOs’ activities. Only 6% of the articles referred to an up-to-date real event.
Considering the above data, media coverage of CSOs displays a significant dosage of pasiveness, 
while on the other hand communication practices of CSOs prove very proactive. 
If the overall media content related to CSOs is analysed based on the primary source of 
information reported and the communication initiative, the results show that 69% of articles were 
initiated by CSO representatives, 19% by journalist/media, 5% by the government institutions, 
4% by politicians and, only a very small amount, by ordinary citizens and international 
organizations.
The disbalance might be a consequence of the unfavourable situation in the media sector where 
financially burdened, low-staffed outlets choose easier ways to produce content, and, on the 
other hand, efficent visibility practices of a growing CSO sector. However, if the two are to work 
toward the same goal, then this or any other disbalance is detrimental to the relation of 
partnership among the two sectors.
When it comes to the content of the articles published in the selected period, they provide a quite 
diversified array of topics, ranging from environmental protection, to culture, human rights and 
politics. 
CONTENT OF THE JOURNALISTIC TEXT
Environment protection 14%
Culture and art 13%
National identity/ideology/politics 13%
Functionality of state institutions 12%
Children, youth and family 10%
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Considering the above data, media coverage of CSOs displays a significant 
dosage of pasiveness, while on the other hand communication practices of CSOs prove very proactive. 
If the overall media content related to CSOs is analysed based on the 
primary source of information reported and the communication initiative, the 
results show that 69% of articles were initiated by CSO representatives, 19% 
by journalist/media, 5% by the government institutions, 4% by politicians 
and, only a very small amount, by ordinary citizens and international 
organizations.
The disbalance might be a consequence of the unfavourable situation 
in the media sector where financially burdened, low-staffed outlets choose 
easier ways to produce content, and, on the other hand, efficent visibility 
practices of a growing CSO sector. However, if the two are to work toward the 
same goal, then this or any other disbalance is detrimental to the relation of 
partnership among the two sectors.
When it comes to the content of the articles published in the selected 
period, they provide a quite diversified array of topics, ranging from 
environmental protection, to culture, human rights and politics. 
CONTENT OF THE JOURNALISTIC TEXT
Environment protection    14%
Culture and art     13%
National identity/ideology/politics  13%
Functionality of state institutions   12%
Children, youth and family   10%
LGBT rights     9%
Rights of persons with disabilities   7%
Humanitarian actions    7%
Corruption/financial abuses   5%
*Other topics, represented only in minor measure, include women’s rights, 
animals’ rights, minority rights, social welfare and media freedoms.
The nature of the content is for the major part negative (41%), but the 
media generally take a neutral attitude toward the reported content.
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The dominant negative nature of content most often is a consequence 
of opposing attitudes of CSOs and the state authorities, irrespective of the 
social area. Further content analysis shows that media reports in 48% of 
the cases presented CSOs as one conflicting side, while only 19% of the 
articles promoted partnerships of CSOs. According to media coverage, CSOs 
most often entered partnerships with public institutions (33%), mainly in 
the area of education and culture, as well as local administration, and other 
CSOs(19%), while the main target of CSOs criticism was the government 
(54%), public institutions (15%), but also other CSOs(10%).
CONTENT (%)
      Positive      Neutral   Negative
           29           30         41
       ATTITUDE TOWARD CONTENT (%)
     Positive    Neutral Negative           7           92         1
LGBT rights 9%
Rights of persons with disabilities 7%
Humanitarian actions 7%
Corruption/financial abuses 5%
*Other topics, represented only in minor measure, include 
women’s rights, animals’ rights, minority rights, social welfare and media freedoms.
The nature of the content is for the major part negative (41%), but the media generally take a 
neutral attitude toward the reported content.
The dominant negative nature of content most often is a consequence of opposing attitudes of 
CSOs and the state authorities, irrespective of the social area. Further content analysis shows that 
media reports in 48% of the cases presented CSOs as one conflicting side, while only 19% of the 
articles promoted partnerships of CSOs. According to media coverage, CSOs most often entered 
partnerships with public institutions (33%), mainly in the area of education and culture, as well 
as local administration, and other CSOs(19%), while the main target of CSOs criticism was the 
government (54%), public institutions (15 ), but also other CSOs(10%).
CONTEXTUAL RELATIONS OF CSOs
WITH VERSUS
Public service institutions 33 % 15 %
Local administration 20 % 9 %
Government 9 % 54 %
Politicians 0 % 4 %
Parliament 0 % 4 %
International organizations/Embassies 6 % 0 %
Companies 13 % 0 %
Church 0 % 4 %
Other CSO 19 % 10 %
CONTENT (%)
Positive Neutral Negative
29 30 41
ATTITUDE TOWARD CONTENT (%)
Positive Neutral Negative
7 92 1
In recent years, some prominent civil society activists have been the target 
of smear campaigns, mostly by one tabloid newspaper, but the monitored 
period also provided proof of negative sterotyping of NGOs. For example, 
one of the leaders of the major opposition force Democratic front, Nebojša 
Medjević, commenting7 on this party’s act in the parliament in which their 
representatives chanted “Milo, thief” toward Prime Minister Milo Đukanović, 
causing verbal and almost physical incident among the MPs. “Chanting “Milo, 
thief!” exposed the entire network of agents of banking fascism, especially in 
the so-called free media (and even in some, until recently, opposition media) 
7  Medojević: Skandiranje “Milo lopove” razotkrilo mrežu agenata bankarskog fašizma, Portal 
analitika, 16 May 2016, http://portalanalitika.me/clanak/229474/medojevic-skandiranje-
milo-lopove-razotkrilo-mrezu-agenata-bankarskog-fasizma (accessed on 8 June 2016)
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and the so-called NGO sector, which for a large part represent the interests 
of global fascists against the interests of their people and their country”, said 
the statement.
Similar statements, which place NGOs either as associates or opponents 
of the government structures and the ruling party, can often be found in 
the media, especially in user generated comments on internet portals, and 
occasionally they came from high state officials. Such a practice contributes 
to the politicization of CSOs, and, especially, when combined with evident 
tensions among different CSOs, it can lead to further polarization of the 
sector, which jeopardizes its main goal. A similar situation has been proven to 
be detrimental to the Montenegrin media scene, where political polarisation 
lowered professional standards.     
Opinion of civil society on media
According to research by TASCO/IPSSOS8  from April 2016, almost half 
of CSOs consider their visibility to be at the appropriate level. However those 
who believe that the visibility of CSOs is at a low level, tend to blame it on the 
media rather than themselves.
Similar to TASCO’s research, the one conducted among citizens showed 
that 44% of citizens find that media sufficiently report on the activities of 
non-governmental organizations, while 31% of citizens believe that the 
media inadequately report on the activities of NGOs.
Some of the most prominent representatives of the civil sector in 
Montenegro agree that media reporting can be generally qualified as 
superficial, sometimes editorially biased, and in extreme cases malicious.
“Most often the main goal of journalist is to tick the box for another 
written article which would secure him a salary at the end of the month. 
Another problem is that the ordinary journalist, even when he/she sees a 
problem and wishes to report on it, the final outcome and its realization 
depends on the will and interpretation of the editor”, says Boris Raonić9, 
President of the Civic Alliance, a human rights organisation. 
“Superficiality can be attributed to almost all media in Montenegro, but 
that can be attributed to the lack of knowledge on the functioning of the 
civil sector rather than to the conscious intention to marginalize the civil 
8  Technical Assistance for Civil Society Organizations, Montenegro Office, Needs assesment 
report, May 2016 9  Interview with President of the Civic Alliance, Boris Raonić, Podgorica, 22 June 2016.
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sector”, says Dejan Milovac, Deputy Executive Director of the Network for the 
Affirmation of NGO Sector – MANS, anticorruption CSO10.  
Another shared experience by some CSO representatives is seeing their 
studies and research data, and even statements interpreted in three different 
ways by three different dailies. They complain of selective use of data, and 
refocusing of the main points of documents provided by CSO’s.
Dragoljub Duško Vuković, long-time journalist and later media analyst, 
who also spent years working in or for media-related NGOs, explains11 that 
media interpretation of CSOs analysis and reports vary from one outlet to another.  
“There are media that use CSOs’ reports in a correct manner and 
contextualize the presented data in a fair manner, but there are also media 
which use these data selectively and in a way that suits them to justify their 
predefined thesis or established approach to specific topics, be it politics or 
something else. This happens because some of the media clearly do not serve 
the public interest, but partial interests of certain centers of power”, says 
Vuković.
Distance from the public interest in media’s operations is something 
that Goran Đurović12, Resident Advisor in the TACSO13 Montenegro Office, also notes.
“The media often act as those who are in a political market – they are 
very well aware of what can be their interest at a certain moment and this 
interest will lead them to conclusions of partnerships that may very well end 
the very next day. The hint of a lucrative opportunity is what tips the scale. 
There is nothing that is not business, including politics. To protect their 
business, they will make different deals. Sometimes they will be guided by 
moral principles, and sometimes they won’t”, says Đurović.
In recent years, media in Montenegro suffered the so-called 
tabloidization, where a clear advantage is given to affairs and scandals at the 
expense of more serious research and analysis. The most drastic examples 
include blatant smear campaigns against CSO activists and some politicians. 
10  Interview with the Deputy Executive Director of the Network for Affirmation of NGO Sector 
– MANS, Dejan Milovac, Podgorica, 26 June 2016.11  Interview with journalist and media analyst, Draguljub Duško Vuković, Podgorica, 23 June 
2016.12  Interview with Resident Advisor in TACSO Montenegro Office, Goran Đurović, Podgorica, 21 
June 2016.
13  Technical Assistance for Civil Society Organisations (TACSO) is an EU funded projects that 
provides support to civil society organisations (CSOs) in countries that are not yet part of the EU.
Montenegro: Between public interest and political divisions
104
The victim of one such campaign run by Serbian-based tabloid Informer, 
was prominent anticorruption activists, executive director of MANS, Vanja 
Ćalović.
Her colleague Dejan Milovac says that it is evident that several media 
work with the specific task of putting pressure on government critics, 
through the vilest campaigns possible. 
“Because of what we do, MANS is often the target of such media who do not 
choose the means in their attempts to discredit our work and, unfortunately, 
often threaten the physical integrity of our employees. Of course, we thereby 
defend even better our research and invest the extra effort that Montenegro 
becomes the society that its citizens deserve”, adds Milovac.
Despite the obstacles, Milovac says that there is still media space for 
high-quality stories and analysis.  What is even more, MANS’ Investigative 
Centre, in partnership with daily “Vijesti” and “Dan” and weekly “Monitor”, 
implemented the project “Pod lupom” /“Under the Magnifying Glass”/ whose 
main product were investigative journalism stories. One such story was 
awarded the second prize of the 2015 EU Award for Investigative Journalism 
contest in Montenegro. The awarded dossier “Dishonorable alliances”, 
through four separate stories, revealed the connection between politics, 
business and organized crime in Montenegro. 
Milovac, who co-authored the awarded story, says that free and 
professional media are the natural allies of all those NGOs who dare to point 
out the most important problems in the country, call the government to 
account and propose concrete solutions. “Without media support, the effect 
and impact of our work would be greatly limited”, concludes Milovac.
When civil society and media meet
The Council of national public broadcaster RTCG, in line with the 2012 
Law on Public Broadcasting Services14, is independent of any State authority, 
consisting of 9 members, who are experts proposed by civil society 
organisations and appointed by the Parliament by simple majority. They 
are nominated by universities, the academy of science, cultural institutions, 
employers associations, trade unions, sports, NGOs working in the field of 
media, while two members are elected among the candidates of NGOs active 
in the field of human rights, environment, consumers’ rights, education, 
social welfare or rights of disabled persons. 
14  Law 79/08 and 45/12 on Public Broadcasting Services of Montenegro, Official Gazette of 
Montenegro, 23 December 2008 and 18 August 2012. Art. 28.
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The council of the regulatory authority - Agency for Electronic Media15 
consists of five members, appointed by the Parliament from among the 
nominees of academia, NGOs dealing with human rights and freedoms, 
NGOs dealing with the media, the Montenegrin PEN Center, and commercial broadcaster associations.
Although the law prescribes rules for the election of councils’ members 
with the proclaimed goal of preventing political influence, the elections 
procedure, as a rule, raises doubts of its legality and indirect influence of 
the ruling parties on the choice of the RTCG Council. During the election 
procedure of the last RTCG Council (2014), the Administrative Committee of 
the Parliament of Montenegro decided to change the rules for the selection 
of candidates from NGOs. The introduced rule stipulates that in order to run 
someone for the RTCG Council, they should submit a tax return. It happened, 
then, that one candidate was eliminated although she had more than 90 
votes of support from a total of 10816. In a most recent case of elections of 
NGO representative to the Council of the Agency for electronic media (May 
2016), the Administrative Committee decided to support a candidate who 
had less support from NGOs and work experience, although those were main 
criteria for selection17. 
Goran Đurović argues that, in this case, the Administrative Committee 
selected a candidate who suits them personally, not the one who had the 
legal basis for election, thus making the law irrelevant.
“The media are connected with mediocrities of political parties and 
non-governmental organizations. Those personal relations between people 
who stifle this country, and who are at the level of friendships from study 
visits, lunches or seminars at the sea or mountain, are quite enough to 
secure the support for certain people from NGOs, and to disrespect the law. 
Similarly, media use similar small privileges and do not care about serious 
investigations into anything. If we had serious dialogue on any topic in 
Montenegro, then we might reach some conclusion on whether the law was 
violated and, maybe, have some consequences for such acts”, says Đurović. 
He adds that interests in this situation are clear from all sides: NGOs, 
political parties and some media - “Someone’s vital interest is to get the fee 
15  Law 46/10, 40/11, 53/11 on Electronic Media, Official Gazette of Montenegro, 06 August 
2010,  08 August 2011, 11 November 2011. Art. 19.16  Milena Perović-Korać, “Nova igra, stari akteri”, Monitor no. 1223, 28 March 2014, See: 
http://monitor.co.me/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5105:izbor-za-
savjet-rtcg-stara-igra-novi-akteri&catid=3510:broj-1223&Itemid=4774 17  “IA razočarana izborom Koljenovića: Doprinos monopolu u upravljanju elektronskim 
medijima”, Vijesti, 21 June 2016, See: http://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/ia-razocarana-
izborom-koljenovica-doprinos-monopolu-u-upravljanju-elektronskim-medijima-893224
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of 800 euros, someone else has an interest to control the electronic media 
through those who got these 800 euros, and, of course, some media, as end 
beneficiaries, will be able to work without paying duties to the state, and not 
producing the legally required amount of programs”.
Đurović himself is also a member of the RTCG’s Council, whose voice 
has often been dissonant with the rest of his colleagues. He admits that the 
effects of NGO representatives’ participation in the Council were very limited. 
Without wider support inside this body that would introduce measureable 
and clear tasks for PBS management and a call for the responsibility of all 
decision makers, the best that he could do is to continue with the attempts 
of bringing to public attention issues that are burdening the functioning of 
the public service broadcaster. Đurović’s initiatives before the Council were 
even left without the support of his colleague, the other of the two NGO 
representatives in the RTCG Council, coming from human rights organisation 
Civic Alliance. The president of this organisation Boris Raonic, says, however, 
that their representative was quite efficient. A list of at least 30 initiatives 
with a written record contains proposals for specialised informative shows, 
resolutions of conflict of interest; respect for work discipline, initiatives 
for debt reduction, financial management, enhancements in programs in 
minority languages, and more. “The functioning of PBS is a highly politicized 
issue. If you have 6 people who will always support the same stance, then 
you›re going head on against the wall if you try to change it. Then, why focus 
on something that is beyond our reach or his knowledge. He decided to act 
within a narrow aspect for which he was elected - human rights. This is less 
visible to the general public because media reports are limited to the two 
extreme points of view on the matter, but most things are happening in the 
middle. It’s just not interesting enough for the media”, says Raonić.
Vuković believes that the civil sector through their representatives 
in the Council of RTCG has done a lot by publicly opening some important 
issues related to the functioning of public service and imposed a debate on 
a national public service is not and what it should be. The Council of AEM, 
in his opinion, does not have the same transparency. “The media do not 
report on the work of the Council. The only communication is through press 
releases published on the Council meetings, and I do not remember that 
representatives of CSO have raised problems regarding certain broadcasters 
who, in my opinion, seriously violate the rules and principles adopted by the 
Council itself”, adds Vuković. 
Milovac sees no significant progress when it comes to the work of the 
public service because, he claims, its managerial team is still dominated 
by installed formal or informal supporters of the regime. In this sense, 
the impact of that part of NGO representatives in the steering council who 
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advocate genuine changes is still powerless against the majority in these 
bodies. Substantial improvements in the quality of public service are still 
not happening and it continues to be nothing more than a tool for creating a 
distorted image of the Montenegrin reality, serving more the party, than the 
public interest, concludes Milovac.
The bridge: Media – NGO-s
In Montenegro, the crisis of organizing journalists in representative and 
credible associations has lasted for a long time now. There are a number of 
journalists’ organizations at the national level (the Association of Journalists 
of Montenegro, Association of Professional Journalists of Montenegro, and 
Montenegrin Association of Journalists) but they exist mainly on paper. They 
don’t provide any significant services to their members and have no actual 
influence.
It is not professional reasons that cause this professional disunity, but 
rather political ones. The media scene is sharply divided along the lines of 
political affiliation or orientation.
“The media serve partial interests, and while this is the case, there can be 
no common denominator that could unite them. One part of the journalistic 
community in the early 90s gathered around the idea of  distancing 
themselves from the policies of the then joint associations of journalists 
which placed themselves at the service of political authorities. And that 
was not a professional, but political reason for gathering. All subsequent 
divisions within the media were also political. We do not have anything that is 
recognized as professional interest that should be articulated and defended. 
And when that is missing, there is no need for uniting,” explains Vuković.
According to a study done by the Center for Democracy and Monitoring 
and OSCE in 2014, more than 80% of journalists do not belong to any 
journalists’ associations.
In April 2013, the Media union was founded, which operates within the 
framework of Free Trade Unions of Montenegro. This is the first serious 
attempt at union organization of journalists and other media professionals in Montenegro.
Media, civil society, and public participationThe latest EC’s report on Montenegro’s EU integration process notes 
that some progress was made in improving cooperation between the 
government and civil society organisations, especially concerning the 
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latter’s’  participation in the accession  process,  where civil society continued 
to play an active role. A TACSO needs assessment report notes that in 2014, 
55 representatives of CSOs participated in the work of 36 working bodies 
formed by the government. On the other hand, data shows that only 25% of CSOs participated in the consultation process both at the local and national 
level, which is a sharp fall from 57% recorded in 2012.  
On various occasions, civil society representatives have voiced their 
dissatisfaction with their level of involvement in policy-making. The 
EC recommends greater transparency in government procedures for 
cooperation and consultation with CSOs, especially in legislation drafting as 
well as the establishment of sustainable system of financing of CSOs. 
Raonić argues that the strength of the CSO sector in Montenegro, is among 
other things, a result of one specific national circumstance. “The Montenegrin 
civil sector has a lot more space than their colleagues in other countries in the 
region. We have a government that is corrupt and untouchable, which leaves 
huge space to all those who want to improve things. In other countries, this 
space is occupied by democratic opposition, universities, and intellectuals 
– while here those public life groups are almost nonexistent”, says Raonić. 
He admits, however, that making a change sometimes is not easy. “We were 
part of certain bodies and left them because we have seen that nothing can 
be done there - but if we can help fix a law or insert a paragraph in a strategy, 
then it’s worth the effort”, says Raonić.
There is a relatively small number of CSOs that have been active for a 
decade and a half and which have accumulated significant know-how in their 
respective areas, have become prominent in public life, and proactively offer 
suggestions and propose solutions to the ongoing reforms. 
Đurović say that it is difficult to obtain greater influence of CSO 
initiatives due to the lack of knowledge in key positions in decision-making 
bodies. Another obstacle is the general reluctance in transferring power 
from institutions and political parties to citizens. “Transfer of power is the 
basis of the game being played and it is natural. The NGO sector is counter 
government because they want to be able to transfer part of the game to 
the citizens”, says Đurović. Sometimes, he argues this “beautiful game we 
all play is played in vain”. “The change will come when citizens are able to decide whether a certain individual should be their representative in the 
parliament again, if he/she did not manage to solve the problems which 
were bothering them during his/her 4-year mandate. There is too many of 
those whose interest is that nothing changes,” concludes Đurović.
All of the interviewed CSO representatives see problems within their 
sector also. While Raonić sees as the biggest problem some of the largest 
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NGOs that, according to him, turn to technocrats, following primarily the 
donors’ interests, while, often, at the same time pose as “know-it-alls.” On 
the other hand, Milovac says that it is no secret that most of the political 
parties, at least unofficially, have their own non-governmental organizations 
with whose help they are trying to create a false picture of cooperation with 
civil society or on some fundamental social issue. 
Besides cooperation with traditional media in pursuing the citizen’s 
interest, interviewed representatives of the civil sector for the major part 
agree that social networks have become an inevitable tool to mobilize people 
around common issues.
Raonić says that social networks have become more relevant than the 
print media. As an example, he states that during the opposition protest in 
October 2015, the post they shared on Facebook and Twitter reached the 
people faster than via traditional media. He, however, warns of the danger of 
the abuses. “Political parties have recognized the strengths of social media 
and even had people trained to post comments on social media and internet 
portals using fake identities thus trying to influence public opinion or a 
persons’ image”, says Raonic.
In May 2016, the case of a lost boy that had been shared through social 
media with CSO representatives moderating the campaign of information 
sharing and organisation of citizens searches proved extremely effective. In 
just two days, 20,000 people were involved, ready to engage in the action. 
Milovac also says that the real value of social networks when it comes 
to civic activism is that they allow citizens to organize themselves outside 
the formal framework offered by non-governmental organizations and more 
independently than it was the case in the past to fight for their rights.
Conclusions
Civil society and the media are the main carriers of the public participation 
in public discussions on almost all major social issues in Montenegro, 
although there is still much room for improvement in both sectors and in 
their cooperation. In some areas, such as corruption and organized crime, or 
even human rights, due to the lack of political will and lack of trust in official 
institutions, non-governmental organizations and the media are the main 
partners of citizens in their efforts to protect their rights.
Media sensibility to important CSO initiatives is present, but the situation 
within the media community itself does not offer sufficient room for likely or 
fast improvements. Current divisions within the media community and their 
alignment along political lines draw them farther from public interest and 
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jeopardizes professional standards. This situation makes the functioning 
of professional associations impossible, and without unified voices of the 
media community, progress is difficult to achieve. Another problem is the 
dependence of the PBS on governing structures, which limits the space 
for joint initiatives aimed at the promotion of citizens’ interest.  Sporadic 
examples of cooperation between part of the media and CSOs still proves 
that this model can yield significant results.
As for the CSO sector, it has proven constant strength in playing the role 
that has been given to it in democratic societies. It remained resilient in front 
of obstacles and has yielded significant capacities that may play an important 
role in areas such as the ongoing process of European integration. Recent 
developments however show that attempts for the politicization of NGOs 
and deepening divisions between them can be taken as a serious threat to the sector’s integrity. 
Provided there is a will, a sustainable system of state financing for 
CSOs and even fostering cooperation with the media would be a major step 
forward, paving the way for more transfer of power to citizens.
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SERBIA
A complex set of cooperation 
and confrontation lines
Jovan Teokarevic
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Relations between media and civil society are of crucial importance for contemporary politics. They reveal a complex set of cooperation and confrontation lines within a very specific part of the society that 
stands between citizens and the political sphere. 
It goes without saying that democracy heavily depends on both a vibrant 
civil society and independent media. Seen from this perspective, the two 
actors are often understood as one, or as indispensable allies. The example 
of Serbia confirms this view to some extent, but has many specifics that call 
for a detailed examination of internal dynamics in their mutual relations. 
This will be done here in several steps. First we will outline the media 
and civil society landscapes, and then we’ll try to figure out what one actor 
thinks of the other one. Their joint actions and interactions will be analyzed, 
too. In the end, we’ll try to find out what the influence of the civil society and 
media on citizens’ participation is.  
Media landscape in flux 
The main feature of Serbia’s media scene is that it has been in flux, or in the 
state of almost permanent and still unfinished transition for the last decade 
and a half. Despite the introduction of a number of legal, institutional and 
policy changes in the media system following Serbia’s turn to democracy in 
2000, many old problems have remained, many new ones have appeared, but 
the system still has not reached the long awaited stability and functionality.1 
Judging by numbers only, Serbia seems to have a very rich and flourishing 
media scene. With the population of 7.2 million, Serbia has more than 700 
print media outlets, 300 radio stations, 120 TV stations and around 200 
1  More about this and other features of the Serbian media scene in: R. Veljanovski, Medijski 
sistem Srbije, Fakultet političkih nauka i Čigoja štampa, Beograd, 2012, pp. 41-52. See also 
Global Media Monitoring. Project 2015, National Report, Serbia, 2015.
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online news portals. No other country in Europe has more TV stations per 
capita than Serbia!2 
These seemingly respectable data pale, however, in the light of the 
quantity of shortcomings and challenges that the current media system 
is faced with. One important part of them is connected with the lack of 
implementation of a generally good recent set of laws passed in 2014, which 
are formally in harmony with EU standards and recommendations. Among 
other things, the laws were supposed to put an end to state ownership in all 
media outlets in 2015. The national news agency Tanjug continued to operate, 
however, in spite of that provision and of many protests, while the state also 
continued to finance some media outlets in other less transparent ways. 
The state share of ownership also has remained unchanged in influential 
dailies Politika and Vecernje novosti. The budget financing of two public 
service broadcasters – the national one RTV Serbia and the regional one RTV 
Vojvodina – is supposed to be replaced in 2016 with a special tax, according 
to new laws, but the solution is still not in sight and that contributes to the 
financial instability and lack of independence of both. 
The country’s media scene also suffers from several long-term and 
systemic problems, among which the most important being: a) Non-
transparency of media ownership; b) Non-transparency of financing, 
economic influence through budget, tax reliefs and other indirect forms 
of public funding; c) Censorship and self-censorship; d) Very high level of 
politicization and tabloidization.3 
Political influence over media by the power-holders is certainly not 
a new phenomenon in Serbia, but the grip on media has been radically 
strengthened since 2012, when incumbent Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic 
and his Serbian Progressive Party came to power. Within a form of almost 
unlimited personal rule, Vucic relies heavily on the support of primarily one 
national TV network (Pink) and several tabloids (led by daily Informer), but 
he controls other key electronic and print media in less direct ways, too. 
In the absence of checks and balances, as well as of a political opposition, 
Vucic’s unprecedented level of control over most media in Serbia has led 
to the serious suffocation of media freedoms and freedom of expression, 
particularly in 2014 and 2015. Media outlets that lost independence have 
turned into powerful propaganda machinery working around the clock 
in favor of the authorities and against any opposition, or even against any 
2  https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2015/serbia 
3  See the Serbian Government Anti-Corruption Council’s 2015 Report on ownership structure 
and control over media in Serbia: http://www.antikorupcija-savet.gov.rs/en-GB/reports/
cid1028-2751/presentation-of-report-on-ownership-structure-and-control-over-media-in-serbia 
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critical voice that might be heard in public. The European Commission’s 
2015 Report on Serbia criticized this turn, emphasizing that “The overall 
environment is not conducive to the full exercise of freedom of expression.”4 
Freedom House 2016 Report on Press Freedoms put Serbia in the category 
of “partly free countries”5, and the organization Reporters Without Borders ranks Serbia 59th out of 180 countries in its 2016 World Press Freedom Index.6 All analyses point out that media outlets and journalists in Serbia 
are under double pressure from politicians and media owners who exert 
heavy influence on editorial content. In the situation of worsening market 
conditions for the survival of the media, they are heavily dependent on 
government subsidies and advertising contracts mostly controlled by the 
government, too.  
This is followed by threats to journalists for the opinions expressed, by 
the closure of some of their popular programs and also by physical attacks 
on them. Journalists have become helpless and incapable of self-defense due 
to their meagre salaries, insecure job positions, and the absence of solidarity 
among them. No wonder that within such a context censorship and self-
censorship have resurfaced. Sixty two per cent of 1,100 journalists surveyed 
in 2015 declared that there was no freedom of information in Serbia, 77% 
said that the state controls media, while more than two thirds estimated that 
“self-censorship has grown very much”.7     
Other similar surveys only confirm all this. For instance, the Serbian 
Journalists’ Association found out in a survey from 2014 that close to 6 per 
cent of journalists felt that they were constantly exposed to censorship, 
while almost 41 per cent of them said they recognized it “from time to 
time”.8 “Soft” versions of censorship have become particularly frequent and 
important instruments of curtailing media freedoms in Serbia’s current 
media landscape. A recent study defined it as “the array of official actions 
intended to influence media output, short of legal or extra-legal bans, direct 
censorship of specific content, or physical attacks on media outlets or media 
practitioners. These indirect forms of censorship include selective media 
subsidies and partisan allocation of advertising, as well as biased application 
4  European Commission, 2015 Serbia Report, p. 17: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/
key_documents/2015/20151110_report_serbia.pdf 5  https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2016 6  https://rsf.org/en/ranking 7  Srećko Mihajlović, ed., Od novinara do nadničara. Prekarizacija rada i života, http://www.
mc.rs/upload/documents/NAJAVE/2016/januar/sazetak-knjige.pdf, p. 2. 8  UNS, Research report on the economic and professional status of journalists, March-September 
2014:  http://www.uns.org.rs/sw4i/download/files/article/ 
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of regulatory and licensing powers that can influence editorial content and 
affect media outlets’ viability.”9 
Civil Society: Developed but weak and not trusted
The civil society landscape in Serbia resembles the already described 
media landscape: the number of civil society organizations (CSOs) is quite 
big, but citizens neither recognize the sector’s significance for their everyday 
lives, nor have much trust in it. 
According to official data from August 2016, there are 26,942 CSOs in Serbia.10  A quarter of them were established before 1990. More than half of 
them were registered after 2010. This sharp rise in the last several years can 
be clearly seen from the following chart:  
9  World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers, Media Reform Stalled in the Slow 
Lane. Soft Censorship in Serbia, Paris, 2015, p. 5.
10  Nacionalna koalicija za decentralizaciju, Indeks održivosti OCD u Srbiji, 2015. godina, p. 36, 
http://decentralizacija.org.rs/tmp/IOCD2015-Srbija-final.pdf 11  Civic Initiative, Monitoring Matrix on Enabling Environment for Civil Society Development. 
Serbia Report, Belgrade, 2015, p. 10.
   Source: Nacionalna koalicija za decentralizaciju, Indeks održivosti OCD u Srbiji, 
2015. godina, p. 36
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As is the case in other countries, a good part of these organizations is 
not active: in 2014, a little less than 18,000 CSOs submitted their financial reports.11 Most CSOs primarily deal with youth (15%), human rights and 
environment (11% each), education and social inclusion (6% each). 
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The number of permanently employed staff in Serbian CSOs is currently 
probably around 7,000 (in 2014: 6,651).12 This is arguably a very big total work 
force, as only eight companies in Serbia have more permanently employed people than the whole civil sector.13 Although there are no fresh data, one 
could assume from the data of several years ago that approximately the same 
number of persons – 7,000 - is currently engaged half-time in Serbian CSOs, 
together with 150,000 volunteers.14 However, one should be careful with 
such data, as official statistics puts churches and religious organizations, as 
well as sport clubs and Red Cross, in the same category with genuine non-
governmental organizations or CSOs. Red Cross alone has, for example, 
more than 60,000 volunteers. They are all financed from the same Serbian 
budget line. CSOs in the narrow sense of the word are certainly getting a 
much smaller part of around EUR 120 million per year, in comparison with 
Government’s financing of sport clubs or religious organizations.  
The total value of all budget grants to all kinds of CSOs in Serbia is 
around 0.75% of the Serbian GDP, which is more than EUR 250 million per year.15 But, one half of CSOs either don’t have any grants, or their grants per 
year are less than 100,000 dinars (less than EUR 900).16 
Several years ago, in 2010, the majority of Serbian CSOs had a budget 
of less than EUR 20,000, and only every tenth of them had a budget of over 
EUR 100,000.17 There is no reliable data on the volume of CSO grants that 
arrive from abroad, but most leading CSOs are increasingly relying on foreign grants.  
When it comes to the image that CSOs have in the Serbian society, it 
is a very different story, indeed. People are by and large not familiar with 
their work; CSOs are rarely present in the media, and they are far from being 
popular. On the contrary: they are not trusted and people often perceive 
them as traitors, who are well-paid by foreign donors. Practically all relevant 
public opinion polls show these results, with minor variations. According 
to a recent survey 61% of Serbian citizens do not trust CSOs, but trust in all 
institutions is quite low, too – on average less than 50%. As many as 57% of 
citizens do not trust the media.18  
12  Građanske inicijative, Ekonomska vrednost neprofitnog sektora u Srbiji u 2013. i 2014. godini, 
Beograd, 2014, p. 9.   
13  Beta, U Srbiji 15.700 NVO sa oko 4.200 zaposlenih, 20. 10. 2011. 14  Građanske inicijative, Procena stanja u sektoru organizacija civilnog društva (OCD) u Srbiji, 
septembar, 2011, Beograd, p. 8. 15  Ibid. 16  Nacionalna strategija za stvaranje podsticajnog okruženja za razvoj civilnog društva u 
Republici Srbiji za period 2015-2019. godine, nacrt, Beograd, 2015.17  Beta, ibid. 18  Beta, “Građani Srbije ne veruju institucijama”, Euractiv Srbija, 02.01.2015.
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In mid-2014, a survey done by the (US) National Democratic Institute and 
(Serbian) CESID showed more of the same: 46% of the population did not trust 
NGOs, while 32% did.19 Since media do not follow CSOs activities much (as will 
be shown later), people are usually ignorant about them, except for one thing 
that has been almost constantly served by the Government propaganda and 
tabloids: that CSOs are working in their own particular interests instead of in 
the interest of the society. A survey on the citizens’ political participation thus 
found out in 2013 that only a little more than one third of the respondents 
guessed what CSOs are all about (“non-profit associations of citizens gathered 
around a specific topic, with the aim to foster changes in society without 
coming to power”). Thirty six per cent of the respondents understood CSO-s 
instead as “international political organizations with their offices in Serbia 
through which they represent their own interests”. The third group of 29% of 
citizens opted for the CSO definition as “non-party organizations of politically 
like-minded people who propagate their ideas independently from official 
government policy or from the state”.20 
This way of thinking took shape a long time ago and has survived almost 
unchanged. It represents a fertile ground for the renewal of ambitious 
government attacks and accusations on CSOs under Serbia’s incumbent 
political regime. As will be shown in further sections of this paper, attacks 
have been relentless and continued, because a part of CSOs and media outlets 
expose the ugly face of the Prime Minister’s absolutist rule, with violations 
of human rights, undermining of institutions and efforts aimed at silencing every dissenting voice. 
That’s why there are serious concerns about the very survival of 
independent and critical civil society and media in the situation of parallel 
political pressures and reduced financing, as they have to rely mostly on 
grants from foreign countries. The 2015 CSO Sustainability Score for Serbia 
found out that the general CSO sustainability score for Serbia is 4.1, on a 
scale between 7 (impeded) and 1 (enhanced).21 And although Serbia’s legal 
environment worsened a bit in 2015 due to the mentioned pressures (4.0, 
down from 3.9 in 2014), the organizational capacities of the country’s CSO 
have slightly improved, as has their financial viability (from 5.2 in 2014 to 4.8 
in 2015). Other indicators in this survey show the same level of sustainability 
– mostly in the middle between the impeded and enhanced poles, or they 
are a little worse. All in all, Serbia’s civil society organizations are in a very 
difficult situation, but most of them are still capable of surviving. 
19  I. Anojčić, “Zašto su građani nepoverljivi prema NVO”, Politika, 01.06.2014. 
20  Centar za istraživanje, transparentnost i odgovornost (CRTA), Učešće građana u 
demokratskim procesima u Srbiji, Istraživanje javnog mnjenja, Beograd, 2013, p. 4.21  The 2015 CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, https://www.
usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1861/EuropeEurasia_CSOSIReport_2015.pdf, p. 214.
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Media coverage of civil society
Civil society organizations nowadays have very restricted access to 
most Serbian media. Their activities are only to some extent followed and 
this is done by the minority of media outlets that are not under direct or 
indirect control of the incumbent political regime. The controlled media 
report virtually nothing about them, except when they get the opportunity 
– and obviously the directive, too - to attack them, accusing them of lack of 
patriotism and of the alleged wealth they have accumulated in exchange for 
their “treacherous” activities. In these situations, carefully planned smear 
campaigns are organized, with countless exposures of fabricated lies or 
half-truths that are being relentlessly repeated. It goes without saying that 
the sacred journalistic rule Audiatur et altera pars (The other side should 
be heard, too) gets blatantly omitted in such cases, and the public is denied 
hearing the arguments of CSO representatives. 
But even in rare occasions when Serbia’s CSOs are mentioned in the 
independent media, systematic coverage of this sector is still lacking. This 
is especially true if compared with the situation in the immediate aftermath 
of the introduction of democracy in Serbia, in 2000. Ten or fifteen years 
ago, civil society was understood by media not as a competitor or political 
rival of the government, but as an ally in much needed reforms, whose 
ideas and recommendations were worth hearing and debating in public, 
regardless of the level of criticism they used to have vis-a-vis the leading 
political actors. At that time, so different from the present one, one could 
find detailed coverage of all kinds of CSO activities in most Serbian media 
outlets, including reports about their conferences or advocacy campaigns, or 
of their direct cooperation or confrontation with political authorities. This 
time around, the media space is closed for civil society as an irreplaceable 
factor of permanent control over the government and political actors. It is 
as simple as that: instead of the exchange of ideas and debate, in the most 
read and watched media outlets, the Serbian public can today hear only one 
side – the official one, of course – together with countless and distasteful 
glorifications of the Government and its leader. Instead of offering unbiased 
news coupled with various free comments, the majority of Serbian media 
have become a genuine propaganda service of the ruling party. Occasional 
mentioning of CSOs in independent media does not essentially change this 
state of affairs: for most people, they do not exist at all and serve only in 
the role of the “public enemy” within staged scandals orchestrated by the 
increasingly popular tabloids that follow the official line. 
The absence of civil society from the Serbian mainstream media should 
be, however, explained from another perspective – the one of CSOs, namely. 
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The majority of Serbia’s civil society organizations are incapable or unwilling, 
or both, of presenting their activities to the public in a clear and interesting 
way, and in harmony with the requirements and opportunities that modern 
media are imposing and offering. Many CSOs lack the knowledge they could 
use in order to win a part of the increasingly shrinking media space. They 
are more oriented toward donors than toward the wider public, and they 
tend to merely promote their missions and activities rather than to mobilize 
citizens. In doing so, CSOs very often rely only on social media which is 
certainly necessary, but not enough for a more aggressive and successful 
information campaign. In addition, they do not use modern PR skills, which 
inevitably make the content they offer less appealing than sensationalistic 
“journalism” preferred by today’s media. 
CSOs are currently trying to overcome some of these shortcomings, 
and the results are, for the time being, more visible in local than in national 
media outlets. That’s certainly an encouraging sign, but a lot remains to 
be done, if CSOs want to get out of the imposed and self-imposed isolation 
they’ve been suffering from for too long. Particularly worrying is the lack 
of wider coverage of rare but important advances of their cooperation with 
the Government, for example in the area of EU integration where stable civil 
society monitoring mechanisms have been functional for a few years now. 
The quality and the volume of CSOs recommendations in this field, often 
accepted by the official negotiating team with the EU, has thus remained 
virtually unnoticed in the media. 
This section of the paper was supposed to present the qualitative and 
quantitative results of a two-week monitoring of several media outlets and 
websites, i.e. of their coverage of CSOs. Despite considerable efforts, however, 
it was genuinely impossible to find any meaningful coverage of civil society 
in the Serbian media, be they under the Government’s control or not, within 
the period of two weeks. This finding is just one argument more in favor of 
the already described virtual absence of CSOs in Serbian media. So, instead 
of doing this, I’ll present here a months-long public debate about the foreign 
funding of CSOs, initiated by several articles published in daily Politika. 
The debate was launched with the text “Pathways of American money: 
Who is getting dollars?” published on 28 December 2015 in Politika. The 
journalist found out that during the last nine years US foundations had 
donated USD 35 million to Serbian CSOs for various projects. The text has 
complete lists of donors, the volume of their grants and the recipients 
in Serbia. A day after, the topic continues with further details of the main 
findings, under the headline “Who are the biggest donors of the Serbian 
civil society”. On 7 January 2016, the third article appeared in this “Politika’s 
Dossier” as the series was being referred to, with an even more intriguing 
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headline: “How to make USD 45,000 by publishing old texts”. Shifting focus 
mostly on media projects supported by American donors, among other 
things, it mocks a web portal that got the grant for the reproduction of war-
mongering media pieces from the times of ex-Yugoslav wars in the 1990s. 
Three days later grants for Kosovo- and Montenegro-based projects was the 
topic (“Sympathies for Kosovo and Montenegro”, 10 January 2016). 
Politika’s four-part “Dossier” led to many fierce reactions and a lot of 
criticism of independent media and CSOs, as well as of many journalists. 
Some of them were published on the pages of Politika on 15 January 2016. 
Critiques pointed out several main objections that could be summarized in 
four points. First, although the whole series was presented as a good example 
of uncompromising and brave investigative journalism, it relied completely 
on publicly available data taken from the website of the US Foundation 
Center (http://foundationcenter.org/ ). This was correctly mentioned in the 
criticized texts, but it was unprofessional and misleading for the readers to 
treat this as a kind of a sensation. Reactions missed to mention, however, 
that the quoted data set was in many instances wrong and far from being 
complete; it was thus genuinely inaccurate. Secondly, the allegedly big 
revelation has not been accompanied by similar research of open or covert 
state funding of “obedient” media and CSOs in Serbia by the Government. 
Neither was Politika’s intention ever to search for cases of mismanagement 
of grants from the Serbian national budget or from local budgets given to 
loyal allies of power holders which allowed easy purchase of media outlets. 
Last but not least, Politika was criticized for in fact compiling a sort of “list 
of foreign mercenaries” that could be used for public defamation (which was 
done) and for political prosecution, which might follow suit, as critiques warned. 
The author replied on 16 January, claiming that figures speak for 
themselves, and that it was strange that CSOs and media who supposedly 
share Western values were trying to exclude themselves from transparency. 
Critiques were particularly appalled by the fact that the author got a newly-
established journalistic reward for the texts from the “Dossier” that violated 
professional standards. The debate moved further on when windows of 
the House of Human Rights and Democracy in Belgrade – a seat of several 
human rights CSOs – were broken during the night in the second part of 
January 2016. Those who didn’t like the “Dossier” connected the campaign 
against the “foreign mercenaries” and “traitors” with this incident, and saw 
it as a natural continuation of the campaign. Politika replied that these were 
dangerous and unfounded insinuations. 
The escalation of the debate that included many CSOs, political parties 
and intellectuals was temporarily discontinued with the Prime Minister 
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Vucic’s sudden statement at a conference a month later that “the engagement 
of the civil sector is good for Serbia” and that his Government will continue 
cooperating with CSOs (Politika, 25 February 2016). This probably came 
as an official reaction to the rising criticism of the EU and many influential 
countries to the campaign launched by Politika’s “Dossier”. Vucic seemed to have understood that he had to back down and pretend that he was not behind 
the accusations against the civil society. He also met the EU representative in 
Serbia whom he had previously accused of sponsoring CSOs that criticize the 
Government. He organized well publicized similar meetings, with some CSOs 
representatives, trying to show that his Government didn’t have anything to 
do with the attack on CSOs, and that Politika did this on its own. It was hard to 
take this seriously, as accusations of CSOs and attacks on them were previously 
largely presented in many media outlets that supported the Government.  
This alleged truce between the Government and the civil society didn’t 
last long, however, at least as far as Politika was concerned. On 19 May 2016 
the “Dossier” author continued in the same way, presenting the CSO-related 
ultra-restrictive legislature of Russia, China and Israel as models that might 
be followed elsewhere, Serbia included.  
After a pause of several months, the “Dossier” author was back on the 
pages of Politika on 12 June 2016, this time around with another set of data that were supposed to prove that Serbia’s grants to its CSOs equal the total 
amount Serbian science gets in a year. 
On 7 July, another journalist of Politika continued where her colleague 
stopped temporarily: the text “Euros for old buddies” this time displayed the 
amounts of recent EU grants to Serbian media and civil society organizations. 
Stating the obvious – that grants were given in a legal and transparent way - 
one of the grantees replied in an angry tone on 11 July, stressing that Politika 
“is not dealing with projects, but with targeting people”, which is why the 
article in question is “dangerous content”, she added. 
Politika’s “Dossier” was also the subject of deliberation at the Appeals 
Committee of the (Serbian independent) Press Council, too. The Committee 
concluded on 26 February 2016 that one of the texts published within the 
“Dossier” violated two principles from the Serbian Journalists’ Code and 
ordered Politika to publish the conclusion. 
The spirit of Politika’s series of texts about foreign funding for Serbian 
CSOs and media continued in a much more drastic way in August 2016 on 
the pages of another Serbian daily – Informer. This tabloid, infamous for its 
undivided support to the Serbian Prime Minister Vucic and in parallel for a 
very aggressive and primitive treatment of all of Vucic’s real and imagined 
competitors, on 16 August 2016 published a long text entitled “Soros gave 
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almost four million Euros for the chaos in Serbia”. The text contains a long list 
of several pages of all Soros’ Open Society Foundation for Serbia donations 
between 2011 and 2014. The data became available following a hacker’s 
attack on the Open Society Foundation (New York) website. 
In the very beginning, the article announces the conspiracy behind 
the Soros funding in Serbia: “The evil American tycoon George Soros, the 
man who stays behind the so-called colored revolutions in Eastern Europe, 
an unscrupulous billionaire who is also responsible for the bloody war in 
Ukraine, doesn’t spare big money with which he would certainly like to 
push Serbia in total chaos, too.” A further, more detailed explanation then 
follows: “The biggest part, almost two thirds of the money was paid in 2013 
and 2014, thus following Aleksandar Vucic’s power takeover. And although 
Soros is giving money officially for the ‘development of democracy’ and for 
‘the promotion of civil society’, it is clear that millions are almost exclusively 
planned in order to destroy Serbia as a state and to bring American puppets 
to power”, concludes Informer, in the same way it had exposed several other alleged conspiracies against Vucic.  
All in all, those two tales of two Serbian dailies, Politika and Informer, 
speak generally of one and the same thing: a hostile attitude of media close to 
the center of power in Serbia towards civil society organizations. There are 
certainly differences between Politika’s softer and Informer’s much harder 
approach, but in principle both of them are sending the same message. To 
be sure, it’s less about the very foreign funding and much more about the 
fact that the incumbent Serbian regime cannot and doesn’t want to imagine 
cohabitation with such social actors, or with any critical voice from the 
society for that matter, because it would endanger the regime’s very basis – 
an absolute and, in principle, indivisible power. 
Civil Society on Media
Civil society organizations have, generally speaking, divided opinions 
on media in Serbia and their opinions mostly depend on how open media 
outlets are for the activities of CSOs, or in other words how big this coverage 
is and whether it is neutral, favorable or critical.  
CSOs engaged in non-political areas are not as critical towards media 
as those dealing with political issues. The reason for this is logical: the 
former ones have more open access to media, as they do not endanger the 
Government’s line, and the media coverage of their activities tends to be more 
favorable. The media access of the latter ones is, however, more restricted 
and mostly limited to media outlets that are more independent from the 
Government. As already indicated in the previous section of this paper, 
Serbia: A complex set of cooperation  and confrontation lines
124
politically oriented CSOs remain either completely absent from government-
dependent media outlets, or often become a target of attack. 
A similar division exists between the attitudes of CSOs on local media on 
one side, and on national ones, on the other. This almost completely reflects 
the level of coverage of CSO activities in the first or in the second group. CSOs 
think much better of local media outlets as they are open to civil society, 
while the national media are more closed, which in turn makes them look 
worse, if not hostile to CSO members.   
These are in a nutshell conclusions of interviews with several civil society 
leaders, done during the preparation of this paper. They are also confirmed 
by some – although rare – public opinion polls on the matter. Their results 
will be presented following another argument that confirms the conclusions. 
It’s about the general public’s understanding of the CSO-media relations. 
Most of the respondents (49% in 2006, 45% in 2009 and 48% in 2014) 
think that media do not cover CSO activities “much”, as can be seen from the chart below.22 Between one quarter of interviewed people in 2006 and 
one third of them in 2014 are of the opinion that media do not cover CSO 
activities “as much as they should”. In contrast to the large majority that the 
previous two opinions combined make (more than 80%) is the opinion that 
CSO activities are covered “too much”. The general public is, in other words, 
very unsatisfied with a low presence of CSO activities in the media.
 
Curiously enough, CSOs seem to have a less critical approach towards media than the general 
public. But that is the conclusion of a survey done in 2011, before the Serbian Progressive Party 
took power.219 As there have been no reliable data in the meantime, two explanations are in order 
here. First, things have gone much worse in the meantime, i.e. ever since the incumbent power 
holders took office. Of equal importance is the fact that more optimistic attitudes of the public 
were expressed in an unusual time – during catastrophic floods in Serbia, when the public was 
able to see at least some news on CSO engagement in this situation, along with the expected 
exaggeration of Government’s efforts. 
So, before a tighter grip on media took place, CSOs showed some dissatisfaction with the media, 
but most of the interviewed ones were satisfied with the cooperation with the media (as much 
219 Građanske inicijative, Procena stanja u sektoru organizacija civilnog društva (OCD) u Srbiji, septembar, 2011.  
                                                            
22 Propozitiv, Public perception and attitudes towards NGO sector in Serbia, Belgrade, 2014. 
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Curiously enough, CSOs seem to have a less critical approach towards 
media than the general public. But that is the conclusion of a survey done 
in 2011, before the Serbian Progressive Party took power.23 As there have 
been no reliable data in the meantime, two explanations are in order here. 
First, things have gone much worse in the meantime, i.e. ever since the 
incumbent power holders took office. Of equal importance is the fact that 
more optimistic attitudes of the public were expressed in an unusual time – 
during catastrophic floods in Serbia, when the public was able to see at least 
some news on CSO engagement in this situation, along with the expected 
exaggeration of Government’s efforts. 
So, before a tighter grip on media took place, CSOs showed some 
dissatisfaction with the media, but most of the interviewed ones were 
satisfied with the cooperation with the media (as much 71%), while only 
8% were not satisfied with this cooperation. As expected, the differentiation 
between the non-political and political CSOs is important: environmentalists 
were most satisfied and those from the areas of education and research are 
most dissatisfied. 
Two thirds of CSOs cooperated with the local media; every tenth did so 
with the national ones, while only a quarter of them (23%) cooperated with 
both. CSOs that offer social services were, from a comparative perspective, 
most satisfied with their cooperation with local media. 
The existence of better relations with local media – and consequently a 
better CSO opinion of them in comparison with the national ones – is visible 
from the fact that local media is the place where most CSOs promote their 
work – in almost two thirds of cases. The second most important channel for 
promotion is – an informal way of spreading information, 38% of promotion 
is done through CSO websites, 29% through social media, while only 21% 
through national media outlets.  
Very important for the topic of this section is the conclusion of the 2011 
survey, according to which less than half (48%) of CSOs think that media 
understand the significance and the role of the civic sector. At the same time, 
the interviewed CSO representatives admit that they need to be educated 
more about modern media, too.  
23 Građanske inicijative, Procena stanja u sektoru organizacija civilnog društva (OCD) u Srbiji, 
septembar, 2011. 
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Civil society representatives in 
the media regulating agencies 
In most democratic countries today laws require that civil society 
representatives have to participate in the councils of independent bodies 
that regulate the work of electronic media. Serbia is no exception to this 
trend so the (Serbian) Regulatory body for electronic media (REM) is obliged to have two civil society representatives. They have to be appointed by the Serbian CSOs.  In this way the civil society would be ideally put in a position to have 
its share of oversight over the work of media public services. This would 
include taking part in decision-making on very important and sensitive 
areas, including the registration of electronic media, and the estimation of whether public interest is being served or not in their work. 
All members of the REM Council are elected by the Serbian Assembly, 
but different stakeholders that are represented in the Council – civil 
society included - are the ones who are entitled to suggest candidates for 
these positions. As in similar situations in other countries, the mentioned 
appointments are usually closely followed in the Serbian public, too. The 
election of new Council members at the end of 2015 caused a lot of friction 
between the Government on one side and CSOs, independent media and some 
opposition parties on the other. The Government did its best to prevent the 
official appointment of civil society candidates by the Assembly’s Committee 
on Culture and Media. Representatives of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party 
in the Committee tried to twist the rules in order to prevent the proposal of 
official candidates to reach the Assembly. The same was done in the case 
of the candidate proposed by the Assembly of Vojvodina. The result of this 
blockade – which directly violated the Law on electronic media, as well as 
the Assembly’s Rules of Conduct – was a months-long delay in completion 
of the REM Council, with three out of nine members lacking without proper explanation. 
This was harshly criticized by the media and civil society organizations 
from Serbia and abroad, but it didn’t change much. Fifty five Serbian CSOs 
and media organizations sent an open letter to the Serbian Government on 
25 March 2016, accusing it for gross violations of the rule of law in the media 
sphere, not only in this but also in many other cases that included unlawful 
subsidies to the media outlets that support the Government, particularly 
through the local-based financing of media within the so-called project-based applications.24 CSOs warned the Government that such behavior would 
24 http://www.gradjanske.org/otvoreno-pismo-vladi-srbije-organizacija-civilnog-drustva-
vlast-da-prestane-sa-ugrozavanjem-vladavine-prava-u-sferi-javnog-informisanja/  
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certainly not contribute to the expected opening of the negotiating Chapter 
No. 23 with the EU that deals specifically with the rule of law. 
The Government was not ready to offer any concessions. However, at 
the end of July 2016, the call for applications for one REM Council candidate 
from Vojvodina was released, only because the Government in Vojvodina was 
changed in the meantime, following elections in April 2016. In contrast to 
the previous state of affairs, when the opposition Democratic Party had the 
Parliamentary majority and the Government in this Serbian autonomous 
province, new elections brought the Serbian Progressive Party into power 
there, too. 
The described affair shows clearly at least two things. Firstly, it shows 
that control of the media is of truly exceptional importance for the incumbent 
Serbian power holders. They don’t seem to be ready to back down here and 
endanger the monopoly over information they’ve had ever since they took 
power in Serbia, at least in the mainstream media. Secondly, this was also a 
perfect example of the high level of politicization of the Serbian media space 
in which genuine information warfare is being waged, and where not a single 
element is irrelevant, and not a single battle can be lost. 
Serbian media space has been for sure politicized even before the 
described REM Council affair, including the times in which Vucic’s opponents 
from today’s opposition were in power. It went without saying even then 
that the election of the REM Council was extremely important and the 
leading political parties took great care of getting the appropriate number 
of the representatives of each important political force, in harmony with 
the results of elections. In Serbia, this has always led to a situation in which 
public interest was deliberately – and almost by definition - replaced with 
the interests of parties that won elections. Within such a context, it was only 
natural to have some politicians and media owners united around the same 
cause, lucrative in the political or economic sense.
Vucic’s rule took this trend to the extreme, eliminating all other possible 
coalitions between political and media actors, except the one and only that 
he is in charge of. This new turn is additionally significant because of the 
effective disappearance of the opposition under his rule. Left without an 
opposition, Serbian society cannot expect the rules of check and balances to 
work and thus the only force capable to counter the rising absolutist rule in 
the country are the media and the civil society. That’s why both independent 
media and civil society have got an even greater political weight, and this is why the two actors are so closely connected. 
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Media, civil society, and public participation
In this concluding section of the paper, we’ll take a brief look at 
organizations that focus on freedom of expression, media freedoms and 
different aspects of the rule of law. As they connect media and civil society in 
many ways, their position and significance in any given society are important 
indicators of the challenges that both media and civil society are faced with 
individually. The findings will lead us then to a more general discussion about 
the possibilities for citizens’ participation, particularly from the perspective 
of the media and civil society activism. 
With the help of the media it controls, the incumbent Serbian regime 
has been very ambitious in its efforts to discredit all influential CSOs that 
deal at the same time with media freedoms and the rule of law. Four of them 
have in the last year become targets of particularly fierce attacks: the Balkan 
Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN), the Network for Investigating Crime 
and Corruption (KRIK), Serbia’s Centre for Investigative Journalism (CINS) 
and - less an organization and more a social movement - “Ne davimo Beograd” 
(Let’s not drown Belgrade)25. The first three came under a coordinated 
attack in late 2015 and were labelled as a dangerous “fifth column” that 
was supposedly constantly working with the aim of overthrowing Prime 
Minister Vucic and his Government. The key “proof” of many alleged actions 
they were engaged in was foreign funding for the projects they worked on. 
The CSOs in question were in fact only discovering unpleasant details of a 
number of unlawful activities of the Government or its key people. These 
included the uncovering of secret elements of government contracts, like the 
one on de-watering the coal mine following big floods in Serbia in the spring 
of 2014, or publicly unveiling data on personal properties of the Serbian 
Prime Minister’s family. The Government showed clearly that it was equally 
painfully hurt by stories covering plagiarism done by some of the key people 
in Vucic’s entourage. The unveiling of the secret purchase of apartments in 
Bulgaria by one of them, the mayor of Belgrade, triggered fierce reactions by 
power holders and their media, too. 
The social movement “Let’s not drown Belgrade” became the target of a 
similar smear campaign because it revealed unlawful actions of the Serbian 
Government and the Belgrade City Council connected with the construction 
of the business and residential complex Belgrade Waterfront. The pressure 
on the movement went up in parallel with the popularity it was getting 
after April 2016. During the spring and summer, the movement organized a 
number of protests, with ever more participants, because of the lack of police 
25 See http://birn.eu.com/en/page/birn-under-fire 
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intervention against an illegal action of destruction of homes and businesses 
in the vicinity of the Belgrade Waterfront.26    
One should note that campaigns against independent CSOs and media 
do not end with one or more official statements of a Government ministry 
or of a Prime Minister’s Party. On the contrary, campaigns usually last for 
days, and are often initiated by the tabloid Informer. Its set of accusations 
and the wording is then repeated countless times in the privately owned 
TV “empire” Pink and in various other printed and electronic media outlets 
across the country. Informer’s editor-in-chief always acted as a special guest 
on TV Pink’s programs in those days in order to emphasize and make people 
remember the accusations made of blatant lies or equally dangerous and 
well-packaged half-truths. He often returns the favor by quoting in length TV 
Pink’s contributions of a similar kind. This cooperation works fine, because 
it looks as if one actor in this game, pretending to pursue independent 
investigative journalism, gets to uncover a plot against Vucic. The other actor 
then reports on the alleged big revelation its partner made, and everything 
seems to be in harmony with the ways in which media are supposed to work 
within a democratic society. But in fact, nothing is what it seems: media 
controlled by the Government are its propaganda service and the whole 
media space instead of being open and run by professional standards is 
highly politicized and confrontational. Public space is thus naturally turned 
into a kind of a war front between the power holders and their media on one 
side and independent media, CSOs and a feeble political opposition on the other. 
Within such a context, citizens’ possibilities for political participation are 
radically diminished, as they are expected to join one or the other side in the 
battle. Leaning towards the Government side is of course more comfortable 
and without risks and requires almost no active engagement at all, except 
on elections. Choosing the other side, however, requires activism that 
comes together with some potential risk. This is why most Serbian citizens, 
impoverished and disappointed by the post-communist transition, choose 
the first option, which is reflected in the high popularity of the incumbent 
Government and its leader. 
Regardless of the way in which social activism is being measured it is at 
present very low in Serbia, but with some signs indicating its modest growth. 
According to the Government’s Office for cooperation with civil society, the 
participation of citizens in debates on draft laws is extremely low. In 2014 
public debates were organized for only 10% of draft laws, and CSOs were 
26 See http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/25-000-attend-savamala-demolitions-
protest-in-belgrade-06-25-2016 
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included in only 20% of working and expert groups that were in charge 
of drafting the laws.27 Examples of much higher CSO engagement do exist 
but are rare. In addition to the already mentioned case of their oversight 
of the negotiations with the EU, one should also mention that a coalition of 
115 CSOs successfully lobbied for the change of tax laws at the end of 2015: 
contrary to the previous regulations, corporate donors have now the same 
type of tax exempts for both the state bodies and for CSOs. 
A survey done by CRTA in 2015 noticed that citizens are a little more 
ready to engage in the solution of local problems. The support for this went 
up from 7% of citizens in 2014 to 12% a year later. Twenty-two percent of 
citizens also believe – in equally modest but still an encouraging way – that 
by participating in the work of CSOs they can contribute to social changes. 
It’s interesting to note that this more direct and visible type of activism 
through CSOs is preferable from the citizens’ standpoint than other types of 
activism. Internet activism is chosen as the best way by 18% of respondents, 
engagement through independent regulatory bodies by 16%, or through 
members of parliament by 19%. The most encouraging finding is that 
citizens have now more trust in protest and demonstrations (22%) as the 
way for their engagement than before. 
It remains to be seen whether this growth in the desire for social activism 
will continue, particularly because the incumbent Serbian regime seems to 
have passed the peak of its popularity. A higher level of citizens’ engagement 
does not, however, translate immediately into higher levels of democracy 
that has been in retreat lately not only in Serbia and in the Balkans, but 
throughout the whole world, as well. 
Conclusions
Our overview of the media and the civil society landscapes showed that both 
scenes are at first sight quite big, but also internally divided, in flux and often 
chaotic, and without respectable capacities that could guarantee their long-
time sustainability. Both sectors are also highly politicized, as is the whole 
public sphere in today’s Serbia, which reduces possibilities for their work. 
The images that civil society and media have of each other are diversified 
and depend on the side they choose in politically polarized and confrontational 
Serbia, torn between the power-hungry Government and powerless citizens. 
The paper showed that there are many ways and areas in which cooperation 
between civil society and media could be implemented and improved. Civil 
27 Nacionalna strategija za stvaranje podsticajnog okruženja za razvoj civilnog društva u 
Republici Srbiji za period 2015-2019. godine, nacrt, Beograd, 2015. 
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society and media should be also capable of motivating much higher political 
participation and more generally higher social activism.  
Serbia’s biggest specific is that in the absence of the political opposition 
at this moment independent media and civil society have remained the only 
social actors that can hold the Government accountable, and try to keep its work within constitutional and legal boundaries. It’s a huge task that these 
actors cannot and should not perform alone, without the political parties. 
They should, however, reject to become fully politicized, and try to remain 
the society’s conscious and key controlling factor that cares for the public interest.     
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